UNDERWOOD'S
Interference Practice

BY
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Published by
PATENT LAW PUBLISHING COMPANY
408 Buhl Block
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PREFACE.

In the preparation of this work I have sought to confine the text to matters which pertain particularly to Interferences and to cover all the important points which have been the subject of controversy in the past twenty years and which have not been rendered entirely obsolete by changes in the Rules of Practice in that period. Many old cases are considered, but they are such as are believed might have a bearing upon the construction of present rules. I have considered that brevity in the statements of points of law would be more useful than extended argument. It is assumed that those who use the book are familiar with the subject in general and all they need in the conduct of a case is a reminder of the points which may be made and a citation of authorities relating there-to. Without such reminder one may overlook important points of evidence which might be presented. A busy lawyer can not stop to read a volume on evidence before, or at the time of taking testimony, hence evidence is herein treated in a limited sense, relating to those matters which are most likely to arise in taking testimony in an Interference.

I send this book forth, hoping that it may aid in a more accurate presentation of causes and in developing a more uniform practice.

Your obedient servant,

HOMER C. UNDERWOOD.

Detroit, Michigan.
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INTERFERENCES.

1. Origin of Interferences. An interference is a statutory proceeding, arising solely under the authority of Sec. 4904, and means a dispute on the question of priority of invention. It is a contest between rival applicants for a patent, or a contest between one or more applicants for a patent, and the owner of one or more outstanding letters patent. *Western Electric Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Electric Co.*, 14 Fed. 691.

2. Interference Statute. Sec. 4904, R. S. U. S. "Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, he shall give notice thereof to the applicants or applicant and patentee, as the case may be, and shall direct the Primary Examiner to proceed to determine the question of priority of invention. And the Commissioner may issue a patent to the party who is adjudged the prior inventor, unless the adverse party appeals from the decision of the Primary Examiner, or the Board of Examiners-in-Chief, as the case may be, within such time, not less than twenty days, as the Commissioner shall prescribe."

3. The Declaration of Interference. A brief but general summary of the Patent Office proceedings in Interference cases will be found in *Westinghouse v. Hein*, 159 Fed. 936-939, in which Judge Sanborn said: "When an application for a patent is filed, an officer known as a Primary Examiner decides whether the application on its face shows patentable invention, Rules 95, 96. No appeal lies from his decision. Rule 124. Patentability being affirmed, it may occur that the application dis-
closes the same invention as another application on file or as a patent already issued. If so, interference exists, and the patent officers are then required, according to the practice and rules of the office, to set on foot an interference proceeding, in order to determine which of the hostile claimants first discovered the invention. This proceeding is carried on before the Examiner of Interferences, and is a proceeding inter partes and results either in a decision awarding priority to one, and denying it to the other, or for some particular reason denying priority to either.

"This question of priority of invention, meaning priority in time, has become the important and almost sole question for consideration in an interference proceeding. Other questions may arise in the Patent Office, such as whether one or both parties has the right to make the claim, whether he has really disclosed in his drawings the invention claimed, whether he is the real inventor, whether he is guilty of laches or estopped to claim priority, whether his devise is operative, whether both claim the same invention so as to actually show interference. By the course of practice in the Patent Office, however, an interference proceeding is confined to the question of priority in time, other questions being raised by motion before the Primary Examiner. The Examiner of Interferences may also call the attention of the Commissioner to facts showing that no interference exists, or that the declaration of interference was irregular, and the Commissioner may then suspend the interference proceedings and remand the case to the Primary Examiner for consideration of the question so raised. Rule 126. It may also appear in the interference proceedings that while both applications disclose patentability and interference, and one is clearly prior in time, yet that neither party is entitled to a judgment of priority against the other, because it would operate inequitably against the other. This happened in Bechman v. Wood,
15 App. D. C. 484, where Wood first discovered a broad invention, but made only a narrow claim, and the junior applicant, Beechman, claimed a specific device in the same field, and also claimed the broad invention. Wood was adjudged to be not entitled to the broad claim because this would defeat Beechman's special apparatus, and Beechman was not entitled to it because he was not the first inventor, but in the ordinary case an award of priority follows as a matter of course.

While the question whether the interference was properly declared, or any interference in facts exists, cannot be directly raised in the interference proceeding, it may by a motion to dissolve the interference. It is the practice to present to the Examiner of Interferences a motion to transmit the motion to dissolve to the Primary Examiner, together with the motion to dissolve. If the latter motion is in proper form he transmits it to the Primary Examiner, and he may at the same time proceed with the interference, Rule 123. When the Primary Examiner has decided the motion, an appeal may be taken to the Commissioner but no further appeal is permitted, the motion being regarded as an interlocutory proceeding. U. S. ex rel. Lowry v. Allen, 203 U. S. 476, 27 Sup. Ct. 141, 51 L. Ed. 281. If the motion to dissolve is denied, the Examiner of Interferences, in the usual case, renders judgment awarding priority of invention to one of the contestants and also fixes the limit of appeal from such judgment. If no appeal is taken letters patent are issued to the successful party, and the Primary Examiner notifies the other party that his claims stand finally rejected. Sec. 4904, Rev. St. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3389. Rule 132. If the defeated party desires to appeal he may do so within the time limited. The appeal first goes to the Examiners-in-Chief (Sec. 4909, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3390), then to the Commissioner in person (Sec. 4910, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3391), and from his decision to the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia (Act Feb. 9, 1893, c. 74, 27 Stat. 476, Sec. 9, U. S. Comp. Statutes, 1901, p. 3391)."

(Note:—Since the above decision the rules of practice have been amended as to jurisdiction of officers who pass upon motions to dissolve.)

4. Declaration of Interference Is Within the Discretion of the Commissioner. Sec. 4904 commits to the judgment of the Commissioner the effect of an application upon a pending one as to whether it interferes with such pending application; something more, therefore than the effect of two applications, something more than the mere assertion of a claim. The assertion must be, in the opinion of the Commissioner, an interference with another, and it is this other that is first in regard, not to be questioned except at the instance of the Commissioner by an exercise of judgment upon the circumstances. Ewing, Commissioner v. U. S. ex rel. Fowler Car Co., 238 O. G. 983, 244 U. S. 1.

5. Earlier Application Excluded in Case of Doubt. When there is doubt as to whether the earlier application discloses the invention in a later continuous application involved in interference, the earlier application will be excluded. Munro v. Alexander, 106 O. G. 1000.

Mechanical Equivalent. An interference should be declared between a patent and an application where a claim of the application is the same as the claim of the patent with the exception of one element which is a mechanical equivalent of a like element of the patented claim. Read v. Scott, 14 Gour. 24.

6. What Should Be Made Counts—Only Claims Patentably Different. Where the claims are not patentably distinct, an issue consisting of a single count will be sufficient to determine the question of priority, and the parties should be notified that if priority of invention is awarded against them their claims which do not contain patentable subject matter over the issue, will be rejected. Voley v. Wuest v. Doman, 111 O. G. 1627.
7. No Interference When. A party is not entitled to an interference if his claim when broadly construed is unpatentable, since a claim must be patentable before it can be put into interference. In ex parte Riddle, 145 O. G. 1021, Riddle asked to be put into interference with certain claims of patentees Dement and Hull and insisted that the claims were patentable because patent had been granted thereon, but it was held that when read upon the Riddle structure it could not be allowed because he would have no right to make the claim and in this respect the case was distinguished from that of In re Or- cuitt, 141 O. G. 567.

No interference will be declared when it is apparent from the outset that no patent can issue on an application, since a party is not entitled to an interference except as to an allowable application. Crane, 106 O. G. 999. In an early (1898) and important decision it was held that an interference should not be declared where one of the applications contained no allowed claims. Hammond v. Hart, 83 O. G. 743.

No Interference on Rejected Claims. No interference will be declared on claims which have been rejected. Holland, 99 O. G. 2548; 1902 C. D. 199; Duker, 115 O. G. 803; In re Neill, 82 O. G. 749, 11 App. D. C. 582.

8. Prior Application—Reference to in Declaration. If the application is clearly a division of, or a continuation of an earlier application, the Primary Examiner should so state. If there is doubt upon this question, no reference should be made to an earlier application, the matter being left for determination upon motion to shift the burden of proof. (See Burden of Proof.) Jackson v. Patten, 150 O. G. 265; Roulet & Nicholson v. Adams, 114 O. G. 1827.

9. Preliminaries to Declaration of Interference. Before a declaration of interference all preliminaries must be settled by the Primary Examiner, and the issue must be clearly defined; the invention which is to form the
subject of the controversy must be decided to be patentable, and the claims of the respective parties must be put in such condition that they will not require alteration after the interference shall have been finally decided, unless the testimony adduced upon the trial shall necessitate or justify such change. Rule 95.

10. One of the Applications Should Be Ready for Allowance. Before an interference between two pending applications is declared, one of the pending applications should be placed in condition for allowance. *Spoon*, 97 O. G. 176, 1901, C. D. 188.

11. Claims Not Forming a Part of the Controversy Need Not Be Considered. When one of the interfering applications is in condition for allowance, if there be any claims in the other application which are not to form part of the controversy, or never could form part of a controversy, it is not necessary that they should be considered before declaring the interference. *Spoon*, 97 O. G. 176, 1901 C. D. 188.

12. Effect of Putting a Claim in Interference. Putting a claim in interference is an allowance of the claim. *Lager v. Browning*, 100 O. G. 231, 1902 C. D. 230; *Reece v. Fenwick*, 14 Gour. 37. In the foregoing cases there had been no allowance of the claims of one of the parties prior to the declaration of interference. If any question is raised on such state of the record it should be by motion to dissolve upon the ground of irregularity in declaring the interference. In an earlier case (1898) of *Hammond v. Hart*, 83 O. G. 743, it was held that where one of the applications contained no allowed claims the interference should not have been declared.

13. Claim Suggested by the Examiner. Rule 96. The Examiner has the right and it is his duty under Rule 96 to suggest claims. The purpose of the practice of suggesting claims is not for the purpose of avoiding interferences between applications because of some differences in the form of claims, but merely by suggestion to
Being the parties together upon an issue which shall be as nearly as possible the same as the claim of the parties so as to reduce to the minimum the chances for motions and controversies during the progress of the interference based upon differences between the claims. Thompson, 98 O. G. 227, 1902 C. D. 6; Myers v. Brown, 112 O. G. 2093.

Rule 96 provides the conditions under which the Examiner may suggest claims to applicants and when claims are suggested thereunder the applicant should make the claims in the precise words suggested if they are applicable to his structure, but at all events should vary therefrom as slightly as possible. Braucht v. Murdock, 13 Gour. 66. If the applicant fails to make the claims suggested within the time specified, such failure or refusal shall be taken, without further action, as a disclaimer of the invention covered by the claim. (Rule 96). Where one party claims only a part of a combination claimed by another, such combination claim should not be suggested. Mercer, 193 O. G. 1017 (1913); Handenschild v. Huyck, 164 O. G. 515 (1911). The Examiner may suggest the claims of a patent and unless such claims are made by the applicant, his claims may be rejected and the correctness of the ruling may then be questioned on appeal. Card v. Card, 112 O. G. 499 (1904). Avoiding the languages of patented claims to avoid an interference will not be permitted where the inventions are the same. Card v. Card, supra. The Examiner should not suggest claims to other applicants who disclose the process but claim only the apparatus for carrying out the process. Werener, 139 O. G. 197 (1909). A party may not argue the patentability of suggested claims before the interference is declared. Sutton v. Steele, 107 O. G. 541. A party to whom claims are suggested can either make them, refuse to make them, or make them under protest, after which he may make a motion to dissolve, but if he refuses to make them the Commissioner will not review the ques-
tion under his supervisory authority. *Samboni*, 20 Gour. 22-14; *Eichelberger & Hibner v. Dillon*, 129 O. G. 3161. Where an applicant is entitled to an interference with a party who is already involved in a different interference on different subject matter, his application should not be held until final termination of the first interference, but the Examiner should request jurisdiction of the application involved in the first interference for the purpose of declaring a new interference. *Brokey*, 156 O. G. 797 (1910); *Moore v. Hewitt v. Potter*, 115 O. G. 509 (1905). Since under Rule 96 the Examiner may fix the time within which a party shall make suggested claims, if the applicant is unable to make them within the time specified, he may, upon proper showing, have the time extended. *Hellmund*, 141 O. G. 565 (1909).

PARTIES TO INTERFERENCES.


Who Are Proper Parties. Only those who can make claim to all the counts should be made parties, and if there is another party who can make some of the counts, but not all of them, a new interference should be declared between his application or patent and the other applications containing like claims. *Dow v. Benson*, 107 O. G. 1378 (1903). An assignee may prosecute an interference where the assignor refuses to prosecute the same. Such right of an assignee may be determined upon motion. *Adams*, 119 O. G. 650 (1905); *Lottridge v. Eustice*, 121 O. G. 689 (1906). An exclusive licensee will not be permitted to intervene so long as the licensor is in good faith prosecuting the same. The National Railways
Materials Co., 129 O. G. 481 (1907). Judgment may be rendered against such parties as fail to overcome, in their preliminary statements, the prima facie case made by the party first filing. Swann v. Sandage, etc., 17 Gour. 34:1 (Apr., 1905).

15. **New Parties** may be added to an interference, but that does not extend the time of the original parties for making a motion to dissolve to 30 days from the date such new party is added. Townsend v. Ehret etc., 137 O. G. 1484 (1908). It is too late to add new parties after decision on priority has been rendered by the Examiners in Chief and the Commissioner, Corey & Baker v. Trout, 99 O. G. 2547; 1902 C. D. 195. One who does not claim all the counts cannot be added as a new party, but where it appears that an applicant can make part of the counts the Examiner should request jurisdiction for the purpose of declaring a new interference with the parties who make the same counts. Dow v. Benson, 107 O. G. 1378 (1903). Where it is found on motion to dissolve that one of the parties has no right to make the claims, the interference should be dissolved as to him and continued as to the other parties. Maxwell v. Byron v. Henry, 98 O. G. 1968; 1902 C. D. 67.


17. **Notice to Parties.** Rule 153 provides that in contested cases, reasonable notice of all motions and copies of motion papers and affidavits must be served, as provided in Rule 154. Proof of service must be made before a motion will be entertained by the office.
Motions will not be heard in the absence of either party, except upon default after due notice.

What amounts to reasonable or due notice has been defined by the decision which will be hereinafter set forth.

Rule 154 provides for the giving of due notice to the opposing party of the taking of testimony, as to the time when and the place where testimony will be taken, of the cause or matter in which they will be used, the names and residences of the witnesses to be examined; that the notice shall be such as to give the opposing party or his attorney full opportunity to be present and cross-examine the witnesses. If witnesses are examined who are not named in the notice and the opposing party fails to object to the examination of such witnesses, or cross-examine them, he waives his right to object to such examination for want of notice. The notice shall be such as to give the party reasonable opportunity to travel to the place where the testimony is to be taken, or to the place where the motion is to be heard.

18. Notice of Taking Testimony, which contains the names and addresses of certain witnesses and contains the added statement "and perhaps others," is not good except as to the witnesses named. *Poller v. Oehs*, 95 O. G. 1049, 1901 C. D. 39; *Tripp v. Wolf v. Jones*, 108 O. G. 563. Notice by telegram on Saturday to take testimony on Tuesday, which did not give the names and addresses of witnesses, but followed on Monday with a formal notice of the taking of testimony of R, "and perhaps others," was not sufficient, and testimony was stricken out. *Ries v. Frick*, 160 O. G. 1040 (1910). Notice may be waived by conduct of attorney who might otherwise successfully urge objections to the notice. *Munster v. Ashworth*, 128 O. G. 2085 (1906). Objection to the insufficiency of notice should be urged at the earliest opportunity, or it will be deemed to have been waived.
Nulley v. Cutler, 126 O. G. 389 (1906). In computing time a notice served on Saturday will be deemed to have been served on Monday at the same hour; for counsel cannot be compelled to travel on Sunday, even if no objection to Sunday travel is raised. Goodfellow v. Jolly, 111 O. G. 1940. Time to communicate with client should be given counsel, in determining whether reasonable time is given. Goodfellow v. Jolly, 111 O. G. 1940. Notice served in Chicago to take testimony in Erie, Pa., less than two days thereafter, is not reasonable notice. Tripp v. Wolf v. Jones, 108 O. G. 563.

19. Service of Notice. The notice of taking testimony or any motion, must be served upon the attorney of record, if there be one, or, if there be no attorney of record, upon the adverse party. A stipulation in writing, signed by the attorneys and filed in the cause, dispenses with the necessity of notice.

20. How Served. There are five ways of serving notices: 1, by delivering a copy of the notice to the adverse party or his attorney; 2, by leaving a copy at his usual place of business and with some one in his employment; 3, when he has no usual place of business, then by leaving a copy at his residence; 4, by registered mail, and 5, by express.

21. Notice of Motions, Petitions, Etc. Notice to an attorney of a party is notice to him whether he has actual notice or not. White v. Hewitt & Nolen, 115 O. G. 1847 (1905). A motion will not be entertained when no notice was served on opposing party. Hansen, 117 O. G. 2632 (1905). Like notice must also be given where a motion is renewed. Dyson v. Land, etc., 133 O. G. 1679 (1908). Notice of petition must be given. Robin v. Muller & Bonnett, 107 O. G. 2527 (1903). Where a party is represented by more than one attorney of record, a notice signed by one of them is sufficient. Heyne, Hayward & McCarthy v. DeVilbiss, 125 O. G. 669 (1906). It is within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences to dis-
pense with notice of a motion to extend time for filing preliminary statement. K e d e r v. B a i l e y v. D a v i s, 1 4 G o u r. 8 2 - 1 ( D e c , 1 9 0 2 ) ; Q u i c k v. M c G e e, 1 0 7 O. G. 1 3 7 6 . Copies of affidavits must be served five days before the hearing unless they are reply affidavits, in which case they should be served before the hearing. B r o w n v. S t r o u d, 1 2 2 O. G. 2 6 8 8 . In all cases where service is required by the rules, proof of service must be made under Rule 1 5 4. A l l e n, C o m m i s s i o n e r, 1 2 7 O. G. 2 3 9 8 (1 9 0 7 ) ; L i p e v. M i l l e r, 1 0 5 O. G. 1 5 3 2 ( 1 9 0 3 ) .

22. Sufficiency of Notice. A notice delivered by private messenger on Saturday afternoon to the office of counsel, notwithstanding Saturday afternoon is a legal holiday in Washington, is good, where counsel is given ample time to prepare for the hearing, and it appearing also that counsel actually received the notice on Monday afternoon. G o o d f e l l o w v. J o l l y, 1 1 5 O. G. 1 0 6 4 . Where the attorneys for both parties resided in the same city and notice to take testimony was served at 1 0 a.m. to take testimony at 2 p.m. of the same day, it appearing that the attorneys for both parties appeared, it was held that the testimony should not be stricken out, notwithstanding the objection in the record of insufficient notice and a refusal to cross-examine. R o b e r t s v. W e b s t e r, 1 1 5 O. G. 2 1 3 5 (1 9 0 5 ) . A notice given in New York City on June 22, that testimony would be taken in Troy, N. Y., on June 24, was held insufficient. R a n d e r s o n v. H a n n a & H a n n a, 1 7 3 O. G. 5 8 6 (1 9 1 1 ) . An affidavit opposing a motion to dissolve, served four days before the hearing was held insufficient notice. T h i e m e v. B o w e n, 2 1 G o u r. 7 0 - 1 3 ( A u g., 1 9 0 9 ) .

ISSUES.

23. The Issues. The issues in an interference are the counts—the claim or claims.

The Issue Must Remain Fixed. It is necessary to orderly procedure that the issues remain fixed throughout the
interference proceeding. To permit a party to change the issue by adding new matter, would lead to the greatest confusion. Brill & Adams v. Uebelhoer, 99 O. G. 2966, 1902 C. D. 220.

24. Construction of Issue—Terms in Claims Should Be Given Their Ordinary Meaning. The reasonable presumption is that an inventor intends to protect his invention broadly, and the scope of the claims should not be restricted beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of the words, except for the purpose of saving them from invalidity. Andrews v. Nilson, 123 O. G. 1667; Eschinger v. Drummond, etc., 121 O. G. 1348.

25. Claims Broadly Construed. (See Exception, Sec. 35.)

While the applications are pending in the Patent Office, the claims will be construed as broadly as the ordinary meaning thereof will permit. Junge v. Harrington, 131 O. G. 691; Miel v. Young, 128 O. G. 2532, 29 App. D. C. 481; Barber v. Transue, 19 Gour. 34-6; Kirby v. Clements, 216 O. G. 1319, 44 App. D. C. 12.

Issue Construed as Broadly as Disclosures Warrant. A limited construction should not be forced upon a broad claim in order to free a party who had asserted such claim upon the supposition that he was the first in the field, from the exigencies of the situation into which he was forced by the subsequent appearance of another party who created the broad subject matter of invention of an earlier date. Viele v. Cummings, 19 Gour. 2-6; Monte v. Dunkley, 245 O. G. 278.

26. Estoppel to Urge Limitations Upon Issue. A party who first presents claims should not be later heard to urge limitations upon the terms thereof which might readily have been expressed therein, had it been intended that they should be so restricted. Junge v. Harrington, 131 O. G. 691; Paul v. Hess, 113 O. G. 847; Leonard v. Horton, 189 O. G. 781, 40 App. D. C. 22.


31. Different Inventions of Different Parties Defined by the Same Claims. When the same language is used by different parties to define different inventions, it is clear that the language of the claims must be ambiguous or indefinite, and should be amended to clearly distinguish the inventions before issue of patents thereon. Alfree v. Sarver, 122 O. G. 2391; Podelsak v. McInerney, 120 O. G. 2127, 26 App. D. C. 399.

32. Construction in New Art. A limited construction will not be put upon terms of a claim where it appears
that the art is comparatively new and the terms used have not acquired a fixed and definite meaning therein. *Lindmark v. Hodgkinson*, 137 O. G. 228, 31 App. D. C. 612.

33. **Necessity of Considering Prior Art.** Where the meaning of the claims of an interference are clear and they read upon both parties, it is not error to refuse to consider the effect of the prior art. *Creeveling v. Jepson*, 256 O. G. 226, 47 App. D. C. 597.

34. **Vague and Indefinite Counts.** If the claims are so vague and indefinite as to be susceptible of various meanings, the interference should be dissolved, or the claims amended (Sec. 31). *Briggs v. Lillie, etc.*, 116 O. G. 871 (1904).

35. **Exception to Broad Interpretation.** Where there is a clear difference in the structures making the claims wholly without point when applied to one, the claims should be given a reasonable interpretation, consistent with the specification in which they originated to the end that the real inventor may prevail. *Murphy v. Cooper*, 228 O. G. 1458, 45 App. D. C. 307. They cannot be construed so as to ignore limitations which give them life. *Gammeter v. Lister*, 253 O. G. 259.

Whether a Party Has the Right to Make the Claim—
Construction. A claim should be given the broadest meaning consistent with its terms; but it cannot be enlarged beyond the plain import thereof as set forth in the specification on which it is based. *Sinclair v. Engel*, 147 O. G. 769, 1909, 152 O. G. 489, 34 App. D. C. 212.

Different Parties Use Different Terms to Describe Same Structure. It is immaterial that the parties use different terms to describe the same structure. *Pratt v. De Ferrari*, etc., 148 O. G. 569.

**THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.**

36. **Filing of Preliminary Statement.** After the issues of an interference have been fixed, the next step required
of a party is to file a preliminary statement. The office fixes the time within which the parties shall file their statements. What a preliminary statement shall contain is set forth in detail in Rule 110. The statement should be prepared with great care for it is very difficult to obtain leave to amend. The rule itself contains a caution to the practitioner that the statement should be carefully prepared and that the parties will be strictly held in their proofs to the dates set up therein. If a party prove any date earlier than alleged in his preliminary statement, such proof will be held to establish the date alleged and none other. The statement must be sealed up before filing (to be opened only by the Examiner of Interferences as provided in Rule 111), and the name of the party filing it, the title of the case, and the subject matter of the invention indicated on the envelope. The envelope should contain nothing but this statement.

**Reasons for Requiring a Preliminary Statement.** The Preliminary statement is made in ignorance of the dates claimed by the opposing party, and this is required for the purpose of avoiding the temptation to fraud. If a party could make his statement after knowing the date of invention claimed by his opponent, there would be strong temptation to fraud and perjury. *Davis v. Occumpaugh v. Garrett*, 104 O. G. 2440 (1903); *Woodward v. Kennedy*, 104 O. G. 1393 (1903).

**37. What Statement Must Contain.** The allegations of the statement must conform to Rule 110, hence a statement that the inventor reduced the invention to practice by constructing the devise, without any allegation as to its successful use, is insufficient. Ordinarily an invention is not reduced to practice by merely constructing the devise. The fact, if it be a fact, that the invention is of such nature that no test of its practicability is required, will appear on final hearing, but a party may not be excused from alleging the use which he has made of his devise, merely because he believes he is not required

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39. **Motions for Extension of Time for Filing—How Made.** This motion should be made in accordance with Rule 104. The motion should state the reasons for asking the extension. It must be verified, a copy served on the other party or parties or their attorneys, together with a notice of the time of hearing of such motion and a proof of service of a copy of the motion and notice of hearing should be filed with the motion. The granting of the motion is within the discretion of the examiner. *Bailey v. Davis*, 102 O. G. 819 (1903); *Ohmer v. Nell & Tamplin*, 118 O. G. 1686 (1905), 123 O. G. 998 (1906), 27 App. D. C. 319. The motion should state a definite time of extension asked for, or it will be refused. *Kecek v. Birmingham*, 191 O. G. 2825.

40. **Time for Filing Statement.** Where a party is unable to prepare his preliminary statement within the time fixed, it is his duty to present the facts to the office and ask for an extension of time, before he is in default, or as soon as possible. *Fowler v. Boyce, etc.*, 107 O. G. 543 (1903).

**Filed After Expiration of Time.** A preliminary state-
ment filed nine days after time expired, was accepted, reasonable diligence in procuring the necessary data having been shown. Charlton v. Sheldon, 111 O. G. 2492.

41. Circumstances Warranting Extension. It is not possible to state any rule as to what circumstances will warrant an extension, for each case must rest upon its own facts. A party must at all times act in good faith; he must not be careless or negligent; he must exercise reasonable diligence in preparing his statement and he must not seek to take advantage of his opponent. Doble v. Eckart v. Henry, 110 O. G. 604. Where it appears from the showing made that a party, his assignee, or his counsel, or all of them, have been negligent or careless in the matter of preparing and filing his preliminary statement, an extension of time will be denied. Anderson v. Peck, 133 O. G. 229, 1908 C. D. 66; Hartley v. Mills, 110 O. G. 604.

42. New Counts Added—New Statement Should Be Filed. Where new counts are added, additional preliminary statements applying to the new counts should be filed. Halwood v. McCormick, 16 Gour. S4-9.

43. A Preliminary Statement May Be Taken as a Substitute for an Affidavit Under Rule 75. Forsyth v. Richards, 115 O. G. 1327.

44. Allegations as to Reduction to Practice. If merely making the device is alleged it must be stated whether such device was successfully used. Klocke v. Burk, 189 O. G. 779 (1913).

Allegations as to Time. “In the early spring of 1900” means not earlier at the utmost than March 1, 1900. Richards v. Meisner, 114 O. G. 1831.

45. Inspection of by Opposing Parties. The rules provide that where preliminary statements are filed and approved, the opposing parties will be permitted to see and obtain copies of their opponents applications and all of the papers in the case and to make motions for dissolu-

46. Amendment of Preliminary Statement. A preliminary statement may be amended under Rule 113, which provides: "In case of material error arising through inadvertence or mistake, the statement may be corrected on motion (see Rule 155), upon a satisfactory showing that the correction is essential to the ends of justice. The motion to correct the statement must be made, if possible, before the taking of any testimony, and as soon as practicable after the discovery of the error."

*Permission to Amend is Within the Discretion of the Commissioner* (or the Examiner of Interferences in the first instance). The rule requiring preliminary statements is a salutary one, its obvious object being to elicit from each of the parties certain vital information before any party is informed as to the statement of any other. Owing to the purpose of the rule, the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion in passing upon motions to amend such statements will not be disturbed unless it is plain that there has been an abuse of that discretion. *Thomas v. Weintraub*, 177 O. G. 772, 38 App. D. C. 281; *Brown v. Dyson & Land*, 188 O. G. 809, 39 App. D. C. 415; *Hammond v. Basch*, 115 O. G. 804, 24 App. D. C. 469; *Cross v. Phillips*, 14 App. D. C. 228, 237, 238; *Neth & Tamplin v. Ohmer*, 123 O. G. 998 (1906), 27 App. 319.


47. What the Motion Must Show. It is not sufficient to show merely that the original statement is incorrect, but it must also be shown that the error did not arise from lack of proper care and diligence in preparing the statement. *Becker v. Currier*, 104 O. G. 2439 (1903).
Not merely a statement that the error was due to inadvertence and mistake, but a showing of facts which will enable the office to judge that there was inadvertence or mistake and that amendment is essential to the ends of justice. *Brown v. Keeney*, 105 O. G. 260 (1903); *Brown v. Cutler v. Keelen*, 104 O. G. 1896. Where it is alleged that the mistake is due to not understanding the meaning of "reduction to practice," it was held that it was the party's duty to discover the meaning of the allegations which he made, or ascertain the meaning from his attorney. *Dunn v. Holliday*, 119 O. G. 1261 (1905). Where a party alleges that he stated the facts in his original statement as he believed them to be and subsequently discovered his error, it must also appear that he could not have discovered the facts sooner by careful and diligent search. *Hamilton v. Carroll, etc.*, 110 O. G. 2510. Where it is alleged that an assignee accepted the statement of an associate of the inventor, it must also be shown that he made diligent effort to ascertain the facts from others who would likely know the facts. *Hamilton v. Carroll, etc.*, 110 O. G. 2510. Where it is alleged that a party when preparing to take testimony learned of an earlier disclosure than that alleged in his statement, there must also be shown a good reason for not discovering the fact sooner. *Fowler v. Boyce, etc.*, 108 O. G. 561. Where a party seeks to amend by showing the making of a model, he must show a satisfactory reason for omitting it from the original statement, and also a good excuse for delay in bringing the motion. *Fullager v. Jungren*, 114 O. G. 1550. Where forgetfulness is alleged it must be shown what effort was made to refresh the affiant's recollection originally or what steps were taken to fix definitely the dates alleged. *Friestedt v. Harold*, 116 O. G. 594 (1905). It must not only appear that there was error in the original statement, but that such error could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care in the preparation of the statement. *Neth & Tamplin v.*

48. Insufficient Showing. A showing to support a motion to amend a preliminary statement must be such as to make it appear clearly that the error in the original statement could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care in preparing it. A showing is insufficient to warrant amendment setting back the date of conception and reduction to practice, where the moving party files his motion after learning of his opponent’s dates and he fails to set forth fully the reason he was unable to learn of and set forth the earlier dates in the first instance. Neth & Templin v. Ohmer, 116 O. G. 874 (1905). Since a party must show due diligence in presenting the motion, a showing that the delay was occasioned by negotiations for settlement is not a sufficient excuse for such delay. Bradley v. Midgeil, 150 O. G. 1042, 1910 C. D. 24. A showing is insufficient when it is not made to appear that due diligence was exercised to ascertain the true facts alleged to have been erroneously stated, or omitted. Hock v. Hopkins, 21 Gour. 67 (Aug., 1909). Showings are also insufficient in the following instances: Where one seeks to carry his dates back of his opponent’s dates, but no good reason is shown why the correct dates were not discovered and alleged originally. Freistadt v. Harold, 116 O. G. 594 (1905). Where the motion is upon the ground of newly discovered evidence from a proposed witness and it does not appear why the facts were not discovered before. McIlvarg v. Schmidt & Mayland, 105 O. G. 263 (1903). Where the ground was newly discovered evidence and it is alleged that a search for certain evidence in the past was not successful, but no satisfactory explanation is given why the search could not have been completed in time for the original statement instead of after learning his
opponent's dates. *Hoyt v. Sanders v. Hawthorne*, 119 O. G. 1260 (1905). Where it was alleged that a mistake was made by the inventor as to what was meant by "re-
duction to practice," but there was no explanation of
what the mistake was, or how it arose, and the dates he
desires to allege are not given. *Fowler v. Boyce, etc.*, 107
O. G. 544 (1903). Where it is not shown that the party
informed his attorneys of all the facts, and it is not
shown that he used the utmost diligence in trying to find
the alleged new evidence before making his preliminary
Where a party discovers the error in his original state-
ment and makes no effort for a long time to discover the
ture facts and does not use diligence in presenting his
1785, 1901 C. D. 35. Where a party in making his pre-
liminary statement was aware of the facts, but not of the
200, 97 O. G. 1598; *Franklin & Norton v. Cooley*, 1901
C. D. 49, 95 O. G. 2063; where the facts alleged show
that the error was one of law and not of fact. *Dalgren v.
Crocker*, 98 O. G. 2586, 1902 C. D. 107; *Miller v. Wal-
lace*, 131 O. G. 1689 (1903); *Bonsall v. Gilmore*, 16
Gour. 82-3; *Fowler v. Boyce, etc.*, 108 O. G. 561. Where
a party makes up his preliminary statement from mem-
ory and after looking up the records discovers that he
C. D. 378. Where a party states that the utmost dil-
gence was exercised in making the discovery of the new
facts, without stating what means were employed and
the reasons why the same means could not have been
earlier employed. *Seamen v. Brooks*, 100 O. G. 685, 1902
C. D. 267. Where there is no reason shown why the
question could not have been considered in the first
Where there is no showing that proper care was exer-
cised in preparing the original statement and no expla-

49. Amendments Have Been Permitted. Amendments have been permitted under the following circumstances:

Where the notice of declaration was not clear. *Hoeker v. Farr*, 193 O. G. 220 (1913). Where there was doubt as to a certain part of a machine involved, and no testimony had been taken. *Carroll v. Stahlberg*, 111 O. G. 1937. Where the affidavit of the inventor was corroborated by another and it was shown that due care and diligence was exercised in the preparation of the original statement, and that a bona fide mistake was made. *Butterworth v. Boral, etc.*, 13 Gour. 2-1 (Jan., 1901). Where a party acted with diligence in discovering the mistake and moved to amend before any testimony had been taken, and was diligent in preparing the original statement, and that the amendment would not injure the other party. *Silver v. Eustis*, 14 Gour. 4-8 (Jan., 1902).
Where there was a bona fide mistake due merely to a clerical error, and there had been no unreasonable delay. *Hamilton v. Ide v. Lowenthal*, 14 Gour. 4-9 (Feb., 1902).

Where there was a bona fide misapprehension as to the sense in which the word "model" was used. *Day v. Adl v. Hardy*, 125 O. G. 2765 (1906). Where the failure to recall the early disclosure was due to illness. *Paul v. Chapin*, 187 O. G. 831. Where the grounds of amendment were based on records in the Patent Office. *Cramer v. Hodge v. Carrier*, 177 O. G. 769 (1912). Where there was no attempt made to change the dates and it was shown that it would not injure the opposing party. *Williams v. Liberman*, 100 O. G. 1331, 1902 C. D. 295.

Where a party showed prior diligence in making his original statement and also made his motion to amend before any testimony had been taken and there would be no additional burden or expense thrown upon the opposing party. *McDermott v. Hildreth*, 98 O. G. 1282, 1902 C. D. 43. Where no testimony had been taken and the amendment would not carry the date of reduction to practice back of his opponent's, and a reasonable excuse is presented for delay in presenting the amendment. *Gales v. Berrigan*, 100 O. G. 232, 1902 C. D. 232. Where the ground was an accidental discovery of a publication referring to the invention, and this publication was not discovered when the original statement was filed, although a careful search had been made. *Davis v. Ocampo v. Garrett*, 104 O. G. 2440 (1903).


50. Amendment After Taking Testimony. After testimony has been taken, an amendment to set back dates set forth in preliminary statement is open to suspicion and will be received only upon a clear showing of mistake, and the moving party must be free from negligence, and must show the utmost diligence in seeking to correct the
mistake. *McDermott v. Hildreth*, 98 O. G. 1282, 1902 C. D. 43; *Pope v. Minn v. McLean*, 104 O. G. 2147 (1903); *Henderson v. Nolkes*, 1892 C. D. 114, 59 O. G. 1431; *Bliss v. Cleverling*, 112 O. G. 499. Changing the date of reduction to practice will not be permitted where there is no showing of the utmost diligence in preparing the original statement. *Lockwood v. Schmidt*, 100 O. G. 453, 1902 C. D. 253; *Parker v. Lewis*, 110 O. G. 305. A claim that the party making the statement did not understand the terms used, is not sufficient. *Parker v. Lewis*, 110 O. G. 305. That a party did not read all of the counts is no excuse. *Smith v. Ingram*, 131 O. G. 2420 (1907). A showing that a party made an investigation as to certain facts before making his original statement, but which failed to show that he exhausted every reasonable means of obtaining the desired information, is not sufficient to warrant amendment. *Floyd v. Rohtfing*, 133 O. G. 992 (1908). A motion based on testimony taken in a case must point out the particular parts of the testimony upon which he relies to sustain his motion. *Floyd v. Rohtfing*, 133 O. G. 992. Where the opposing party had not completed the taking of his testimony and the motion was based upon an accidental discovery of an exhibit which was dated at an earlier date than that set forth in the preliminary statement, and other affidavits were filed by parties who stated that they saw the exhibit on the date alleged, and it further appearing that the moving party had made diligent search for all of his drawings previous to making his original statement, amendment was permitted. *Brening v. Ridgely*, 19 Gour. 65-2 (Aug. 5, 1907). A party may not give notice of intention to amend and then delay in presenting his motion until his opponent has completed taking his testimony. *Green v. Farley*, 132 O. G. 235 (1907). Where a party discovers a mistake in his preliminary statement, he must act promptly to correct it, and if there is any delay, he must show a satisfactory excuse for the delay.
Kent v. Wilson, etc., 137 O. G. 1943; Anderson v. Nilson, 105 O. G. 2059 (1903). A notice of intention to move to amend, given during the taking of testimony, must be exact and explicit as to what amendment is to be made. Kent v. Wilson, etc., 137 O. G. 1943. Where a party doubted the accuracy of his original statement at the time he made it, but made no thorough search for the true facts, amendment was denied. Whitall v. Gillespie v. Blaw, 171 O. G. 744 (1911). The fact that a party did not fully appreciate the effect certain evidence would have upon the issue, but knew of the existence of the evidence at the time he made his original statement, would not entitle him to amend. Thomas v. Trissel, 97 O. G. 1598, 1901 C. D. 200. Where a party discovers a mistake in his preliminary statement and thereafter permits his opponent to take and file his testimony without giving notice to amend, the motion will be denied. Mills v. Torrence, 98 O. G. 416, 1902 C. D. 17. In passing upon a motion to amend the Examiner of Interferences will not try the question of whether the allegations in the motion are true or false, before granting or denying the motion. Mills v. Torrence, 98 O. G. 416. To warrant amendment after the testimony has been taken, the ground being newly discovered evidence, it must clearly appear that the evidence could not have been discovered at the time of the filing of the original statement. Fordyce v. Taisey, 102 O. G. 821 (1903). Where a party seeks to carry his date of conception back ten years, basing his motion upon testimony taken in his own behalf, the motion will be denied in the absence of any sufficient reasons why the facts were not discovered at the time his original statement was filed. Woodward v. Kennedy, 104 O. G. 1393 (1903). Even where the testimony shows clearly that a mistake was made in the preliminary statement, the amendment will not be permitted in the absence of a showing of due care in making the original statement. Woodward v. Kennedy, 104 O. G.
1393. Where a party had been notified that his state-
ment was indefinite, but no motion to amend was filed
until eight months later and after his opponent had
taken his testimony, and no satisfactory excuse given for
the delay, he was not entitled to amend. Dixon v. Mc-
Elroy, 127 O. G. 2393 (1907).

51. Motions to Amend When Reviewable. Considera-
tion of motions to amend may be postponed until final
hearing in which case the decision of the Examiner of
Interferences is reviewable by the examiners in chief.
Gummeter v. Thropp, 190 O. G. 266 (1913); Forsberg
v. Bradbury, 177 O. G. 239 (1912).

AMENDMENT OF ISSUE.

52. Adding—Counts—Rule 109. After an interfe-
rence has been declared, it often becomes important to
add new counts to an interference. This may be done at
any time within thirty days after the preliminary state-
ments of the parties have been filed and approved. One
who desires to add new counts should make a motion to
amend in accordance with Rule 109 and Rule 153, the
latter rule applying to giving notice of the motion to the
opposing parties, service of copies and proof of service.
The procedure should follow Rule 124 as amended May
7, 1914, which though applying to motions to dissolve,
has been held to be applicable and the proper practice
on motions to add counts. Townsend v. Copeland v.
Robinson, 126 O. G. 1355 (1907).

The motion to amend the application should contain
the claim or claims which the moving party believes
should be made the basis of interference between himself
and the other parties. It should contain a statement that
it is believed the claims are patentable and should be
made an issue in the interference, and it should be point-
ed out specifically wherein the claims which it is desired
to add are applicable to the structure of each of the par-
ties, and must not be conditional or with a proviso.

The purpose of Rule 109 is to enable a party to claim a patentable invention which he shows and describes, but has not claimed, and which the opposing party has claimed. Perrussel v. Wickmann, 99 O. G. 2970, 1902 C. D. 228. A further purpose of the rule is that an interference may be made to completely cover the patentable invention which is common to the applications involved. Reece v. Fenwick, 97 O. G. 188, 1901 C. D. 143. And to avoid a second interference. Townsend v. Copeland v. Robinson, 126 O. G. 1355 (1907).

Since it is the purpose of Rule 109 to give a party to an interference full opportunity to put in issue matter which he may think patentable or common to the interference applications, but which was not included in the interference as originally declared, if he fails to take advantage of this rule while the interference is pending, he is estopped thereafter from presenting broader claims. In re Capen, 214 O. G. 685, 43 App. D. C. 442; Capen, 214 O. G. 683 (1914); Sutton, Steele & Steele, 121 O. G. 1012 (1906).

53. An Appeal May Be Taken from the decision of the Law Examiner refusing a motion to amend, to the Examiners in Chief in the first instance, but the appeal must be inter partes. Rule 124. Since the amendment of Rules 109 and 124, May 7, 1914, when a motion to amend is made, if found in proper form, it will be transmitted by the Commissioner to the Law Examiner and if the Law Examiner renders an adverse decision, he shall fix a limit of appeal, not less than twenty days, for appeal to the Examiners in Chief, and if the appeal is not taken within the time fixed by the Law Examiner it will not be heard except by permission of the Commissioner. In Townsend v. Copeland v. Robinson, 126 O. G. 1355 (1907), it was held that the reasons which led to the change in Rule 124, set forth in Newcomb v. Thompson
(122 O. G. 3012), apply with nearly the same force to motions under Rule 109, hence it was held that the proper practice was to follow the procedure under Rule 124. The reason for allowing such appeal is that a final adverse decision rendered on such motion would obviously constitute ground for refusing such claims presented after the conclusion of the interference. Mortimer v. Thomas v. Brownson, 192 O. G. 215 (1913).

54. When Motion Must Be Made. Rule 109 provides that a motion to amend may be made at any time within thirty days after the preliminary statements of the parties have been received and approved. However, for various reasons, motions have been presented long after the thirty days' limit therein stated, hence there have been many rulings applying to the particular facts presented.

55. Reopening Interference to Amend Issue. After the expiration of the time allowed for bringing motions, and after a decision of the Law Examiner on a motion to dissolve has become final, the interference will not be reopened to amend the issues, especially where there is no valid excuse shown for delay in bringing the motion. Ignorance of the provisions of Rule 109 is no excuse. Kimball v. Sharpley, 21 Gour. 68-10 (Aug., 1909); Davis v. Zellers, 167 O. G. 513 (1911). But it would seem that upon proper showing an interference might be reopened.

56. Amendments Have Been Allowed Long After Thirty Day Limit. Where a party was able to make satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the motion, as was the case in Becker v. Otis, 127 O. G. 1267, amendment was permitted after the thirty day limit. But where the motion was made after testimony was taken, alleging as the reason for the delay the fact that the Examiners in Chief, on appeal on priority, found that the moving party had no right to make the claims, which was contrary to the ruling made by the Primary Examiner and the Examiner of Interferences, the motion
was properly refused as there was no excuse for the delay of six months after the decision of the Examiners in Chief. (Distinguishing Becker v. Otis, 127 O. G. 1267; Hanan & Gates v. Marshall, 21 Gour. 54-16 (June, 1909).

57. Where the Necessity for Amendment Did Not Arise Until After a Decision on Motion to Dissolve, it was held that the motion to amend should be transmitted for the reasons given in Becker v. Otis, 127 O. G. 1267; Williams v. Gibbon, 20 Gour. 82-1 (Nov., 1908). New counts will not be admitted after partial dissolution where proofs as to the same may be presented in connection with the counts remaining. Scott v. Emmett & Hewlett, 119 O. G. 2233 (1905).

58. Adding Counts After Taking Testimony. Where testimony has been taken, the Examiner should not suggest new counts before judgment on priority. Freeman v. Parks, 117 O. G. 276 (1905); Potter v. VanCleek v. Thompson, 95 O. G. 2484, 1901 C. D. 53; Newell v. Hubbard, 15 Gour. 82-3 (Dec., 1903). After decision on priority it is too late to amend by adding new counts. Safert v. Meyer, 109 O. G. 1885.

59. Amendment Substituting Patentable for Unpatentable Counts. It has been held in Churchward v. Douglas v. Cutler, 106 O. G. 2016 (1903), that where some of the counts of the issue are unpatentable and one of the parties proposes amended claims as substitutes for them, they should be considered by the Primary Examiner, and if found patentable he should suggest them to the other party and fix a time limit within which such other party may make them, and if he fails to make them within the time, such failure should have the same effect as suggested claims under Rule 96. It was also observed that at the time Rule 109 was adopted the practice of suggesting claims had not been inaugurated and that the practice outlined in this case is not provided for in Rule 109 (Note: Rule 109 has since been amended). If new pat-
utable counts are proposed after the original counts have been held unpatentable, on the evidence taken, the interference may be redeclared and a motion under Rule 157, to use the testimony previously taken, would be in order. *Brooks v. Foote v. Wenk*, 108 O. G. 287. The foregoing decisions are given for the purpose of assisting the practitioner in interpreting Rule 109 as now in force.

60. **Adding New Counts by Stipulation.** New counts may be added to an interference by motion signed by all the parties to the interference, if the Law Examiner holds the proposed counts to be patentable, though there are no rules providing for such practice. *Bence v. Fenwick*, 99 O. G. 669, 1902 C. D. 145; *Norman v. Krimmelbein*, 115 O. G. 249.

61. **Proposed Counts Must Be Patentable.** The Law Examiner should decide whether the proposed counts are patentable. If so, they should be included in the interference, and if not, he should make a specific ruling to that effect, giving his reasons therefor, and the amendment should be refused admission, and the party whose motion is denied may then appeal to the Examiners in Chief. *Bence v. Fenwick*, 14 Gour. 3-7 (Feb., 1902); *Hillard v. Fisher*, 101 O. G. 2290, 1902 C. D. 448; *O'Connor v. Vanderbilt*, 102 O. G. 1782 (1903).


63. **Questions Considered on Motions to Amend.** A motion to amend raises the question of the patentability of the proposed counts; the right of the parties to make them and all grounds raised in opposition to the motion, but the same questions will not be again considered on a

64. After a Motion Has Been Transmitted, additional claims not set out in the original motion, will not necessarily be considered by the Examiner. *Maltice v. Langworthy*, 132 O. G. 678 (1907).

**DISSOLUTION.**


1. That there has been such informality in declaring the same as will preclude a proper determination of the question of priority of invention.

2. On the ground that the claims of the issue are not patentable.

3. That a party has no right to make the claim.

It has been held that the three grounds for dissolution mentioned in Rule 122, relate respectively to very different matters and should not be confused, one with the other. *Kaczander v. Hodges & Hodges*, 118 O. G. 836; *Woodward v. Newton*, 86 O. G. 490; *Owen v. Richardson*, 111 O. G. 1037 (1904).

66. Motion to Dissolve—In General. It should be borne in mind in considering the older decisions relating to motions to dissolve, that the rules were amended May 7, 1914, transferring from the Primary Examiner to the Law Examiner jurisdiction of motions to dissolve. 202 O. G. 634.

Motions to dissolve must set forth definitely the grounds, upon which motion is based and a failure to be specific and accurate often results in denial of the motion. ‘If the ground is, that the issue is not patentable, then the motion must clearly set forth why it is not patentable. It must state how the patents cited anticipate the issue, that is, whether each patent anticipates the
issue, or if not, how they are to be combined to show anticipation of the issue. If there is more than one count in the issue, it must be shown to what count the anticipating patents apply and how they apply. Rountree v. Sloan, 189 O. G. 1231 (1913); Keyes & Kraus v. Yunek, 182 O. G. 248 (1912); Vanderveld v. Smith, 159 O. G. 490 (1910); Heyne, etc. v. DeVilbiss, 125 O. G. 669 (1906); Burligh v. Elliott, 197 O. G. 240 (1913).

A party may base his motion upon all the grounds mentioned in Rule 122 and the Primary Examiner (Law Examiner) is required to decide the motion upon all the grounds and fix a limit of appeal as to those grounds upon which an appeal may be taken. Hopfett v. Read, 106 O. G. 767 (1903); Oldham & Padbury v. Peck et al., 99 O. G. 670, 1902 C. D. 148; Read v. Scott, 14 Gour. 3-5 (Jan., 1902); Hinkley v. Baker, 97 O. G. 2742, 1901 C. D. 236; Owen v. Richardson, Jr., 111 O. G. 1037.

The several grounds mentioned in Rule 122 have separate, distinct and well defined meanings, and the motion should not state the facts in such way that the Examiner will not be able to determine what facts are relied upon to support each separate ground for dissolving the interference. The Examiner is required to decide the motion upon each ground alleged and therefore it is important that the motion should state what facts furnish the reason for dissolving the interference upon ground 1; what facts furnish the reason for dissolving the interference upon ground 2, and what facts furnish the reason for dissolving the interference upon ground 3. Woodward v. Newton, 86 O. G. 490; Vreeland v. Fessenden, etc., 117 O. G. 2633 (1905) and same case, 119 O. G. 1259 (1905); Dunker v. Reist, 119 O. G. 1925 (1905); Thulen v. Young & Townsend, 118 O. G. 2251 (1905); Klepelke v. Becker, 120 O. G. 658 (1905); Owens v. Richardson, 111 O. G. 1037 (1903).

We have seen by the foregoing decisions that the motion must be definite and certain as to how the facts apply.
to each ground stated in the motion, but the question often arises as to what is and what is not definite. Where there was more than one count in the interference and the moving party failed to specify whether his motion was directed to all or only a part of the counts in issue, and there was no specific statement as to which element of the claims are not supported by the original disclosure, it was held that the motion should not be transmitted. *Lizotte v. Neuberth*, 124 O. G. 1842 (1906). Where the motion was on the ground of unpatentability in view of eight references, of which it is stated “each of the counts is met by each of the patents singly or in combination, “it was held that the allegations were in the alternative and indefinite. *Thullen v. Townsend*, 130 O. G. 1312 (1907). Where the allegation was that the issue is not patentable in view of certain references, but it was not stated how these references are to be applied, transmission of the motion was refused. *Phillips v. Scott*, 130 O. G. 1312 (1907). Where it was alleged that each of the counts of the issue is anticipated, or necessarily limited, it was held that the allegations are in the alternative and the motion therefore does not state which counts are to be urged as anticipated and which limited, nor does it show which patents are to be relied upon for anticipation and which for restriction. *Murphy v. Bordan*, 132 O. G. 231. All the references must be put into the motion when filed. A moving party will not be permitted to cite certain references in his motion and then state that he will cite others more than five days before the hearing. The motion would be good as to the patents cited, but not as to any that might be thereafter cited. *Papendell v. Bunnell, etc.*, 131 O. G. 362 (1907).

67. References Discovered After the Motion Has Been Filed or Transmitted. If a party can make a proper showing that he has discovered since the filing of his motion, or since its transmission, a new and pertinent reference, and a further satisfactory showing that it could not have
been earlier discovered, he may, by giving due notice to his opponent, have such reference considered as a part of his motion. Kirts v. Jackson & Pierce, 98 O. G. 2568, 1902 C. D. 106; Young v. Eick, 113 O. G. 547. But where no such showing is made a party will not be permitted to argue the pertinency of references not set out in his motion. Hilliard & Parsons v. Hewlett, 19 Gour. 55-10 (April, 1907).

68. Only One Motion to Dissolve. A motion to dissolve may not be presented in piece meal by presenting a motion on one ground and if it is denied, present another motion upon a different ground. The whole case must be presented in one motion. Richards v. Kletzker & Goessel, 98 O. G. 1709, 1902 C. D. 62; Finch v. Singleton, 98 O. G. 1709, 1902 C. D. 61; Egly v. Schultz, 117 O. G. 276 (1905).

69. Motion to Extend Time for Filing Motion to Dissolve. The granting or refusing of a motion to extend time for filing motion to dissolve is within the discretion of the official before whom the motion is filed. Egly v. Schultz, 117 O. G. 276 (1905).

70. Amendment of Motion. Amendment of a motion may be permitted and time given therefor, if it appears that a party is acting in good faith. Jones v. Hulse v. Melville, 21 Gour. 86-15 (July, 1909).

Questions involving priority are not presented by motions to dissolve and the Examiner should not pass upon such questions. Clement v. Brown v. Stroud, 126 O. G. 2189 (1907); Wende v. Horine, 118 O. G. 1070 (1905).

71. Operativeness. On motion to dissolve on the ground of inoperativeness, it was held that the interference would be dissolved whether the structure of one or both of the parties is inoperative, but where a party files a motion before the Examiner of Interferences for permission to take testimony on the ground that his opponent's structure is inoperative, it is necessary for the moving party to show that the alleged ground of inopera-
tiveness does not apply to his own structure. This is because if the structures of both parties are inoperative, there is no question of priority presented. *Clement v. Browne v. Stroud*, 126 O. G. 2189 (1907); *Bodwitch v. Todd*, 98 O. G. 792.

72. Informality in Declaring the Interference. Where there were 132 counts in the interference, it was held that the great number of counts would of itself tend to preclude a proper determination of priority, and under the provisions of Rule 212, the interference should be transmitted to the Primary Examiner to determine whether the interference should not be dissolved and a reasonable number of counts substituted for those forming the issue. *Ragena v. Harris*, 150 O. G. 266 (1909).

73. Defects in Oath. Where the oath filed with one of the applications was administered by the attorney for the applicant, the interference was dissolved. *Reigger v. Beirel*, 150 O. G. 826 (1909). Where it was discovered during the taking of testimony that there was an informality in the oath of one of the parties and such party promptly filed a corrected oath, the motion was denied. *Jackson v. Weber*, 18 Cour. 84-13 (Nov., 1906).

74. Lack of Official Seal of officer who administered the oath may be cured by proof that the officer actually had authority to administer it. *Dukesmith v. Covington v. Turner*, 126 O. G. 348. The lack of such seal is an ex parte matter and not an irregularity warranting dissolution. *Auerbach & Gubing v. Wiswell*, 108 O. G. 289.

75. Supplemental Oath. Where a party has filed no preliminary statement, a motion to dissolve upon the ground that the claim should have been supported by a supplemental oath, should be transmitted for determination of whether a supplemental oath is necessary, and, if found necessary and is not furnished within a reasonable time, the interference should be dissolved. *Gold v. Dixon*, 194 O. G. 1142, 1913 C. D. 217.

76. That the Issues Are Vague and Indefinite, are
proper questions to raise as constituting informality in declaring an interference. *Field v. Colman*, 131 O. G. 1686 (1907); *Anderson v. Vrooman*, 123 O. G. 2975 (1906); *Dinkel v. D’Oliver*, 113 O. G. 2507 (1903). An interference is irregularly declared where one of the applications does not disclose the subject matter of one of the counts. *Gilbert-Stringer v. Johnson*, 102 O. G. 621; 1903 C. D. 20.

77. Abandonment. Where an abandoned application is put in interference with another application, it may be dissolved as irregularly declared. *Coulson v. Callender & Callender*, 101 O. G. 1607.

78. What Is Not Such Irregularity or Informality in Declaring the Interference as Will Preclude the Proper Determination of the Question of Priority of Invention. Multiplicity of counts is not an irregularity, if the counts are separately patentable. *Narman v. Krimelbein*, 118 O. G. 2251 (1905). That the Examiner has not notified the parties that the claims in issue are patentable. *Luger v. Browning*, 100 O. G. 231; 1902 C. D. 230. That a party has stated in his applications involved in the interferences that they are divisions of a prior patent granted to him; *Meyer v. Sarfert*, 96 O. G. 1037; 1901 C. D. 91. That a party has rejected claims and if they should be decided to be patentable, a new interference would be necessary. *Truax v. Robinson*, 13 Gour. 822 (Dec., 1901). Where no irregularity was pointed out, and the issue was construed as broad enough to cover the inventions of both parties. *Gillespie v. Dean*, 15 Gour. 83-7 (Nov., 1903). That the claims of the counts cover two species of invention. *Atherton & Happ v. Cheney*, 111 O. G. 1040. That the suggestion of claims was not authorized by the practice then in force. *Myers v. Brown*, 112 O. G. 2093. The sending of a notice of interference to a patentee referring to his patent as an application. *Guely v. Brand*, 16 Gour. 50-4. That the suggestion of the claim in interference to the party by
the Examiner, was improper, because said party had not claimed substantially the same invention expressed in said claim. *Meden v. Curtis*, 117 O. G. 1795 (1905). That the Examiner improperly suggested claims under Rule 96. *Templin v. Sergeant*, 119 O. G. 961 (1905). That the Examiner improperly issued a patent to the opponent of the moving party during the pendency of his application (That is a matter the office can not remedy). *Dunhill v. Reist*, 119 O. G. 1925 (1905). That the Examiner failed to include certain claims made by both parties, where the claims not included are not patentably different from those which were included. *Gally v. Burton*, 120 O. G. 325 (1905); *Earll v. Love*, 140 O. G. 1209 (1909). Mere clerical errors which may be corrected by a letter of the Primary Examiner calling attention to them, does not warrant dissolution. *Gally v. Burton*, 120 O. G. 325 (1905). The fact that the issue involving a parent case could as well have been included in the interference involving a divisional application. *Phillips v. Sensenick*, 122 O. G. 1047 (1906). That the counts of the interference are not patentably different. *Hawkins v. Young*, 21 Gour. 34-3 (May, 1909); *McKeen v. Davis*, 21 Gour. 84-7 (Aug., 1909). The fact that the Examiner formulated the claim suggested for the purpose of interference, is not an informality in declaring the interference. *Gold v. Dixon*, 194 O. G. 1142 (1913).


Where a party makes suggested claims under protest, it was held that while such facts might warrant a motion by such party to dissolve on the ground that he had no right to make the claims, the same facts, however, would
not sustain a motion to dissolve on the ground of informality and irregularity in declaring the interference. *Eichelbreyer & Hibner v. Dillon*, 129 O. G. 3161 (1907).

Where the Examiner includes in an interference counts which he has held not patentable, such inclusion is not an irregularity in declaring the interference, because the party had a right to appeal on the question of the patentability of those counts and they are properly retained in the interference, but if he fails to appeal within the time set therefor, the interference stands dissolved as to those counts. In such case it is customary for the Examiner of Interferences, when the case is returned to him from the Law Examiner, to notify the parties that the interference is dissolved as to such counts. *Halwood v. McCormick*, 16 Gour. 847.

79. **Motion to Dissolve on the Ground That the Issue Is Not Patentable—Who May Question Patentability of the Issue.** A party whose claims are held not patentable cannot question the patentability of the claim of his opponent. *Soverign & Leunders v. Lillie*, 185 O. G. 830 (1912).

80. **Who Has Jurisdiction to Determine Patentability.**

A motion for dissolution was based on all grounds provided by the rules. The motion was denied by the Primary Examiner. A petition to the Commissioner was filed, asking that the Examiner of Interferences be directed to pass on the patentability of certain counts. The Commissioner held that the Examiner of Interferences had no jurisdiction to pass upon the questions which were sought to be placed before him, because they do not relate to the question of priority. *Wood v. Pfister*, 154 O. G. 837 (1910).

The question of the patentability of the issue should be raised by a motion to dissolve and will be determined by the Law Examiner (formerly by the Primary Examiner). The Court of Appeals, D. C., has held that the question of the patentability of the issue is not a juris-
ductional one which must be considered by each of the tribunals called upon to pass on the question of priority of invention in an interference proceeding. *Johnson v. Mueser*, 29 App. D. C. 61, 145 O. G. 764. It is well settled that the patentability of the issue will be considered on final hearing only under the supervisory authority of the Commissioner and in a clear case. *Dixon v. Marsh, et al.*, 127 O. G. 1993; *Sobey v. Holsclaw*, 126 O. G. 3041, 28 App. D. C. 65; *Potter v. McIntosch*, 127 O. G. 1995, 28 App. D. C. 510; *Huber v. Aiken*, 88 O. G. 1525. Where an applicant sought to present the question of patentability on an appeal to the Commissioner from a judgment of priority, it was held that the interference should not be dissolved, though had the question been presented at the proper time by a motion to dissolve it would have been dissolved. *De Farranti v. Lindmark*, 183 O. G. 782 (1912).

81. **Nature of Right to Question Patentability.** A motion to dissolve on the ground of non-patentability is not a matter of right under any statute, but is a matter of procedure arising under the rules of practice, and the moving party appears in such motion merely as amicus curiae. Whether a certain count is patentable is a question between the applicant presenting it and the office, as is every claim presented in an application where there is no opposing party. But following certain decisions indicating that it is of assistance to the office to have the opposing party argue the patentability of the issue, the rules were amended to provide for appeals on this question, inter partes. See *Appeal, Kelly v. Dempster*, 164 O. G. 975 (1911); *Gold v. Gold*, 150 O. G. 570-573; *Griffith v. Dodgson*, 116 O. G. 1731 (1905); *Lipe v. Miller*, 109 O. G. 1608; *Robbins v. Titus*, 111 O. G. 584; *Patterson v. Hecher*, 192 O. G. 215 (1913).

82. **Effect on Moving Party.** Where an applicant moves to dissolve on the ground that the issue is not patentable, his opponent being a patentee, such applicant is

83. When Motion Should Be Made. The motion to dissolve upon this ground should of course be made at the time and as provided by the rules, but such motions have been made at various stages of the proceedings. Where the motion was made after the taking of testimony, it was held that the interference would not be suspended to consider the pertinency of a reference. To warrant such consideration the anticipation must be clearly apparent. Graham v. Langhaer, 177 O. G. 240 (1912). Where a party is an applicant and his opponent is a patentee and the applicant in response to a motion to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him for failure to take testimony, no testimony having been taken, moves to dissolve on the ground that the issue is not patentable, the interference should not be dissolved, but judgment should be rendered. Smith v. Slocum, 123 O. G. 1900; 1906 C. D. 269.

84. Character of Showing Required. Where the motion to dissolve alleges that the counts are not patentable in view of certain enumerated patents, if the moving party is of the opinion that each of the references is an anticipation of each of the claims, the motion should so state. If not, the motion should enumerate the references in connection with the claims to which they will be applied in the argument. If the contention of non-patentability is based upon the theory of aggregation, or double use, or substitution of equivalents, it should appear in the motion, also the manner in which it is proposed to combine the references. Heyne, Hayward & McCarthy v. De Vilbiss, 125 O. G. 669 (1906). Ex parte affidavits will not support the motion, for the reason, that if the interference is dissolved, the claims must be rejected and the claims can not be rejected on ex parte

Anticipating patents must be such as are not antedated by the preliminary statement. *Forsyth v. Richards, 115 O. G. 1327 (1905),* but in *Martin v. Goodrum, etc., 130 O. G. 1485 (1907),* it was held that a motion setting up such a patent as an anticipation should be transmitted for the purpose of permitting the (Examiner) Law Examiner to consider the pertinency of the reference and permit the filing of an affidavit alleging facts required by Rule 75, outside those contained in the preliminary statement.

Patents granted on applications filed subsequent to the date of invention alleged in the preliminary statement of one of the parties, are not anticipating patents which will support a motion to dissolve an interference upon the ground of non-patentability. *Raymond v. Kitselman, et al., 134 O. G. 2243 (1908).*

85. Appeal—When Not Permitted (See Appeal). No appeal is permitted from a decision of the Law Examiner affirming patentability of the issue. All interlocutory matters, such as motions to dissolve, are regulated by the Patent Office rules and a party has no statutory right to appeal on any question except a judgment on priority rendered in an interference, hence if he has a right to appeal he must find that right in the Patent Office rules. The Primary Examiner is given authority to pass on questions of patentability of the issue and neither the statute nor the rules of the Patent Office permit appeals from a decision rendered upon a motion for dissolution affirming patentability of the issue (*Allen v. Lowry, 116 O. G. 2253*) and it is only from decisions adverse to the patentability of the claims that an appeal will lie (*Sobey v. Holschlaw, 126 O. G. 3041, 28 App. D. C. 65*). As the Primary Examiners are under the Commissioner, he
may, where it is clear that gross error has been committed in holding the issue patentable, exercise his supervisory authority and take jurisdiction of the question, but such will not be exercised where there is merely a difference of opinion on the part of the lower tribunals.

86. How the Question of Patentability of the Issue May Come Before the Commissioner. The Examiner of Interferences, in his decision, and likewise the Examiners in Chief on appeal, are confined to the question of priority, but if any other matter not relating to priority and which would amount to a statutory bar to the granting of a patent to either of the parties, shall come to their notice, they may direct the attention of the Commissioner to such matter under Rule 126, and the Commissioner may, before judgment on the question of priority, suspend the interference and remand the case to the Primary Examiner, for his consideration of the matters to which his attention has been directed, and from the decision of the Examiner an appeal may be taken. If the Commissioner does not remand the case, the Primary Examiner will, after judgment, consider any matter affecting the rights of either party to a patent which may have been called to his attention, unless the same shall have been previously disposed of by the Commissioner. After the Primary Examiner has held the claims to be patentable and the Examiner of Interferences and the Examiners in Chief have omitted or declined to call the attention of the Commissioner to the non-patentability of the issue, or where the Commissioner has declined to review the decision of the Primary Examiner, after his attention has been called to the alleged non-patentability of the issue, the Court of Appeals will consider the patentability of the issue settled, except in an extraordinary case. *Sobey v. Hotschlaw*, 126 O. G. 30-11, 28 App. D. C. 65; *Allen v. Lowry*, 116 O. G. 2253 (1905).

87. No Right to Make the Claims. Since the decision of the Court of Appeals, D. C., in *Podolsack v. McInner-
ney, 26 App. D. C. 399, the question of the right of a party to make the claims of the issue, has been uniformly held to be an ancillary question to be considered in determining the question of priority of invention and this question may be raised on final hearing and on appeal. As a result of this decision Rule 130 was promulgated, by the provisions of which, where the patentability of a claim to an opponent is material to the right of the party to a patent, said party may urge the non-patentability of the claim to his opponent at final hearing and on appeal, but he can not raise the question unless he shall have duly presented a motion under Rule 122 for dissolution upon that ground, or show good reason why such motion was not presented. It was therefore held in McBerty v. Shore & Shore, 175 O. G. 843 (1911), that the Examiners in Chief properly awarded priority upon the ground that one of the parties had no right to make the claims. Following further the development of the practice we find in Cosper v. Gold & Gold, 151 O. G. 194, 34 App. D. C. 194, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal upon the ground that it was taken from a decision of the Commissioner dissolving the interference because Cosper had no right to make the claims of the issue, and under such circumstances it was not a final decision which could be appealed to that court. Thereupon the Commissioner entered an award of priority based upon Cosper’s lack of right to make the claims and from this decision Cosper appealed to the Court of Appeals, and it was held that under the practice established by the decision of Podelsack v. McInerney, two questions arise in every interference case where the right of one of the parties to make the claims of the issue are presented on a motion to dissolve upon that ground, to wit: the right to make the claims, and the priority of invention. If the first shall be decided adversely to the claimant, the formal award of priority goes to his opponent as a matter of course. But in Carlin v. Goldberg, 45 App. D. C.
540, 236 O. G. 1222; 1917 C. D. 128, it was held that no award of priority could be made on a motion to dissolve upon this ground, before proofs are taken, and it was pointed out that in Cosper v. Gold the judgment was entered after the interference had been tried and the question of priority hinged upon the question as to whether Cosper had a right to make the claims. Where there has been no hearing upon the question of priority, no award of priority can be made on motion to dissolve.

On motion to dissolve on the ground that a party has no right to make the claims, the sole question to be considered is whether the specification and drawings of the application are sufficient to justify the allowance of the claims in question. Seacombe v. Burke, 182 O. G. 973 (1912).

A dissolution on the ground that a party has no right to make the claims, is merely a ruling that it was a mistake to declare the interference as to that party. Campbell v. Dyson v. Dunham, 242 O. G. 253 (1916).

Abandonment of the invention goes to the question of the right to make the claims. Felsing v. Nelson, 121 O. G. 1347 (1906).

Where the issue was alleged to be substantially the same as that of a prior interference between the same parties, and the senior party had been defeated on the question of priority, it was held that the question presented was one involving the right of the senior party to make the claims. Eschinger v. Drummond, etc., 121 O. G. 1348 (1906).

Where the moving party alleges that he has no right to make the claims, the motion will be refused transmission, because if he is of the opinion that he has no right to make the claims, he should take action in accordance with the provisions of Rule 125, or he may take no action whatever in the interference and permit judgment to go by default. Miller v. Perham, 121 O. G. 2667 (1906); Kinney v. Goodhue, 123 O. G. 1663 (1906);
Goodwin v. Smith, 123 O. G. 998 (1906). But Commissioner Billings allowed the filing of motions under such circumstances. And where the claims were suggested under Rule 96, a different rule prevails, and a party may properly move to dissolve on the ground that he has no right to make the claims, but in such case he must state specifically the reasons upon which his motion is based. Hermendorf v. Driggs v. Schneider, 133 O. G. 1189 (1908).

The facts which will support a motion to dissolve on the ground that a party has no right to make the claims, relate to the extent of disclosure, estoppel, operativeness, and the like, and if established will result in rejection of the claims to which they are applicable. Booth, et al., v. Hanan, et al., 123 O. G. 319 (1906).

Alleging on motion to dissolve, facts which relate to priority does not present any question for consideration on such motion, and it will be refused transmission. Dickinson v. Hildreth, 122 O. G. 1397 (1906).

Recommendation by Examiners in Chief. If the Examiners in Chief in affirming a decision of the Law Examiner holding that a party has no right to make the claims, recommends that the other party also has no right to make the claims, such other party may appeal ex parte from such recommendation. Woodbridge v. Conrad, 165 O. G. 241 (1911).

A party cannot be deprived of his right to make claims because his structure performs some function in addition to what is called for by the claims. Miel v. Young, 126 O. G. 2591 (1906), 29 App. D. C. 481.

That a party is not entitled to the date of an earlier application because the claim was not made therein, and because there was included a disclaimer of it, relates to the right of the party to make the claims. Dillgen v. Parminter, 99 O. G. 2966; 1902 C. D. 218.

That a party’s application did not disclose the invention until a certain amendment was filed therein, is a
contention that he has no right to make the claims, and
should be presented in a motion to dissolve and not in a
motion to shift the burden of proof. *Tripp v. Wolff v.
Jones*, 103 O. G. 2171 (1903).

The fact that an issue includes an element of a com-
bination which one party does not disclose, is ground for
dissolution on the ground that such party has no right
to make the claim. *Bodwitch v. Todd*, 98 O. G. 792;
1902 C. D. 27.

Inoperativeness should not be insisted upon in a mo-
tion to dissolve except in a clear case. *Bodwitch v. Todd*,
98 O. G. 792.

If a party’s structure is capable of performing the
function in question, it is immaterial whether or not his
description refers to it. *Western Electric Co. v. Sperry
Electric Co.*, 65 O. G. 597; *Fenwick v. Dixon & Dixon*,
15 Gour. 71-23 (Sept., 1903).

88. Disclaimer—Rule 107. Rule 107 provides: An
applicant involved in an interference may, with the writ-
ten consent of the assignee, when there has been an as-
signment, before the date fixed for the filing of his pre-
liminary statement (Rule 110), in order to avoid the
continuance of the interference, disclaim under his own
signature, attested by two witnesses, the invention of the
particular matter in issue, and upon such disclaimer and
cancellation of any claims involving such interfering
matter, judgment shall be rendered against him, and a
copy of the disclaimer shall be embodied in and form
part of his specification (See Rule 182).

Were a disclaimer is filed, such disclaimer only ex-
tends to the particular claim or claims as to which the
interference has been declared, and the judgment fol-
lowing does not effect the question of invention as to
other claims, although they may contain other interfer-
ing matter. *Reed v. Concrete Machinery Co., et al.*, 239
Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1916). An assignee of entire
interest may disclaim invention. *Moore & McKee v.*
Bradley, etc., 180 O. G. 879 (1912). A judgment of priority may be avoided by disclaimer, or by filing an application for a reissue containing properly limited claims only. Fend v. Midgett, 223 O. G. 649 (1915).

**Disclaimer by Refusal to Make Claims Under Rule 96.** If an applicant refuses to make claims suggested under Rule 96, he disclaims the interfering subject matter. Ferris, 114 O. G. 541.

**Oral Disclaimer.** If a party to an interference in answer to a question propounded to him in the taking of testimony, states that he does not claim to be the inventor of the subject matter in controversy, a judgment of priority can not be awarded to him. Oliver v. Felbel, 100 O. G. 2384; 1902 C. D. 565. A statement by an applicant to his assignee that he does not regard himself as the inventor of the subject matter claimed, is not sufficient to overcome his oath that he is the inventor thereof, especially where it appears that he is hostile to his assignee. Gibbons v. Peller, 127 O. G. 3543 (1907).

89. **Miscellaneous Motions to Dissolve.** The grounds for dissolving interferences are set forth in Rule 122, and a motion which does not state any of the grounds therein enumerated, is not a proper motion. Keith v. George, 16 Gour. 194. However, there have been many attempts of a miscellaneous character to dissolve interferences for grounds not mentioned in Rule 122, and which have been invariably refused transmission, illustrations of which are that a party failed to file a supplemental oath, or that the oath is defective. The filing of an oath is an ex parte matter and not a ground for dissolution. Graham v. Langhaar, 164 O. G. 739 (1911); Reitzel v. Harmatta, 161 O. G. 1043 (1910); Rowe v. Brinkmann, 133 O. G. 515 (1908); Emmet v. Fisler, 130 O. G. 2719 (1907).

Motions to dissolve upon the grounds of public use, and based upon ex parte affidavits, will not be transmitted. Davis v. Swift, 96 O. G. 2409; 1901 C. D. 134; Shrum v. Banning, 104 O. G. 577 (1903); Dunn v. Doug-
luss, 184 O. G. 804 (1912); Barber v. Wood, 128 O. G. 2835 (1907). Nor where it is alleged that the structure of one of the parties is greatly superior to that of the other. Kolb v. Hemingway v. Curtis, 122 O. G. 1307 (1906). Nor on the ground that a party is intending to rely upon a certain machine in the production of his testimony. Barr v. Bugg, 122 O. G. 2061 (1906). Nor where the question raised is one involving the burden of proof. Townsend v. Ehret, etc., 137 O. G. 1484 (1908). Nor where it is alleged that an affidavit filed under Rule 75 is false. Schuler v. Barres, etc., 140 O. G. 509 (1909). Nor that a party has no right to make the claims because of his delay in making them. Manly v. Williams, 21 Gour. 85-11 (Aug., 1909); Long v. Flagg, etc., 190 O. G. 265 (1913). Nor that the claims were formulated by the Examiner. Miresell v. Lovejoy, 186 O. G. 294 (1912). Nor upon the ground of intervening rights in the issuance of a patent. Perkins & Requa v. Weeks, 188 O. G. 1052 (1913). Nor that the invention was made by a third party. Welch v. Ausiero, 219 O. G. 930 (1915). Nor merely alleging abandonment of the invention by reason of delay in renewing application. Gehring & Cudden v. Barry, etc., 225 O. G. 371 (1914). Nor alleging prior knowledge and use as a bar. Murphy v. Borland, 132 O. G. 231, and cases there cited. Nor that the issues are substantially the same as that of a prior interference. Sugden & Pidgin v. Layanke, etc., 130 O. G. 1484 (1907). Nor an allegation by a sole inventor that himself and another as joint inventors did not invent the device. Babcock v. Pickard, etc., 21 Gour. 85-13 (Nov., 1909); Jarvis v. Quincy, 113 O. G. 550. Nor where the motion is based on affidavits as to inoperativeness. Horton v. Leonard, 155 O. G. 303; Keyes & Kraus v. Yunck, 182 O. G. 248 (1912). Nor where the facts set forth in the motion are based upon testimony taken. Ghallenberger v. Andrews, 100 O. G. 3013; 1902 C. D. 346; Sullivan v. Thompson, 94 O. G. 585; 1902 C. D.
21. Nor that one of the parties is not an original inventor but derived his knowledge from another. Corey, etc., v. Blakey, 115 O. G. 1328 (1905). Nor on the ground that a party desires to present claims of a broader nature, since proofs may be offered in the interference to cover any broader claims which the applicant may later present. Phelps v. Wormley, etc., 118 O. G. 1069 (1905). Nor on the ground that the moving party is shown by the testimony in another interference to be the first inventor. Newel v. Rose, 119 O. G. 337 (1905); Dorr v. Ames & Pearson, 15 Gour. 35-6 (June, 1903). Nor where the question presented is one which may be determined on final hearing and which should be so determined. Struble v. Young, 121 O. G. 339; 1906 C. D. 95.

EVIDENCE.

90. The subject of evidence as here treated has special reference to interference proceedings and such questions as are likely to arise in presenting proofs in such cases.

91. Burden of Proof. Rule 116 provides that the several parties to interferences will be presumed to have made the inventions in the order in which they filed their completed applications for patents clearly illustrating and describing the invention; and the burden of proof shall rest upon the party who shall seek to establish a different state of facts.

92. What is the Filing Date. The filing dates are the respective dates on which the applications were filed in the Patent Office. However, if the application is a true division of an earlier application, then the later application takes the filing date of the earlier application. This is only true where the earlier application clearly discloses the same invention. Lowry v. Spoon, 110 O. G. 858; Meyer v. Sarfert, 96 O. G. 1037; Cain v. Park, 86 O. G. 797, 14 App. D. C. 42; Bundy v. Rumbarger, 92 O. G. 2002; Toledo Scale Co. v. Dunn, 214 O. G. 50.

Earlier Application as Evidence. Even though the Primary Examiner fails to include an earlier application by one of the parties, in the declaration of interference, he is not deprived of the benefit of it, if it discloses the invention, since he may introduce it as a part of his evidence. Munro v. Alexander, 106 O. G. 1000 (1903); Greenawalt v. Mark, 111 O. G. 2224; Osborne v. Armstrong, 114 O. G. 2091.

93. Divisional Application—Evidence. The action of the Primary Examiner as to what is and what is not a division, is not controlling upon the Examiner of Interferences, since it is a matter relating to priority on which it is the peculiar province of the Examiner of Interferences to pass judgment, and where the Primary Examiner permitted an application to be amended by adding what in his opinion was not new matter, such ruling is subject to the independent judgment of the Examiner of Interferences. Robinson v. Copeland, 102 O. G. 466 (1903).

94. Official Records as Evidence. Subdivision (e) of Rule 154, provides that upon notice given to the opposite party before the closing of the testimony, any official record, and any special matter contained in a printed publication, if competent evidence and pertinent to the issue, may be used as evidence at the hearing. This section relates to two classes of evidence, official records and printed publications.

An official record is a record kept by an official, though usually it must be one required by law to be kept. Thus in the State of New York, where death certificates are filed in the Health Department, it was held that such certificates are "Official Records" within the meaning of Code Civil Procedure, Sec. 959, providing that certain official records shall be presumptive evidence of their contents. Robinson v. Supreme Commandery, Order of

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Golden Cross, 79 N. Y. Supp. 13, 16. Judgments, orders and decrees are properly proved by the minutes or calendar entries where the latter form the legal record thereof, but if the record consists of a judgment roll or some more formal writing, the latter if in existence, is the proper evidence. It is not the purpose to here undertake to state the various classes of official records and how they may be introduced in evidence, but merely to call attention to the subject in a general way to illustrate the class of evidence that would come within the foregoing subdivision of Rule 154. For an extended discussion of the subject of Official Records as evidence, reference is made to Encyclopedia of Evidence, Vol. 10, page 716.

Testimony taken in another action is not rendered admissible by the introduction of the record in such action. Encyclopedia of Evidence, Vol. 10, page 761. The Rules of Practice relating to the introduction of testimony taken in another interference, follow in a general way the rules of evidence in courts of law and recognize that such testimony is not an official record referred to in subsection (e) of Rule 154. Therefore special provision is made for introducing testimony taken in another interference. Rule 157.

An earlier application may become available as evidence, even though not involved in the interference, by introducing a certified copy thereof. To avoid any element of doubt there should also be introduced a certified copy of the filing date, or of the notice of allowance, if allowed. In Cain v. Park, 14 App. D. C. 42; 1899 C. D. 278, 86 O. G. 797, a certified copy of the application had been introduced in evidence and the Commissioner took judicial notice of his own records and found that the application was allowed and a pending application when the application in interference was filed. In Robinson v. Seelinger, 116 O. G. 1735 (1905), 25 App. D. C. 237, the Examiners in Chief had taken
judicial notice of the filing of a prior application (which had not been introduced in evidence) and the court held that it could not be expected to consider something which is not a record open to the public and which was in no form before the court as was the application which was taken judicial notice of in Cain v. Park, supra. It would seem, therefore, that while the office may take judicial knowledge of its own action upon an application and the date on which such action was taken, it is necessary to introduce a certified copy of the application to make it available as evidence.

Any special matter contained in a printed publication may be used as evidence at the hearing if before closing the testimony notice is given to the opposite party as provided in subdivision (e) of Rule 154, of intention to so use the same. A question may sometimes arise as to what is and what is not a printed publication. In Walker on Patents, Sec 56, it is said: "A printed publication is anything which is printed, and without any injunction of secrecy, is distributed to any part of the public in any country; and such publication may negative novelty. Indeed, it seems reasonable that no actual distribution need occur, but that exposure of printed matter for sale is enough to constitute a printed publication. But the mere existence of a printed thing is not a printed publication, though its deposit in a public library is. A drawing, in a prior patent or printed publication, if its meaning is really undeniable, may negative novelty."

95. Continuous Application Takes Filing Date of Original Application. Where an application is a continuation of a prior application which became abandoned, the applicant is entitled to the filing date of the earlier application as to everything that it discloses, even though the later application may contain new matter not shown in the original application. Tripler v. Linde, 101 O. G. 2288; 1902 C. D. 444; Gilbert-Stringer v. Johnson, 102

**Identical Filing Dates.** Where both applications are filed on the same day it is the practice of the office to throw the burden upon the one who was last to execute his application.

96. **Burden as Between Applicant and Patentee.** Where through inadvertence an interference was not declared between two pending applications for the same invention until after a patent had been issued to the junior applicant, the patentee does not thereby gain any advantage with respect to the burden of proof, but is in the same situation he would have been had his patent not been granted. *Evans v. Associated Automatic Sprinkler Co.*, 241 Fed. 252, 229 Fed. 1007; *Cutler v. Leonard*, 31 App. D. C. 297, 136 O. G. 438; *Andrews v. Nilson*, 123 O. G. 1667 (1906), 27 App. D. C. 451.


**Patent Granted During Forfeiture of Application.** Where a party permits his application to become forfeited, and while it is forfeited another files an application and secures a patent for the same invention which is put in interference with a renewal of the forfeited application, the burden of proof is upon the renewal applicant notwithstanding the earlier date of his first application. *Lutz v. Lewis*, 110 O. G. 2014. There is a distinction as to the burden of proof as between a patent granted while opposing party’s case is pending and a patent granted while opposing party’s case is forfeited. *Lowry v. Spoon*, 110 O. G. 858.

97. **Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt—In What Cases.** Where one party is a patentee and the other party filed his application after the issue of the patent, the burden is upon the applicant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

**Reasonable Doubt Defined.** Efforts of courts to define what is meant by "reasonable doubt" have not resulted in any established definition. However the definition stated in Words & Phrases, Vol. 7, page 5964, and supported by abundant authorities, is as follows:


**98. Shifting the Burden of Proof.** It often becomes a matter of controversy as to which party has the burden of proof and this usually arises out of the uncertainty about the filing dates to which the respective parties are entitled. A party may discover after an interference has been declared that he is made the junior party therein
where as he should have been made the senior party by reason of an earlier application filed by him, or by reason of his application being a continuing one, and which discloses exactly the same invention as that involved in interference. Under such circumstances he may make a motion to shift the burden of proof. This motion is within the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences and not the Primary Examiner, and there is no appeal from his decision prior to final hearing. *Roulet & Nicholson v. Adams*, 114 O. G. 1827; *Scott v. Southgate*, 121 O. G. 689; *Osborne v. Armstrong*, 114 O. G. 2091.

**Evidence to Support the Motion.** No evidence is necessary to support the motion where the record in the respective cases show all the facts necessary to determine the question. *Bundy v. Kumberger*, 92 O. G. 2001.

99. Foreign Application—Burden. Where a party claims the benefit of a foreign application, the notice of interference will be prepared in accordance with the date of filing of the applications in this country; but the Examiner of Interferences may, upon a proper showing, shift the burden of proof and give the party the benefit of the filing date of his foreign application. *Steel & Steel v. Myers*, 205 O. G. 1021; 1914 C. D. 74.


Testimony must not be at variance with the preliminary statement, as to conception, disclosure and reduction to practice, and testimony taken tending to establish earlier dates, if admitted, will be effective only for the purpose of establishing the dates alleged. *Cross v. Phillips*, 14 App. D. C. 228, 87 O. G. 1399; 1899 C. D. 342; *Funk v. Matterson v. Haines*, 100 O. G. 1563; 1902

101. Conception—Evidence of. A conception of the mind is not an invention until represented in some physical form. Clark Thread Co. v. Wiliamantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 489, 35 L. Ed. 521, 525; Voightmann, et al., v. Perkinson, et al., 138 Fed. 56; Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D. C. 264, 81 O. G. 1417 (1897). In some instances statements and conversations of the inventor may be shown to establish conception of the invention. In many cases of inventions, it is hardly possible in any other manner to ascertain in the precise time and exact origin of the particular invention. The invention itself is an intellectual process or operation; and, like all other expressions of thought, can in many cases be scarcely made known, except by speech. The invention may be consummated and perfect, and may be susceptible of complete description in words, a month, or even a year before it can be embodied in visible form, machine or composition of matter. Conversations and declarations of the inventor that he made a certain invention, and describing its details and explaining its operations, are properly to be deemed an assertion of his right, at that time, as an inventor to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known; although the date of his invention in such case would be the time when he makes known the invention and not the time when he claims to have first had it in mind, if that be a previous time. Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Peters 448, 10 U. S. Law Ed. 535, 542. If the inventor orally describes his invention with sufficient clearness,
even though he does not state all the details, that an artisan can work out the details, he has disclosed an invention. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Instrument Co., 133 Fed. 167.

Where an oral statement by the inventor is relied upon to prove invention it must be shown not only that the statement was sufficiently clear and complete to enable one skilled in the art to make the machine, or practice the process or art, but also that it was made to one who understood it and remembered it with sufficient accuracy to enable him to communicate it to the world. Stephens v. Salisbury, 1 McArthur's Patent Cases, 355.

102. Kinds of Evidence to Prove Conception. The evidence may consist of oral or written description of the invention, or drawing or model or partly of one of these forms of evidence and partly of another. But we have already seen that the description or drawing, or model, must be known to some one other than the inventor and the date of invention is the date upon which it is made known to such other person or persons, hence this brings us to the consideration of the question of disclosure, and, later the corroboration of the inventor.

Disclosure. Disclosure in the sense of the patent law must be made ordinarily to persons competent to understand and appreciate the alleged invention. Merely showing a device or drawing to witnesses who had no understanding of the invention, can not be considered a disclosure. It is therefore plain that in proving disclosure it should be shown clearly that the person to whom the disclosure was made, understood the invention, remembered it with sufficient accuracy to communicate it to others, or could recognize the identical drawings or device exhibited to him and explain their meaning, or operation, or construction. Furthermore in order to make such evidence available to establish a date of invention, the witness or witnesses to whom the disclosure was made must be able to in some manner fix the time of
such disclosure with reasonable certainty, and, where they are called upon to testify some years after the event, great care should be exercised to establish, as near as possible, a definite time of disclosure which will not be dependent upon the uncertainties of memory as to when such event took place. Eastman v. Houston, 95 O. G. 2064; 1902 C. D. 386, 18 App. D. C. 135-140; Henngi v. Dullmeyer, 253 O. G. 514. A disclosure to one skilled in the art to which the invention belongs, is sufficient. Persons “skilled in the art” includes careful workmen who are skilled in the particular line of business in which they are engaged. Pupin v. Hulin & Leblanc v. Stone, 100 O. G. 931; 1902 C. D. 269. Where the witnesses make it appear that the inventor had in mind the result to be accomplished, but not the means by which it was to be done, conception and disclosure is not established. Cobb v. Goebel, 23 App. D. C. 75, 108 O. G. 1591; Brooks v. Hillard, 106 O. G. 1237 (1903); Fenner v. Blake, 30 App. D. C. 507, 134 O. G. 2244 (1908). The disclosure must be full and clear as to all essential elements of the invention and such as was sufficient in itself to enable the party to whom the disclosure was made to give the invention practical form and effect without the exercise of invention on his part. Sendelbach v. Gillette, 22 App. D. C. 168, 109 O. G. 276. Disclosing matters which are old in the art, is not disclosing invention. French v. Holcomb, 115 O. G. 506 (1905). Where the inventor presents drawings witnessed and dated, it should appear that the witnesses whose names are signed thereto not only signed them on the date appearing on the drawings, but that they understood the invention and that the drawings at the time they are offered in evidence are in the same condition that they were when they were witnessed. Kirkegaard v. Jebsen v. Ries, 125 O. G. 1700 (1906). Where the wife of an inventor is offered as a witness to prove disclosure, it has been held that her testimony should be corroborated. The soundness of this
ruling may well be doubted. *Hartler v. Barrett*, 114 O. G. 575. Where an original application is relied upon for disclosure, it must appear that the invention in issue is disclosed in that application as originally filed. *McKnight v. Pohle*, 30 App. D. C. 92, 130 O. G. 2069 (1907); *McMulkin v. Boilie*, 126 O. G. 1356 (1906). (See Reduction to Practice and Dates.) It is not necessary that an apparatus used to carry out a process be disclosed in order to constitute a disclosure of the process. *Osborne v. Armstrong*, 19 Gour. 3-8 (Jan., 1907). Work done on an invention in a foreign country is not available as evidence to prove conception or reduction to practice in the United States, R. S. Sec. 4923. *DeKando v. Armstrong*, 37 App. D. C. 314, 169 O. G. 1185. A disclosure to one of two joint inventors is a disclosure to both. *General Electric Co. v. Steinberger*, 208 Fed. 699-714. Circumstances surrounding an alleged disclosure of invention may be such as to discredit the evidence, as where Jenner saw a notice of Dickinson’s invention in 1900, and did not file his own application for patent until he was induced to do so by Hildreth in 1902, it was held that no value can be attached to testimony on his behalf that he made the invention in 1899. *Jenner v. Dickinson; Thibodeau v. Dickinson*, 117 O. G. 600 (1905). And where for several years after the alleged conception, as appeared from the evidence, manufacturers were demanding a device of the kind in issue and the party made no disclosure to such manufacturers nor any attempt to reduce to practice, but endeavored to sell patents upon prior devices and failed on the express ground that they did not possess the advantages found in the present invention, it was held that his claims to early conception and disclosure are not entitled to consideration. *Hope, Jr., v. Voigt*, 115 O. G. 1585 (1905), 25 App. D. C. 22.

103. Corroboration of Inventor. Corroborating evidence means evidence which tends to support and render more probable some other evidence—generally that al-

The mere uncorroborated statements of an inventor are not sufficient to show conception, disclosure or reduction to practice. The same rule holds true as to joint inventors because joint inventors constitute but a single party and their minds and interests become one, hence they can not corroborate each other. Freeman v. Garrels & Kimball, 102 O. G. 1777 (1903); Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D. C. 264, 81 O. G. 1477; Garrels, et al., v. Freeman, 103 O. G. 1683, 21 App. D. C. 207; Paul v. Hess, 113 O. G. 847; Podelsak & Podelsak v. McInerney, 26 App. D. C. 399, 118 O. G. 835 (1905), 120 O. G. 2127. A witness may be able to corroborate the inventor as to certain details of his invention, even though his testimony does not corroborate him as to every detail sought to be established. Dunbar v. Schellengers, 125 O. G. 348 (1906). Statements in an inventor’s note book, alleged to disclose the invention in issue, are insufficient to prove conception, where it does not appear that the entry was ever shown to anyone. French v. Holcomb, 26 App. D. C. 307, 120 O. G. 1824 (1905). Vague and indefinite corroborating evidence of witnesses is insufficient to overcome a prior filing date of an opposing party. McKnight v. Pohle & Crossdale, 105 O. G. 977; Steinmetz v. Thomas, 31 App. D. C. 574, 137 O. G. 479 (1905); Smith v. Foley, et al., 136 O. G. 847 (1907); Burson v. Vogel, 125 O. G. 2361 (1906). The evidence should be clear and specific and not dependent upon inferences. Robinson v. Thresher, 18 Gour. 21-21 (March, 1906); Lotz v. Kenny, 19 Gour. 51-10 (July 13, 1907). The making of drawings on a specific date is not established by witnesses who have not had possession of the drawings since they were shown to them and who are not able to testify that they are in the same condition at the time their testimony is given as they were at the time they were shown to them. Miller v. Blackburn, 172 O. 61
G. 549 (1911); Kirkegaard & Jebsen v. Ries, 125 O. G. 1700 (1906); Freeman v. Garrels & Kimball, 102 O. G. 1777.

104. **Who May Be Corroborating Witnesses.** An assignee may testify as a corroborating witness, though his testimony would not be given the same weight as it would if he were disinterested. *Turnbull v. Curtis*, 120 O. G. 2442 (1905). The wife of the inventor. *Harter v. Barrett*, 114 O. G. 975. One joint inventor can not corroborate another joint inventor. *Freeman v. Garrels & Kimball*, 102 O. G. 1777 (1903).

105. **Importance of Date of Conception in Interference Cases.** In an interference case, the date of conception and disclosure becomes important on the question of priority, to the party who was last to file his application or last to reduce to practice, so when he is the first to conceive but the last to reduce to practice, he is entitled to an award of priority where he has followed up his conception and disclosure by due diligence, more particularly diligence in reducing his invention to actual practice than in filing his application for a patent or manufacturing his device for public use. *Oliver v. Feibel*, 20 App. D. C. 255, 100 O. G. 2384; 1902 O. D. 565; *Cooke v. Jones & Taylor*, 116 O. G. 1181 (1904).

106. **Diligence.** Many interference cases turn on the question as to which of the parties exercised diligence in following up his invention and putting it into practical, useful form. We have seen that invention is a mental process, in the first instance, and that so long as it remains in the mind of the inventor, undiscovered to anyone else, it serves the world no purpose and does not advance the arts or sciences. The inventor may refuse to disclose his discoveries. The object of the public in granting a patent is to obtain the benefit of the discovery and therefore inventors are encouraged to put their discoveries into practical useful form. Not only in patents, but in many other affairs of life, the law rewards the
diligent. An inventor may conceive an invention and make drawings of it, but he will not be permitted to stop at that point and through utter carelessness give it no more consideration for a long period of time, if while he is sitting idly by, another, more industrious, makes the same discovery that he has made and proceeds with due dispatch to put the discovery into form in which the public can obtain the benefit thereof. There can be no good reason for depriving this later, diligent, industrious inventor of a reward in the form of a patent, merely to accommodate the doless, idle inventor who has no excuse for holding back his invention.

There are, however, many circumstances which may contribute to prevent an inventor from putting his invention into useful form, and for this reason we hear the apparently delinquent as to what excuse he may have to offer for not being more diligent in reducing his invention to actual practice or what excuse he may have for not filing his application for a patent at an earlier date. The excuses which have been offered cover a wide range, and some have been found to be reasonable and legitimate while others have been found to be insufficient as against another inventor who has been diligent and has no need to offer excuses. Diligence is therefore the essence of the proper relation between conception and reduction to practice, and must consist of the degree of effort that can fairly be characterized as substantially one continuous act. Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Loew Mfg. Co., 243 Fed. 373. There is no fixed rule of diligence applicable to all cases alike. Whether the delay shown shall be regarded as excusable or inexcusable, must necessarily depend upon the special circumstances surrounding the actions of the party in the particular case where-in the application of the rule may be sought. Christensen v. Ellis, 94 O. S. 2561; 1901 C. D. 326, 17 App. D. C. 498.

Whoever first perfects a machine is entitled to the
patent therefor and is the real inventor, although others may have previously had the idea and made some experiments toward putting it in practice, subject, however, to this qualification, that if the party who conceives the invention was at the time of a second invention by another party using reasonable diligence in perfecting the same, he is entitled to be recognized as the first inventor, although the second to conceive may have been the first to reduce to practice, either actually or constructively. In other words, the inventor who starts work on an invention is required to keep working at it or show a good reason for not working at it or applying for a patent. Funk v. Matteson v. Haines, 20 App. D. C. 285, 100 O. G. 1704; 1902 C. D. 553; Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583.

107. To What Diligence Relates. Diligence relates to the efforts of a party to perfect his invention mechanically and not to efforts to exploit the invention commercially, so where a party is in straightened financial condition, he should devote his attention to securing means necessary to construct his machine, or, if unable to do that, to securing assistance to apply for a patent. See Berger v. Dodge, 113 O. G. 1415; Turnbull v. Curtis, 120 O. G. 2442 (1905).

108. Of Whom a Showing of Diligence Is Required. Diligence is required of the first to conceive but last to reduce to practice. Under our patent system, he who first arrives at a complete conception of an invention is entitled to a patent therefor, unless the interest of the public is compromised by his lack of diligence in demonstrating that his invention is capable of useful operation. As between two inventors of the same thing, the one who first reduces the discovery to practical operation is deemed prima facie the true inventor without regard to the date of his conception, but the earlier inventor may overcome such presumption by satisfactory evidence that he used due diligence to perfect and utilize the in-
vention, and actual reduction to practice is preferable
to that which is constructive merely. *Laus, et al., v.
Continental Paper Bag Co.*, 142 Fed. 479, 516; *Contin-
452; *Gabowsky v. Gallaher*, 191 O. G. 835.

109. When Not Applicable. A showing of diligence is
not required of the inventor who was the first to reduce
his invention to practice. *Gabowsky v. Gallaher*, 39
845, 46 App. D. C. 324; *Henderson v. Gilpin*, 186 O. G.
289.

110. At What Time Diligence Is Required. One who
is the first to conceive but the last to reduce to practice,
must show due diligence from a time just previous to the
entry of his opponent into the field. *Scott v. Laus &
Sponenberg*, 118 O. G. 1367 (1905); *Braun v. Wahl*,
45 App. D. C. 291, 228 O. G. 1458; *Givens v. Warren*,
216 O. G. 1013, 44 App. D. C. 10; *Christie v. Seybold*,
55 Fed. 69.

111. Comparative Diligence. Comparative diligence
of the parties is not material. *Paul v. Johnson*, 109 O. G.

112. Work On Auxiliary Inventions. That the inven-
tor was engaged in work on an auxiliary invention is gen-
erally no excuse except where it is necessary to have the
auxiliary invention perfected in order to use the inven-
96 O. G. 1432; 1901 C. D. 414; *Lotterhand v. Hanson*,
G. 835 (1905); *Turnbull v. Curtis*, 120 O. G. 2442
(1905).

113. Work on Other Forms of the Device. That the
inventor was at work on other forms of the device is or-
dinarily no valid excuse for doing nothing on the form
of device in issue. *Clement v. Richards, etc.*, 113 O. G.
1143; Briggs v. Lillie, etc., 116 O. G. 871 (1904); Jones v. Wolff, 17 Gour. 53-8 (July, 1905).

114. Work on Other Inventions. That the inventor was engaged in perfecting other inventions is no valid excuse for laying aside the invention in issue. Robinson v. Copeland, 111 O. G. 579; Liberman v. Williams, 23 App. D. C. 223, 109 O. G. 1610; Taylor v. Westinghouse, 119 O. G. 1257 (1905); Kilbourn v. Hiner, 124 O. G. 1841 (1906); Tower v. Yost, 19 Gour. 66-3 (July, 1907).

115. Business Convenience. While the inventor is not required to devote his entire time to the reduction of his invention to practice under circumstances which would ordinarily deprive him of the means whereby he obtains a livelihood, still he will not be permitted to offer as a valid excuse that because of a certain contract he had entered into he was prevented from perfecting his invention, or applying for a patent, or that his personal business commanded his time in another direction, or that he delayed action for the purpose of interesting some person of large capital for exploitation of the invention. Watson v. Thomas, 106 O. G. 1776 (1903); Mickle v. Read, 18 App. D. C. 128, 96 O. G. 426; 1901 C. D. 396; Clement v. Richards, etc., 113 O. G. 1143; Robinson v. Copeland, 24 App. D. C. 68, 112 O. G. 501; Taylor v. Westinghouse, 119 O. G. 1257 (1905); Seeberger v. Dodge, 114 O. G. 2382, 24 App. D. C. 476-485; Wyman v. Donnelly, 21 App. D. C. 81, 87; Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co. v. Bole, et al., 227 Fed. 607, 610.

116. Poverty. Where poverty is offered as an excuse for inactivity the claim will be carefully scrutinized, including the credit of the applicant, his expenditures in other directions, his earnings, his efforts to obtain assistance from others, and if too poor to construct his machine it must also appear that he was too poor to apply for a patent at an earlier date. Usually this excuse has not been established. Turnbull v. Curtis, 123
O. G. 2312 (1906); Feinberg v. Cowan, 29 App. D. C. 80, 125 O. G. 667 (1906), 128 O. G. 889; Woods v. Poor, 126 O. G. 391 (1906); Donnelly v. Wyman, 103 O. G. 657 (1903). Where poverty is the alleged excuse for not filing an application, it must be shown that the circumstances were of a compelling nature and not merely a matter of business convenience, and the filing of other applications in the meantime would rebut any such claim. Paul v. Hess, 113 O. G. 847, 115 O. G. 251; Turnbull v. Curtis, 120 O. G. 2442 (1905); McNeal v. Macey, 106 O. G. 2287 (1903); Gibbons v. Peller, 124 O. G. 624 (1906).


118. Shifting Responsibility to Guardian or Assignee. Since responsibility must rest upon someone, if a minor attributes his lack of diligence to his guardian, then the guardian must explain the reasons for delay. If through the intervention of the guardian the minor was prevented from perfecting his invention, then the minor must show diligence after he became of age. Fuller v. Jones, 115 O. G. 1066; Fuller v. Hewlett, 17 Gour. 3-6. Nor can responsibility for lack of diligence be shifted to an assignee. O’Connel v. Schmidt, 118 O. G. 588 (1905).

119. Making of Drawings and Blue Prints. The making of drawings and blue prints is no evidence of diligence unless it is followed promptly by construction and testing of the device, or by application for a patent. Watson v. Thomas, 108 O. G. 1590, 23 App. D. C. 65.
Large Cost. The great cost of building and testing an
invention is no valid excuse, if within the means of the

Infringement Suit. Where a party relies upon the
existence of an infringement suit as the cause of his
delay, he must show what there was in that infringe-
ment suit to prevent his reducing to practice the inven-
D. C. 469. Belief that a prior patent covered the issue
is no excuse. *Seeberger v. Dodge*, 114 O. G. 2382, 24
App. D. C. 476.

Sickness. Where one gives the excuse of sickness for
his inactivity, he must show that he was diligent up to
the time of his illness and subsequent thereto. *Paul v.

120. Time for Experimenting. Long delay in produc-
ing an invention will not be tolerated, especially where it
is shown that the inventor had, or could readily have ob-
tained facilities for speedy construction of his invention.

121. Reasonable Diligence—What Is. Reasonable
diligence, like "reasonable doubt" is not capable of any
exact definition. What is a reasonable time in one case,
may under other circumstances be unreasonable. The
court will grant great latitude when the inventor is de-
layed by reason of circumstances over which he has no
control; but where the delay is caused by the negli-
gence of the inventor, or for a manifest ulterior purpose,
no leniency whatever should be extended. *Nelson v.

Reasonable Diligence Shown. For particular cases
where the parties have been held to have exercised rea-
sonable diligence under the circumstances shown, see
*Rowe v. Brinkman*, 172 O. G. 1090; *Cragg v. Strickland*,
250 O. G. 255; *Sauer v. Groebli*, 239 O. G. 653; *Oakes

122. Diligence in Filing Application for Patent. After reduction to practice of the invention, a mere delay of the inventor in applying for a patent, in the absence of concealment (see Title Concealment), abandonment (see Title Abandonment), or suppression, will not prevent an inventor from obtaining a patent based on priority of invention. Rose v. Clifford, etc., 135 O. G. 1361 (1908); Hubbard v. Berg, 195 O. G. 818. So he is allowed a reasonable time to perfect his invention before applying for a patent. Mead v. Davis & Varney, 31 App. D. C. 590, 136 O. G. 2001 (1908). Even a delay of six years was permitted, where, notwithstanding the long delay, he was the first to file his application. Kellogg, etc., Co. v. International Telephone Mfg. Co., et al., 158 Fed. 104-108, 171 Fed. 651, 656. A delay of four years in filing an application, in the absence of evidence showing actual abandonment of the invention, was held not to estop the applicant on the ground of concealment stated in (Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D. C. 86, 84 O. G. 147). Rolfe v. Kaisling v. Leeper, 143 O. G. 562; Walker v. Lederer, 179 O. G. 851.

123. Intervening Rights. Inventors striving, in good faith, and with due diligence to perfect their inventions, instead of engaging in a race of diligence to reach the Patent Office with crude and probably inoperative devices, should be commended for their delay rather than be charged with laches; but there is sometimes a tendency to hold back applications for patents in order to circumvent rival claimants and to prolong the life of the monopolies granted, which tendency should be rebuked whenever it is possible to do so. Fesel v. Stock-
er, 17 App. D. C. 317, 94 O. G. 433; 1901 C. D. 269; McNeal v. Macey, 106 O. G. 2287 (1903). Where during a delay of six years a rival had entered the field, widely advertised the device and sold several thousand of them, it was held that the first to reduce to practice but who had secreted his invention, never made public use of it or otherwise gave it to the public, had lost his rights. Davis, etc., v. National Steam Specialty Co., 164 Fed. 191. One who conceives a broad invention but fails to claim it broadly, leaves the field open to specific inventions other than his own. He can not control all specific inventions by procuring a broad patent on the broad invention, the claim to which he did not advance prior to the making of a specific invention by a later inventor. Wood v. Beckman, 89 O. G. 2459, 15 App. D. C. 484.


125. Diligence of Attorney in Filing Application. Where the attorney was given the invention in February to prepare an application, the Patent Office drawings were made in July and the specifications were prepared in October, it was held that the party was not diligent, and that a showing that his attorney was sick for six weeks during that time, was not a sufficient excuse. Briggs v. Lillie, etc., 116 O. G. 871 (1904). A delay of three months by an attorney in filing an application was held not to constitute a lack of diligence. Poe v. Scharf, 130 O. G. 1309 (1907).

126. Diligence in Prosecuting Application. After a
party has filed his application his rights become fixed and he can not be charged with a lack of diligence because of delays in the prosecution of his application. Mckie v. Read, 18 App. D. C. 128, 96 O. G. 426; 1901 C. D. 396; McDuffee v. Hestonville, etc., Co., 181 Fed. 503-512; Young v. Struble, 153 O. G. 1223; Shreeve v. Grissinger, 202 O. G. 951 (1914).

127. Documentary Evidence—Letters. Where letters are offered in evidence accompanied by proof that they were received in the ordinary course of business; that the recipient was familiar with the signature of the party who purports to have written them; that they are in his handwriting or signed by him, they are admissible. Royce v. Kempshull, 125 O. G. 1347 (1906). Where letters were introduced as collateral evidence relating to the conduct of a party, and it was shown that they were received in the due course of business and acted upon by the writer and the person to whom they were sent, no other proof of their genuineness was necessary. Jones & Taylor v. Cooke, 25 App. D. C. 524, 117 O. G. 1493 (1905). A letter properly deposited in the United States mail will be presumed to have reached its destination and to have been received by the addressee in due course, but such presumption may be rebutted by evidence. Abbott’s Proof of Facts, page 664. This presumption is overcome by testimony of the addressee that he never received it. Ault v. Interstate Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 15 Wash. 627, 47 Pac. 13. Letters from an agent are admissible if the agency is established. Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637, 17 Law Ed. 601. Where a party testified that letters offered in evidence were received by him through the mail in answer to letters written by himself, they will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary, to be the letters of the party whose name is signed to them. Briggs v. Lillie, etc., 116 O. G. 871 (1904); Abbott’s Proof of Facts, page 660. If one party offers part of a connected correspondence, the
other party may offer the remainder thereof. Abbott's Proof of Facts, page 557.

Copies of Letters. Where the original letters are in possession of an adverse party and it is desired to introduce them in evidence, notice should be served on the adverse party or his attorney to produce them at a certain time and place, or on failure to do so, letter press or other copies thereof will be offered, but in such case proof should be offered that the copies are correct copies of the original. Boyce v. Kempshall, 125 O. G. 1347. The writer's execution of the letter must be shown before it is admissible in evidence, unless it is shown to have been mailed at the writer's place of residence and to be in answer to a letter previously written to him. Abbott's Proof of Facts, page 659.

128. Refreshing Memory of Witness. Books, memoranda, letters or documents of most any kind may be used by the witness to refresh his memory as to the date of the happening of an event, but such means of refreshing the memory are not in themselves evidence proper to be introduced in evidence by the party who offers the witness, for the contents of such instruments, etc., may not in any manner bear upon the issue and may be wholly foreign to the issues; but on cross-examination opposing counsel may require the production of the memoranda used by the witness, in order that he may cross-examine upon the same. Abbott's Proof of Facts, pages 403 and 487. Laas & Spenceburg v. Scott, 122 O. G. 352; Lowrie v. Taylor & Taylor, 123 O. G. 1665 (1906), 27 App. D. C. 522.

129. Photographs—Secondary Evidence. In most cases photographs are secondary evidence. The thing photographed is the primary evidence unless the photograph itself is the thing in dispute, but it would seem that photographs of things which it is manifestly impossible to produce before the tribunal should be received if they are accompanied by proper proof that
they are correct representations of such things or are offered as a part of the oral testimony of a witness. Abbott's Proof of Facts, pages 792, 793.

130. Blue Prints are copies of some original, but they may be introduced as a part of the testimony of a witness and as such are made a part of his oral testimony. Fessenden v. Pierce, 21 Gour. 21-11 (Mar., 1909).

131. Drawings. One relying upon drawings to fix the time of conception or disclosure, must not only produce the drawings but he must also establish the fact as to when the drawings were made or disclosed to others, and the inventor's own statements, uncorroborated, are not sufficient to show when the drawings were made or when the drawings were exhibited to another. Freeman v. Garrels & Kimball, 102 O. G. 1777 (1903).

132. Exhibits. Exhibits not properly marked, though filed in the Patent Office, need not be considered. However the party was permitted to offer ex parte affidavits as furnishing a foundation for proof that they are the identical exhibits offered in evidence and the party was permitted to take proofs to establish such fact. Helder v. Graf, 96 O. G. 2063; 1901 C. D. 130.

Exhibits, except by consent of the parties to the cause, can not be taken from the Patent Office. They will, however, be sent in charge of an employee of the office. Sciler v. Goldberg, 116 O. G. 595.

Identification of Exhibits. Where the witnesses identify an exhibit by its general appearance and have no knowledge of the invention embodied in it and it appears that the invention in controversy is a feature of construction almost hidden from view and having no effect upon the general appearance, such testimony does not prove the existence of the invention in controversy at the date stated. Harris v. Stern & Lotz, 105 O. G. 259 (1903).

The claim has often been made that exhibits were changed after being introduced in evidence, or after fil-
ing. To avoid such controversies, the exhibit should be carefully described at the time of its introduction.

133. Reduction to Practice—Actual. To constitute actual reduction to practice it is necessary (except in certain cases where actual test is manifestly unnecessary) to do more than make the device or machine. It must be shown that the machine was capable of performing the work for which it was designed, at least to a small degree of efficiency. *Macdonald v. Edison*, 105 O. G. 973 (1903). *Sale Commercially*. So where the evidence showed that the machine had been built, practically tested and sold commercially as an operative machine, the facts were held to establish beyond a reasonable doubt a reduction to practice. *Otis Elevator Co., et al., v. Interborough, etc., Co.*, 222 Fed. 501. The machine must embody the elements of the issue, be put to practical use and operated successfully to perform the particular work for which it was intended. The fact that the inventor afterwards constructed one or more other machines with a view to greater mechanical perfection, or where the inventor constructs a cheaper or lighter machine, or changes certain details to perfect it for the trade, such subsequent constructions do not alter the fact that the former construction was a reduction to practice. *Thomas v. Trissel*, 107 O. G. 265 (1903); *Trissel v. Thomas*, 109 O. G. 809, 23 App. D. C. 219; *Hein v. Buhoup*, 81 O. G. 2088; *Blackford v. Wilder*, 104 O. G. 578 (1903), 21 App. D. C. 1.

Mere progress to an end is not sufficient, however near that progress may have been to the end in view. The law requires certainty and the inventor must show that his machine was actually capable of performing the work for which it was intended. *Funk v. Matteson v. Haines*, 20 App. D. C. 285, 100 O. G. 1764; 1902 C. D. 553; *Macdonald v. Edison*, 21 App. D. C. 527, 105 O. G. 1263 (1903).

The Mechanism Claimed Must Operate Successfully.
Though it is not necessary that the machine be perfect or that all parts of the machine in which it is used shall be mechanically perfect, still, as to that part of the machine which is in issue, there must be successful operation. A failure can not be excused by making the claim that a skilled mechanic could have made it operate successfully. *Sweihart v. Maudlin*, 99 O. G. 665; 1902 C. D. 137. (See Tests.)

**134. Imperfections.** To constitute a reduction to practice it is not necessary that a machine be perfect, but it must appear that a structure embodying all the essential elements of the invention did accomplish the result for which it was intended, in a reasonably practical way. A machine may be even crude and not made with materials which would ordinarily and naturally be used by a manufacturer and still be a reduction to practice, if in such form it is practically operative and performs the function for which it is intended. *Cummings v. McKenzie*, 110 O. G. 1167; *American Co. v. Tool Co.*, 4 Fisher 299; *Hulwood v. Lator v. Boekhoff*, 21 App. D. C. 61, 103 O. G. 887 (1903); *Spaulding v. Norden*, 24 App. D. C. 286, 112 O. G. 2091, 114 O. G. 1823; *Smith v. Brooks*, 24 App. D. C. 75, 112 O. G. 953; *Hope, Jr., v. Voight*, 25 App. D. C. 22, 115 O. G. 1585 (1905); *Lowe v. Taylor & Taylor*, 27 App. D. C. 522, 123 O. G. 1665 (1906); *Burson v. Vogel*, 29 App. D. C. 388, 131 O. G. 942 (1907).

**135. Crude Structure.** Where a structure was so crude as to make it necessary to make further experiments before undertaking to build machines in accordance with the exhibit and it appears that it is essentially an experimental device, it is not a reduction to practice. *Occumpaugh v. Norton*, 25 App. D. C. 90, 115 O. G. 1850; *Liendermeyer v. Hoffman, et al.*. 18 App. D. C. 1, 95 O. G. 838 (1901).

**136. Reduction to Practice in a Foreign Country.** The construction of a successful device in a foreign country

137. **Reduction to Practice by An Assignee.** Where an invention has been assigned, the assignee may reduce it to practice and such reduction inures to the benefit of such assignee, whether the inventor contributes to the reduction or not, and even though the machine constructed may embody features patently different from the original. *Thomas v. Stewart*, 202 O. G. 1259 (1913), 42 App. D. C. 222.


139. **Model.** While a model, in the strict meaning of that term, is not a reduction to practice, nevertheless, where a device was called a model but was actually used for the purpose intended and completely demonstrated its practicability, even though but half size of a commercial machine, it was held to be a reduction to practice. *Gallagher v. Hein*, 25 App. D. C. 77, 115 O. G. 1330 (1905); *Hammond v. Busch*, 115 O. G. 804, 24 App. D. C. 469; *Hope, Jr., v. Voight*, 25 App. D. C. 22; 115 O.

140. Machine Incomplete at the Time of Taking Testimony. Though a machine may not be complete at the time of taking testimony, if it is clearly established that the missing parts were present at the time it was operated, and where it also appears that the test showed successful operation, it would be a reduction to practice. Basch v. Hammond, 113 O. G. 551; Brooks v. Seelinger, 116 O. G. 1735 (1905); Wyman v. Donnelly, 104 O. G. 310 (1903), 21 App. D. C. 81. And where the device only required the addition of a mechanical detail which any mechanic skilled in the art would have supplied and such detail itself is old in the art, it was held a reduction to practice. Howard v. Bowes, 137 O. G. 733 (1908), 31 App. D. C. 619.

TESTS.


When Tests Are Not Necessary. When a device is so simple that it is apparent upon inspection that it will perform the intended function, no test is necessary to establish a reduction to practice. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D. C. 86, 84 O. G. 147; 1898 C. D. 510; Lindemeyer v. Hoffman, et al., 18 App. D. C. 1, 95 O. G. 838; 1901 C. D. 353; Loomis v. Hauser, 19 App. D. C. 401, 99 O. G. 1172; 1902 C. D. 530; Landa v. Kavle, 158 O. G. 228 (1910); Gaisman v. Gillette, 165 O. G. 244; Cham-

Particular Devices, Tests of Which Were Held Necessary:


Bottle cap so crude as not to be capable of actual use. *Lindemeyer v. Hoffman*, 95 O. G. 838.


142. Kind of Test Required. The kind of test that is required is a test which will show that the machine as constructed did perform the work which it was intended to perform, and though it is safer practice to show a test under actual service conditions such showing may not be necessary if its practicability can be established by a test elsewhere. Roe v. Hanson, 99 O. G. 2550; 1902 C. D. 546; Rolfe v. Hoffman, 121 O. G. 1350 (1905) Ebersole v. Durkin, 132 O. G. 842 (1907).


An experimental test may or may not establish a reduction to practice, depending upon the nature of the invention and the results shown by the test. Mills v. Torrance, 17 Gour. 67-6 (Oct., 1905); Dashiell v. Tasker, 21 App. D. C. 64, 103 O. G. 2147 (1903), 102 O. G. 1551.

Mechanical changes may be necessary and still constitute a reduction to practice. It is only necessary that

143. Parts Broken. The mere fact that some part was broken during the test does not necessarily show an unsuccessful operation, if it was ordinary breakage which might be expected of similar machines under similar conditions. *Double v. Mills,* 112 O. G. 1747. But where, as a result of breaking the materials had to be changed, as well as the shape of the device, the test was held insufficient. *Gilman & Brown v. Hinson,* 118 O. G. 1933 (1905). And where in the test the device was crushed to fragments, it was held not a sufficient test. *Gallagher v. Heine,* 114 O. G. 974. Where the device was embodied in an automobile and after a run of eighty miles, certain parts were broken, even though the injury did not appear to be to the novel parts, it was held an insufficient test. *Huff v. Gutlick,* 38 App. D. C. 334, 179 O. G. 579. But where a machine had been used for six months and the only broken part was a rivet supporting one of the parts, the test was held sufficient. *Pool v. Wenk,* 118 O. G. 1366 (1905).

144. Must Include All the Elements of the Issue. The test must generally include all the elements of the issue. *Henderson v. Gilpin,* 186 O. G. 239 (1911), 39 App. D. C. 428, 187 O. G. 231; *Mickle v. Scott & Scott,* 40 App. D. C. 17, 190 O. G. 1030; *Hett v. Swinnerton,* 181 O. G. 542 (1911). But where some of the elements were old and the nature of the invention was such that a test was hardly necessary, it was held that the test established a successful reduction to practice even though lacking some elements of the issue. *Stewart v. Thomas,* 202 O. G. 1262, 42 App. D. C. 222.

145. When Test Must Be Made. To overcome a prior filing date, the test must have been made prior to the filing date of the opposing party. *Mickle v. Scott & Scott,* 190 O. G. 1030, 40 App. D. C. 17.
146. Chemical Compound Test. It is sufficient to show that the compound had some apparent usefulness. *Potter v. Tone*, 163 O. G. 729 (1911); *Silverman v. Hendrickson*, 99 O. G. 445; 1902 C. D. 123.

147. Process Test. A process may be shown to have been successfully reduced to practice even though the product was defective, due to defective material and not to the fact that the process was not successfully carried out. *Appert v. Brownsville Plate Glass Co.*, 144 Fed. 115, 118.

148. Two Forms of Machine—One Test. Where after making a successful test of one form of machine, the inventor made an improved form and showed the second form in his application, making broad claims, including the first form, it was held a reduction to practice. *Wyman v. Donnelly*, 21 App. D. C. 81, 104 O. G. 310 (1903). Affirming Commissioner, 103 O. G. 657.

149. Evidence of Success of Test. In proving successful operation, care should be exercised to avoid introducing merely the conclusions or opinions of the witnesses (unless they are persons skilled in the art) without stating the facts upon which such opinions or conclusions are based, and it is not sufficient for the witnesses to state that a machine was tested and found satisfactory. While such evidence may be entitled to some weight, it is plain that in most cases such evidence would be merely the opinion or conclusions of the witnesses arrived at from what they observed during the test. The tribunal trying the case is the ultimate judge of whether the tests were satisfactory, and therefore such tribunal is entitled to know what was done at such tests and particularly what results were obtained. *Robinson v. Thresher*, 123 O. G. 2627, 28 App. D. C. 22, 123 O. G. 2976 (1906); *Daggett v. Kaufmann*, 33 App. D. C. 450, 145 O. G. 1024. Where the invention was a friction spring and the evidence showed that it was put in a vice and subjected to pressure, but there were no facts ap-
pearing of record which showed what the pressure was, nor any facts stated which would enable the court to determine whether the statement of the inventor that the test was satisfactory, was justified, it was held insufficient to show a reduction to practice. *Gallagher, Jr. v. Hein*, 25 App. D. C. 77, 115 O. G. 1330 (1905); *Emmet v. Fullager*, 124 O. G. 2178 (1906).

150. Opinions of Witnesses Skilled in the Art. The Court of Appeals, D. C., in the case of *Sreeberger v. Russell*, 121 O. G. 2328, 26 App. D. C. 344, held that the opinions of witnesses skilled in the art and who were shown to have understood the invention or construction, that the device operated successfully, was sufficient to show reduction to practice though the facts upon which such conclusions were based were not stated. *Horton v. Zimmer*, 32 App. D. C. 217, 137 O. G. 2223 (1908); *Hopkins v. Peters & Dement*, 199 O. G. 1243, 41 App. D. C. 302; *Ebersole v. Durkin*, 132 O. G. 842 (1907).

151. Description of Invention Tested. It must of course clearly appear that the invention in issue is what was tested, and the witnesses who testify to its successful operation must be shown to have understood the invention. *Schmidt v. Clark*, 138 O. G. 768, 32 App. D. C. 290.

152. Tests Made at Time of Trial. Where a machine is operated at the time of trial for the purpose of showing that it will operate successfully, and witnesses are produced who testify that the machine is in the same condition as when it was first operated, and that the last operation is the same as the first, such facts would establish a reduction to practice. *Gordon v. Wentworth*, 130 O. G. 2065 (1907); *Putnum v. Wetmore & Niemann*, 181 O. G. 269, 39 App. D. C. 138. But where a party has failed to prove successful operation, he can not at the final hearing, operate an exhibit to show that it is in operative condition and would have so operated when first constructed. *Taylor v. Gilman*, 158 O. G. 883
153. Organized Machine Successful—Presumption as to Subsidiary Parts. If an organized machine was successfully operated, it will be presumed that its subsidiary parts also operated successfully. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Greenman, 153 Fed. 283, 286.

Adoption for Commercial Use. Where an invention had been tested by the government and adopted as a model for the production of others like it, it was held to show a reduction to practice. Schneider v. Driggs, 162 O. G. 1000, 36 App. D. C. 116. Commissioner's decision, 162 O. G. 269.

154. Circumstances Discouraging Test. Where a witness after having used a tool, recommended the adoption of another similar tool, it was held that such conduct was stronger evidence that the test was unsatisfactory than his testimony that it was satisfactory. Double v. Mills, 112 O. G. 1747. The construction of another device to obviate defects in a prior device, tends to show that the first device was unsatisfactory. Marconi v. Shoemaker, 131 O. G. 1939 (1907). So work on a similar device or devices tends to show that the first was unsatisfactory. Jobski, etc. v. Johnson, 247 O. G. 479, 47 App. D. C. 230. Where a machine was constructed and tested for a short time but subsequently dismantled and parts of the same were lost and the machine was never again used by other similar machines made for several years, a presumption arises that the machine was unsatisfactory. Indianager v. Hien, 25 App. D. C. 77, 83; 1905 O. D. 624; Seeberger v. Russell, 117 O. G. 2086. But on the facts in the latter case the Court of Appeals, D. C., arrived at a different conclusion. 26 App. D. C. 344. But the mere fact that a machine was used but little and was then dismantled, is not conclusive that it was not successfully operated, for failure to use the machine may be satisfactorily explained. Staubon v. Howe,


Weight of Evidence. Ex parte tests will not be given as much weight as tests made in the presence of both parties. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Niles, etc., 160 Fed. 880. Affirmed, 173 Fed. 1019.

154a. Patentability of the Issue—Rule 130. One who desires to question the patentability of the issue to his opponent, should first make a motion to dissolve under Rule 122, upon the ground that the claims are not patentable to his opponent, or in other words, that his opponent has no right to make the claims, and he may then argue the question on final hearing. Rule 130 is intended to provide for the contingency that one party may have the right to make the claims and another party may not have the right to make them. It can not be urged under this rule that none of the parties, including the moving party, have a right to make the claims, or that the counts are not patentable, generally, over the prior art. But where a motion to dissolve assails the right of one of the parties for any reason to make the claims, the question of priority is directly involved, since one who can not make the claims would not in any event be entitled to an award of priority. Elsom v. Bonner & Golde, 246 O. G. 299, 46 App. D. C. 230. Rule 130 only gives a party the right to argue at final hearing the unpatentability of the claims to an opponent, and then only when it is material.
to the right of such party to a patent, and other questions arising on motion to dissolve, may not be presented on final hearing, nor can a party argue the patentability of the issue over the prior art. *Molyneux v. Onderdonk*, 191 O. G. 292 (1918); *Havemeyer v. Coryell*, 186 O. G. 558 (1912); *Weis v. Mack*, 185 O. G. 830 (1912); *Smith & Larsen v. Hill*, 177 O. G. 523 (1912). The right of a party to argue at final hearing the right of his opponent to make the claims, is conditioned upon his having first moved to dissolve upon that ground, or having presented a sufficient reason for his failure to do so. *Weis v. Mack*, 185 O. G. 830 (1912); *Broadwell v. Long*, 164 O. G. 252, 36 App. D. C. 418. However, the office may consider the question upon its own motion, even though no motion to dissolve has been made. *Smith v. Foley, etc.*, 136 O. G. 847 (1907). A cause will not be set down for final hearing under Rule 130 except upon motion, which motion should be made before, but may be made after, entry of judgment upon the record. *Noble v. Levine*, 180 O. G. 602 (1912). Where a party moves to amend the issue under Rule 109, and his opponent opposes the motion upon the ground that the moving party has no right to make the claims, such opponent may urge at final hearing under Rule 130, the nonpatentability of the claims presented by such amendment. *Leonard v. Pardoe*, 164 O. G. 249 (1911). Since the operativeness of an opponent’s device goes to his right to make the claims, this question may be presented on final hearing under Rule 130, where the question has previously been presented on motion to dissolve. *Barber v. Wood*, 127 O. G. 1991 (1907).


156. Abandoned Experiment. The proofs tending to establish a reduction to practice must be considered as a whole with all the surrounding circumstances of the
case and the action of the inventor with respect to his invention, whether he made or attempted to make use of it, or pursue his object to any final conclusion, whether he made any attempt to apply for a patent, whether he gave up his original structure and proceeded to work on some other or similar device for similar use, after testing the original, or threw the original on the scrap heap, permitting parts thereof to be lost, or delayed giving it any further consideration until he learned of a rival in the field. It would therefore be quite impossible to state any general rule as to what is and what is not merely an abandoned experiment, since each case must rest upon the particular facts and circumstances shown. *Oeum
paugh v. Norton*, 25 App. D. C. 90, 115 O. G. 1850 (1905). Where an inventor does not use his machine, but permits it to slumber and does not apply for a patent, he can not resort to such invention as an anticipation of a subsequent patent by another. *Welshbach Light Co.
v. Cohn*, 181 Fed. 122, 125. And where an invention is laid aside for six years until it is discovered that another has entered the field with a similar device, such inaction would strongly tend to show that the invention was impractical, or if operative, had been abandoned. *Curtain Supply Co. v. National Lock Washer Co.*, 178 Fed. 95.

**Discarding the Invention After Test.** Where one throws aside his invention after test and does nothing more until he learns of others making a similar device, such action would indicate that the alleged invention was merely an experiment. *Lawrence v. Voight*, 147 O. G. 235 (1909); *Lemp v. Mudge*, 114 O. G. 763, 24 App. D. C. 282; *Gilman & Brown v. Hinson*, 201 O. G. 1219 (1913); *Whipple v. Sharp*, 112 O. G. 1749.

**Another Device Put Upon the Market After Test.** The circumstance that another device was put upon the market by the inventor, or those who were given charge thereof, after test of the invention in question, would in-

**Inaction in the Face of Demand for the Invention.** Total abandonment of effort in the face of a strong demand for the invention is proof positive that the device amounted only to an abandoned experiment. *Lemp v. Mudge*, 24 App. D. C. 282, 114 O. G. 763; *Reichenbach v. Kelley*, 94 O. G. 1185; 1901 C. D. 282.

**Delay as Evidence of Abandoned Experiment.** A long delay after alleged reduction to practice, during which time the inventor develops other inventions, is convincing evidence that the alleged reduction to practice was merely an abandoned experiment. *Moore v. Hewitt*, 31 App. D. C. 577, 136 O. G. 1535 (1908). A delay of four years in applying for a patent is strong evidence that the device was not successful. *Fefeller v. Stocker*, 94 O. G. 433; 1901 C. D. 269; *Quist v. Ostrom*, 108 O. G. 2147, 23 App. D. C. 69.

**Refusal to Adopt After Test.** Where those who were relied upon to market the device abandoned the enterprise after test and refuse further assistance thereafter and nothing further was done by the inventor for several years, the invention was held to be an abandoned experiment. *Pohle v. McKnight*, 119 O. G. 2519 (1905).

**Abandoned for Financial Reasons.** Where a party can make satisfactory proof showing that his inactivity was
due to lack of finances and it is further shown that his device was practically operated, such inactivity will not be regarded as an abandonment of the invention, nor as proof that his reduction to practice was merely an abandoned experiment. *Columbia Motor Car Co., et al. v. C. A. Durr & Co., et al.*, 184 Fed. 893, 900.

**Work Done by Hand After Alleged Reduction to Practice.** Where the invention is intended to dispense with hand work and for three years after the alleged reduction to practice the inventor continued to do the work by hand, such circumstance was held to show that the invention was merely an abandoned experiment and not a reduction to practice. *Jenner v. Dickinson, etc.*, 116 O. G. 1181 (1904).

**Making a Second Machine.** Where the inventor makes a second machine differing from the first merely in improvement in details, such fact does not show that the first machine was not successful. *Brooks v. Smith*, 110 O. G. 2013.


The doctrine of concealment is however, a strict one which will not be enforced except in cases which come clearly within it. So where there is nothing to indicate that a party was induced to file because of knowledge of activity on the part of another, and there are no circumstances to impugn his good faith, or he can satisfactorily explain his inaction and such explanation appears reasonable and in accord with conduct which might be reasonably expected of a person who was honestly seeking to give the public the benefit of his invention, he can not be charged with concealment. Brown v. Blood, 105 O. G. 976 (1903); Gaisman v. Gillette, 36 App. D. C. 440; Hubbard v. Berg, 40 App. D. C. 577; Stewart v. Thomas, 42 App. D. C. 222; Pirmann v. Chisholm, 44 App. D. C. 460; Lederer v. Walker, 182 O. G. 511; Hathaway v. Field, 261 O. G. 413, 1919 C. D. 460; Aufero v. Monnot, 242 O. G. 750, 46 App. D. C. 297.

The fact that an inventor conceals and suppresses his invention after reduction to practice and does nothing more with it in the way of giving the public the benefit of it, or applying for a patent, until he obtains some definite knowledge that another party has made the same invention and put it into use, or has applied for a patent, is usually sufficient to cause the first inventor to lose any rights he may have originally had in such invention. Matthes v. Burt, 24 App. D. C. 265, 114 O. G. 764; Gordon v. Wentworth, 31 App. D. C. 150, 135 O. G. 1125 (1908); Dreckschmidt v. Schaefer & Holmes, 246 O. G. 301; Whitney v. Brewer, 177 O. G. 1296. So where a party after reducing his invention to practice, put it aside for more than a year until he discovered that his rival had put his invention upon the market, it was held that he must be charged with concealment. Howard v. Bowes, 31 App. D. C. 619, 137 O. G. 733 (1908). The
question as to who was first to file his application is not material as to one who is properly chargeable with concealment. Whitney v. Brewer, 177 O. G. 1296.

Disclosing to Others as Affecting Concealment. Where the inventor does not keep his invention secret but discloses it to others, there is no abandonment of the invention by concealment. Chisholm v. Pieran, 225 O. G. 1105 (1915). Nor where the inventor showed his invention to his opponent. Meyer v. Surfert, 102 O. G. 1555 (1903).

158. Originality. One of the questions which may arise in an interference and which is pertinent to the issue of priority, is that of originality. It is plain that one who has derived his knowledge of the invention from his opponent is not an inventor. Evidence that a third party, who is not a party to the record, invented the device in issue, is not material, hence evidence as to originality will be confined to the parties to the interference. Foster v. Antisdel, 88 O. G. 1527, 14 App. D. C. 552; Pope v. McKenzie, 38 App. D. C. 111, 176 O. G. 1072; Thomas v. Weintraub, 175 O. G. 1097 (1911); Herman v. Fullman, 107 O. G. 1094; Bauer v. Crone, 118 O. G. 1071; Doble v. Henry, 118 O. G. 2249 (1905).

159. Burden of Proof. The burden of proving lack of originality is upon the one who asserts it, and the fact must be established by clear evidence in any case, but where the party against whom the charge is made has a patent which was granted prior to applicant's filing date, then the applicant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, want of originality in such patentee. Kreag v. Green, 124 O. G. 1208 (1906); Funk v. Matthews v. Haines, 100 O. G. 1764 (1902), 20 App. D. C. 235, 100 O. G. 1563; 1902 C. D. 297; Swinglehurst v. Ballard, 265 O. G. 459 (1919), 258 Fed. 973.

160. How Established. Lack of originality is a difficult fact to prove since direct evidence is not ordinarily obtainable and resort must be had to circumstantial
evidence. As has often been said in criminal cases, circumstantial evidence is as reliable as any other evidence, provided the circumstances pointing to the existence of the fact in question are so complete in detail that no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn from them than that such fact exists. *Reinhart v. Gibson*, 185 O. G. 1383, 39 App. D. C. 358.

161. Opportunity of Derivation. It is proper to show that a party had an opportunity of deriving his knowledge of the invention from his opponent, and the fact that he had such opportunity would be a strong circumstance tending to establish lack of originality, but the mere existence of such opportunity would not of itself be sufficient to establish lack of originality. *Wood v. Poor*, 126 O. G. 391 (1906); *Cutler v. Keeney*, 17 Gour. 66-2 (Aug., 1905). Where two parties appear with the same invention, identical in many novel details, there would be a strong suspicion that one derived his knowledge from the other, if it also be shown that he had an opportunity to so derive such knowledge. *Beal v. Shuman*, 120 O. G. 655 (1905).

162. Failure to Rebut Evidence of Lack of Originality—Effect. The failure of a party to rebut the sworn statement of his adversary that he fully disclosed the invention to him, is conclusive evidence that the latter was not the first inventor, and the oath filed with the application of the party so charged, is not sufficient to overcome the effect of such testimony. *Winslow v. Austin*, 14 App. D. C. 137; *Hewlett v. Steinberger*, 40 App. D. C. 287, 190 O. G. 270; *Royce v. Kempshall*, 125 O. G. 1347 (1906).

163. Sufficiency of Disclosure to Prove the Charge. Where one alleged that he communicated the invention to his opponent, he must show exactly what the nature of the communication was and that is was full and clear as to all essential elements of the invention, so as to enable the party to whom such disclosure was made to give it

**Reduction to Practice by One Inures to the Benefit of the Other.** Where one who has derived his knowledge of an invention from another reduces it to practice, such reduction to practice inures to the benefit of the one who made the disclosure. *Shuman v. Beall*, 123 O. G. 1664.

164. **Employer and Employee.** Where one employs another to construct or improve a machine, the presumption is that the resulting machine or improvement is the invention of the employer, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary. *Thibodeau v. Hildreth*, 117 O. G. 601, 25 App. D. C. 320. The burden of proof that the invention is that of the employee rather than that of the employer, is upon the employee in such cases, but the employer must show that he disclosed to the employee more than the result desired and that he did not leave it to the employee to invent the means of accomplishing the result. He must show that his instructions not only embodied the result to be attained but also the means of accomplishing the result. *Corry, et al. v. McDermott*, 117 O. G. 279, 25 App. D. C. 305; *Robinson v. McCormick*, 128 O. G. 3289 (1907); *McKeen v. Jerdone*, 34 App. D. C. 163, 153 O. G. 272; *Ladoff v. Dempster*, 166 O. G. 511, 36 App. D. C. 520; *Eshelman v. Shantz*, 189 O. G. 1282, 39 App. D. C. 434.

**When the Rule Does Not Apply.** The rule does not apply unless the employee is engaged in perfecting the device under the direction of the employer. *Soley v. Hebbard*, 5 App. D. C. 99; *Jameson & Yeserba v. Ellsworth*, 192 O. G. 218, 40 App. D. C. 164; *Schroeder v. Wageley & Stoeke*, 118 O. G. 268 (1905). Nor where one is employed merely as a draughtsman. *Miller v. Blackburn*, 172 O. G. 549 (1911). Nor where the mak-
ing of the improvement is not within the line of the duties of the employee. *Peckham v. Price*, 118 O. G. 1934 (1905).


**Fellow Employees—Principal and Assistant.** The same rule of law that applies to employer and employee, applies with like force to principal and assistant, though they are fellow employees. *Braunstein v. Holmes*, 133 O. G. 1937 (1908).

165. Inoperativeness. Where a party to an interference desires to present evidence that the structure of his opponent is inoperative, and since the question of the operativeness of the device goes to the question of the right to make the claims, he should proceed in accordance with Rule 130, first to prosecute a motion to dissolve before the Primary Examiner (Law Examiner),
and subsequently, if necessary, bring a motion before the Examiner of Interferences for leave to take testimony as to the operativeness of his opponent's device. *Pym v. Hadaway*, 125 O. G. 1702; *Lowry & Cowley v. Spoon*, 122 O. G. 2687; *Brown v. Stroud*, 122 O. G. 2688. But in *Ritter v. Krakau*, 104 O. G. 1897, it was held that a party must anticipate ordinary attacks upon his evidence and that testimony taken as to the operativeness of a device offered in evidence by a senior party would not be stricken out.

**Character of Showing Required—Motion to Take Testimony as to Operativeness.** As a prerequisite to the right to take testimony as to the operativeness of an opponent's device it is not necessary that the moving party make an absolutely conclusive showing of inoperativeness, but if he makes out a prima facie case of inoperativeness thereof, which does not extend to his own, and it appears that it would be a matter of great difficulty to decide the question of operativeness from a mere inspection of the application and it can not be determined that a decision so arrived at would be the same as would be reached in the light of information that might be derived from witnesses expert in the art to which the invention relates, a motion for leave to take testimony should be granted. *Lowry & Cowley v. Spoon*, 124 O. G. 1846 (1906); *Brown v. Stroud*, 122 O. G. 2688.

**Counter Affidavits.** While an opposing party may attack the sufficiency of the motion, he should not present counter affidavits. *Clement v. Browne v. Stroud*, 126 O. G. 2589 (1907).

166. **Public Use.** It may not be possible to give any accurate definition of the term "public use," but the general principles by which we may determine whether or not a certain use is a public use or otherwise, are fairly well established by the decisions.

The use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of another person under his direction, by way of experi-
ment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as a public use. When the subject of the invention is a machine, it may be tested and tried in a building either with or without closed doors, in either case, such use is not a public use within the meaning of the statute so long as the inventor is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation. He may see cause to alter it or improve it or not. His experiments will reveal the fact whether any alterations may be necessary, if durability is one of the qualities to be attained, a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished. And though during all that period he may not find that any changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using the machine only by way of experiment, and no one would say that such use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the quality of the machine, would be public use, within the meaning of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own control and does not lose his right to a patent. It would not be necessary in such case that his machine be put up and used only in the inventor's own shop or premises. He may have it put up and used on the premises of another, and the use may inure to the benefit of the owner of the establishment. Still, if used under the surveillance of the inventor, and for the purpose of enabling him to test the machine and ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended, and make such alterations and improvements as experience demonstrates to be necessary, it will still be an experimental use and not a public use, within the meaning of the statute. But if the inventor allows his machine to be used by other persons generally, either with or without compensation, or if it is with his consent, put on sale for such use, then it will be in public use and on public sale within the meaning of the law.

Whether the use of an invention is public or private, does not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom its use is known. If the inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, within the meaning of the statute, even though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to one person. Eggbert v. Lippman, 104 U. S. 333, 336; Root v. Third Ave. R. Co., 146 U. S. 221, 36 L. Ed. 951. So where one uses the invention himself for his own profit and advantage, it is public use. International Tooth Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U. S. 63, 35 L. Ed. 347.

Where the invention is a machine designed to manufacture articles, the inventor may make use of or sell such product as he may make while so experimenting, without bringing himself within the statute as to public use. But if the invention is upon the article, the sale of the article would be public use. Bryce Bros. Co. v. Seneca Glass Co., 140 Fed. 161.

167. Character of Evidence as to Experimental Use. Where use for more than two years prior to the application for a patent is established, it is incumbent upon the patentee to show by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that such use was experimental with a view to perfecting the mechanism and improve its operation or test its qualities. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U. S. 264, 31 L. Ed. 146.

Public Use in Interference Cases. It seems that the action of the Patent Office relating to public use is not conclusive against the parties and a review may be had in an action in equity under Section 4918, Revised St. Dittrgen v. Racine Paper Goods Co., et al., 181 Fed. 394.

The fact that a party to an interference proceeding
has been awarded a judgment of priority does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to a patent, for it may appear in the course of the proceedings that there is a statutory bar to a grant of a patent to him. *Sobey v. Holsclaw*, 28 App. D. C. 65, 126 O. G. 3041; 1907 C. D. 465; *Burson v. Vogel*, 29 App. D. C. 348, 131 O. G. 942; *United States ex rel., Dunkley v. Ewing, Com'r*, 203 O. G. 603, 42 App. D. C. 176.

168. **Public Use Proceedings When and How Instituted.** Since the institution of public use proceedings is within the discretion of the Commissioner, after consideration of the prima facie proofs presented, the petitioner should present with his petition sufficient affidavits to make out a prima facie case of public use against the applicant, serve the other party or parties with due notice of the filing and hearing of the petition, offer to produce the witnesses for examination and bear the expense. And where such petition is filed before the taking of testimony as to priority, the public use proceeding will take precedence. *In re United States Wood Preserving Co.*, 153 O. G. 271 (1910); *Schrum v. Baumgarten*, 104 O. G. 577.

**Petition Presented Pending Motion to Dissolve.** If a motion to dissolve is pending at the time of the filing of the petition to institute public use proceedings, such motion should be determined before proceeding to determine the question of public use. The reason for this is that a ruling on the motion to dissolve may make it unnecessary to incur the expense which might be involved in the public use proceeding. *Snyder v. Woodward*, 173 O. G. 863 (1911); *In re United States Wood Preserving Co.*, 153 O. G. 271.

**After Testimony Has Been Taken as to Priority.** After the parties have taken their testimony as to priority, the interference should not be suspended for the purpose of instituting public use proceedings, since a ruling on the question of priority may make it unnecessary to deter-
mine the question of public use, unless the testimony shows that the party against whom the public use proceeding is to be instituted, knew of the public use and his application was therefore fraudulently filed. *Luellen v. Claussen & Claus*, 190 O. G. 265 (1913); *Kneisly v. Kusling*, 174 O. G. 830 (1911); *Doble v. Henry*, 118 O. G. 2249; *Wert v. Börst, etc.*, 122 O. G. 2062; *Brenizer v. Robinson*, 166 O. G. 1281 (1911).

**As Between Applicants.** In *Surferi v. Meyer*, 98 O. G. 793; 1902 C. D. 30, Commissioner Moore said: "Where the interference is between pending applications, the institution of public use proceedings prior to the final determination of priority is uniformly refused, for the reason that if the bar of public use or sale be established against one of the parties, it might leave the road clear to the grant of a patent to the other, who might perhaps not be the prior inventor."

**When Shown by the Evidence in an Interference—Action Under Rule 126.** The Examiner of Interferences, or Board of Examiners in Chief, may either before or in their decision on the question of priority, direct the attention of the Commissioner to the fact that in their opinion the issue is not patentable because of two years' public use. In such case the Commissioner refers the question to the Primary Examiner for a report thereon. If the Primary Examiner reports that in his opinion the issue is not patentable because the evidence shows more than two years' public use prior to the filing of the application, the office will not be justified in continuing the interference without investigating and finally determining the question of public use. But the evidence taken in the interference can not be used as a basis for final judgment as to that question without giving the parties an opportunity to take further testimony thereon. The Commissioner will then notify the parties that the testimony already taken will be used as prima facie case in support of the allegation of public use and if any of
them wishes to take testimony, to notify the Commissioner within a specified time. If such notice is given time will be given by the Commissioner in which the parties may take their further proofs. Niedringhaus v. McConnell, 121 O. G. 338 (1905). Allegations as to public use must apply to all the counts to warrant a suspension of proceedings. Moss v. Blaisdell, 113 O. G. 1703; Patee v. Cook, 16 Gour. 2-1.

WITNESSES.

170. Subpoena for Witnesses. By the provisions of Section 4906 R. S., the clerk of any court of the United States for any district wherein testimony is taken for use in a contested cause in the Patent Office, shall, upon application of any party thereto, or of his agent or attorney, issue a subpoena for any witness residing or being within such district, commanding him to appear and testify before any officer in such district authorized to take depositions and affidavits, at any time and place in the subpoena stated. But no witness shall be required to attend at any place more than forty miles from the place where the subpoena is served upon him. His fees and expenses must be paid or tendered unless he waives them, and his failure to demand them is not a waiver. In re Boeschore, 125 Fed. 651.


171. Application to Force Obedience. The proper form of application to enforce obedience to a subpoena issued under this section is a petition to the court for an

Subpœna duces tecum. This section does not authorize the issue of a subpœna duces tecum. *Ex parte Moses*, 53 Fed. 348; *In re Outcalt*, 149 Fed. 228.

Failure to attend or refusal to testify. Sec. 4908 R. S. provides that one who has been served with a subpœna and neglects or refuses to appear, or after appearing, refuses to testify, may be punished by the judge of the court whose clerk issued the subpœna. But a witness shall not be required to disclose any secret invention or discovery made or owned by himself.

172. Refusal to Testify—Suppression of Testimony. It has been held that the testimony of a witness may be suppressed on account of his refusal to furnish material evidence. *Lindstrom v. Lipschutz*, 120 O. G. 904 (1905).

173. Solicitor of Patents as a Witness. A solicitor of patents who is not an attorney-at-law, is not privileged from answering questions under this section, as he can not invoke the privilege of confidential communication between attorney and client. *Brungger v. Smith*, 59 Fed. 124.

174. Cross-Examination of Witnesses. There will be no attempt here to discuss in detail matters pertaining to the cross-examination of witnesses, but merely to state some of the general rules.

**Leading Questions.** It is well settled that the cross-examiner is entitled to ask leading questions. *Hempton v. State*, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596.

**Assuming Facts Not Proved.** Counsel in his cross-questions should not assume that the witness has testified to facts to which he has not testified. *Howland v. Oakland etc., R. R. Co.*, 115 Cal. 487, 47 Pac. 120.

**Argumentative Questions.** Questions should not be argumentative. *People v. Harlan*, 133 Cal. 16, 65 Pac. 9.

**Bringing Out New Matter.** Where on cross-examination counsel goes outside the direct examination and in-
quires about new matters, not related thereto, he makes the witnesses his own as to such new matter and he is not entitled to ask leading questions in relation thereto, though this is a matter within the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances. *Legg v. Drake*, 1 Ohio St. 286, 29 Ala. 558.

**Immaterial Matters.** Where on direct examination a witness has been asked about immaterial matters, the other party has a right to cross-examine with reference thereto. *L. & N. R. Co. v. Hill*, 115 Ala. 334, 22 South. 163.

**175. Acts and Conversations.** Where an act or a statement or a part of a conversation of a witness is put in evidence, he may be cross-examined respecting everything connected with that act, or all the circumstances under which the statement was made, or the entire conversation may be brought out, even though parts of it may be immaterial. In other words, when the party calling a witness opens up a subject, his opponent is entitled to inquire all about that subject. *Vogel v. Harris*, 112 Ind. 494, 14 N. E. 385; *State v. Pancost*, 35 L. R. A. 518; *Hartness v. Goddard*, 176 Mass. 326, 57 N. E. 677; *Gilmer v. Higley*, 110 U. S. 47.

**176. Showing Hostility, Bias and Prejudice.** Great latitude is permitted in cross-examining a witness with a view to showing hostility to a party; hence he may be asked as to his interest in the case, his relations to the party calling him, his feeling toward the opposing party, or any facts or circumstances which would tend to reveal his state of mind with reference to the parties. *People v. Thompson*, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. 589.

**177. Impeachment of Witness.** A witness may be impeached by showing that he made statements at some other time and place which are contrary to those testified to, but it is necessary to ask the witness on cross-examination whether he made such statements at a certain time and place and to a certain person. If he denies hav-
ing made the statement, the person to whom he is alleged to have made them, may be called to prove the facts as laid in the impeaching question. Conrad v. Griffey, 16 How. (U. S.) 33; Anculs v. People, 134 Ill. 401; McCulloch v. Dobson, 133 N. Y. 114; Skelton v. Fenton Electric Light etc. Co., 100 Mich. 87.

Evidence Must Be Material. You cannot impeach a witness upon an immaterial matter, that is, matter not material to the issue on trial. U. S. v. Dickinson, 2 McLean (U. S.) 325; People v. Tipler, 84 Cal. 651; Elbert v. Witman, 122 Ind. 538; Com. v. Jones, 155 Mass. 170.

178. Surprise by Hostile Witness. It not infrequently happens that a party calling a witness is surprised by the witness testifying directly opposite to what he indicated to the party calling him. In such case the party calling him is usually permitted to cross-examine him to a limited extent, and, in some jurisdictions, to impeach him, not for the purpose of showing that his original statement to the party calling him was true, but for the purpose of setting the party who called him right before the court or jury.

179. Party as a Witness—Presumptions Arising From Failure to Testify or Produce Evidence. Where a party refuses to answer questions, it will be presumed that the facts are against him. Perri v. Thoma, 188 O. G. 1053, 39 App. D. C. 460.

180. Failure to Call a Material Witness. Where a party fails to call a material witness and offers no explanation for not calling him, the presumption is that his testimony would have been unfavorable. McConnell v. Wood, 250 O. G. 767; Blackman v. Alexander, 113 O. G. 1703, 26 App. D. C. 541, 121 O. G. 1979; Turnbull v. Curtis, 120 O. G. 2442 (1905); Schmidt v. Clark, 138 O. G. 768, 32 App. D. C. 290. But where the witness might have been called by either party and such witness was the only person, aside from the parties, who knew certain facts, and it appeared that the witness was in the
employ of one of the parties, it was held that the party in whose employ he was would have called him, if his testimony would have been favorable to such party. *Gallagher v. Hastings*, 103 O. G. 1165, 21 App. D. C. 88.

**Failure to Call a Hostile Witness.** Where an assignee failed to call the inventor and it was shown that the inventor was hostile to such assignee, and it was within the power of the opposing party to have called such applicant, no unfavorable presumption arises against the assignee. *Stoetzl v. Fordyce*, 21 Gour. 2-4 (Jan., 1909); *Silverman v. Hendrickson*, 99 O. G. 445; 1902 C. D. 123.

181. **Failure to Deny Charges of Lack of Originality.** When the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of a party and he fails to take the stand and testify thereto, the presumption is that he could not deny the truth of the evidence offered against him. *Steinberger v. Hewlett*, 183 O. G. 1308 (1912); *Winslow v. Austin*, 86 O. G. 2171; *Royce v. Kempshall*, 125 O. G. 1347 (1906); *Rollfe v. Kaisling v. Leeper*, 143 O. G. 562, 32 App. D. C. 582. So also a failure to produce evidence clearly within the control of a party, raises a presumption that if produced, it would have been unfavorable. *Huff v. Gulic*, 179 O. G. 579, 38 App. D. C. 334. And where the circumstances are such that a party might easily disprove the facts sought to be established by his opponent, if untrue, and he fails to make any effort to disprove them, the presumption is that they could not be disproved. *Schneider v. Driggs*, 162 O. G. 1000, 36 App. D. C. 116; *Whitman v. King*, 160 O. G. 260, 35 App. D. C. 449.

182. **Failure to Produce Sketches or Devices.** Where a party claims to have produced certain sketches, drawings, or to have completed a certain device, he should produce the same or make a satisfactory explanation for not doing so. In the absence of a showing of any reason for not producing such evidence, an unfavorable presumption arises. *Saunders v. Miller*, 146 O. G. 505, 33

183. **Failure to Rebut.** Where the circumstances show that the evidence produced by a party might readily be disproved, if untrue, and his opponent makes no effort to disprove the facts, such failure raises an unfavorable presumption against such opponent. So where the evidence clearly showed that a certain machine embodying every element of the issue was in existence and readily accessible to the party who might be expected to disprove its existence if he entertained any doubt of the truth of such evidence, but he offers no evidence upon that subject, the existence of the machine will be regarded as established. *Smith v. Kilgren*, 215 O. G. 324, 43 App. D. C. 193.


184. **Conduct Inconsistent With Claims to Invention.** The conduct of a party, acts as well as words, is often more potent in revealing the truth than the testimony he renders after becoming involved in a controversy with another. Hence it is important in weighing the testimony to consider what happened prior to as well as after the controversy arose, and where a party claimed to have made an invention at a certain time, but continued thereafter to experiment upon other inventions for securing the same ultimate results, and full records at the time do not mention the invention in issue, and patents were taken out on other inventions; but no application was filed on the invention in issue, it was held that the conduct of the inventor at the time is stronger evidence against his claim to invention than is the testimony of himself and witnesses in favor of the same. *Sherwood v. Drewsen*, 124 O. G. 1205 (1906); *Gibbons v. Peller*, 124
185. Failure to Assert Claim to Invention. Where a party fails to assert any claim to an invention under circumstances which would indicate that another is claiming it, and the former constructed no device embodying the issue, the presumption is that he did not invent it. *Hansen v. Dean*, 129 O. G. 483 (1907), 29 App. D. C. 112. Where a senior party informed a junior party that he had applied for a patent on the invention and the junior party made no protest and signified neither by word nor act that the invention was his own, it was held that then, if ever, he should have spoken. *Scott v. Scott*, 96 O. G. 1650; 1901 C. D. 419. And where a party testified in favor of another in an interference, making no claim at the time to his own invention of the issue, but afterward filed an application therefor, it was held that it was his duty to have asserted his claim earlier. *Lloyd v. Antisdel*, 95 O. G. 1645; 1901 C. D. 371.

And where a party fails to assert his claim to an invention after knowledge that others are claiming it, his silence at a time when he should have spoken, discredits his testimony. *McKnight v. Pohl & Croasdale*, 22 App. D. C. 219, 105 O. G. 977 (1903); *Harter v. Barrett*, 114 O. G. 975, 24 App. D. C. 300.

Delay in Copying Claims of a Patent—Estoppel. In *Chapman v. Wintroth*, decided March 1, 1920 (not yet reported), the United States Supreme Court held that an applicant has two years from the date of filing of a divisional application, in which to copy the claims of an issued patent for the purpose of interference. Up to 1916, it had been the practice to allow two years in which to copy the claims of a published patent, but at that time the Court of Appeals, D. C., in *Rountree v. Sloan*, 45 App. D. C. 207, held that one who delayed for more than one year to copy the claims of a published patent, was
guilty of laches and estopped from copying such claims for the purpose of interference. This ruling was followed by the office until the reversal of the Court of Appeals D. C. by the United States Supreme Court, in Chapman v. Wintroath, March 1, 1920.

186. Failure to Disclose Invention. And where a party fails to disclose the invention in issue under circumstances which would naturally induce him to do so, the presumption is that he did not have the invention. Slaughter v. Halle, 102 O. G. 469 (1903); Hope, Jr. v. Voight, 115 O. G. 1585 (1905), 25 App. D. C. 22.

187. Delay in Filing Application and Failure to Assert Alleged Right. Where a party permitted a manufacturer to manufacture the device in issue for a period of nearly two years, without claiming the invention, or making protest, and did not file an application for patent for over four years after the alleged discovery and not until after he had difficulties with such manufacturer, such silence and failure to earlier file an application, was held to discredit his claim to inventorship. Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co. v. Bole, et al., 227 Fed. 607, 610.

188. Testimony Impeached by Previous Declarations. Where the testimony of an inventor is shown to be at variance with his preliminary statement and with affidavits filed during the progress of his application, or in conflict with the oath filed with the application, such facts should weigh strongly against the credibility of the witness, unless a satisfactory explanation is made of such variance. Barnes v. Swartwout, 161 O. G. 1045 (1910); Tripler v. Linde, 102 O. G. 1297 (1903).

189. Presumption Arising From Knowledge and Experience of a Party. The knowledge and experience of a party in general, and particularly his experience in and familiarity with the subject in issue, will be considered in weighing the testimony. Therefore, as between two parties, each claiming a disclosure of an invention to the other, where one of such parties is shown to have a prac-
tical knowledge of the art and the other has not, a strong presumption arises that the one having such practical knowledge would be the more likely to have conceived the invention (See subject Originality). *Alexander v. Blackman*, 26 App. D. C. 541, 121 O. G. 1979 (1906); *Flather v. Weber*, 21 App. D. C. 179, 104 O. G. 312 (1903); *Miller v. Kelley*, 96 O. G. 1038; 1901 C. D. 403, 18 App. D. C. 163.

190. Presumption as to Originality—Following the Line of Invention of Another. Where one is shown to have gained his knowledge of the art from the invention or series of inventions of the other party, and a dispute as to the inventorship of a specific improvement arises, both parties claiming it, a question of veracity is presented, and under such circumstances, to determine to whom the greater weight should be given, the presumption will be that the party experienced in the art is the more likely inventor. *French v. Holcomb*, 115 O. G. 506; *Scott v. Scott*, 96 O. G. 1650; 1901 C. D. 419.

And where there is an issue of originality, and all that one of the parties did grew out of and was dependent upon the disclosure of the other party, the presumption is that the party making such disclosure was the inventor of the issue. *Granger v. Richardson*, 110 O. G. 722; *Scott v. Scott*, 96 O. G. 1650; 1901 C. D. 419, 18 App. D. C. 420.

191. Irrelevant Testimony. Testimony is irrelevant when it has no bearing on the matter in dispute, does not affect the subject matter of the controversy, and can in no way assist the court in deciding the case. The Court of Appeals D. C., has called attention to the fact that the practice of encumbering the record in interference cases with irrelevant matters is general, and has strongly condemned the practice. *Connor v. Dean*, 24 App. D. C. 277, 142 O. G. 856; *Scott v. Scott*, 96 O. G. 1650; 1901 C. D. 419, 18 App. D. C. 420.

Testimony to show non-patentability of the issue or the

191a. Expert Testimony. It is not the practice of the office to permit expert testimony to explain what an application discloses, and it should be permitted only in very exceptional cases, if at all. *Cooper v. Downing*, 222 O. G. 727 (1915). But in *Hopkins v. Newman*, 134 O. G. 2028, 30 App. D. C. 402, such testimony was considered. In *Cooper v. Downing*, 230 O. G. 909, 45 App. D. C. 345, it was held that the Commissioner properly refused to consider evidence of what was intended by the disclosure of one of the parties, since it is the duty of the office experts to determine what an application discloses.

191b. Objections to Evidence. A party who desires to oppose the admission of any evidence produced or offered by his opponent, should make his objection and state the grounds therefor at the time the evidence is offered. If he fails to object he waives his right to have the evidence excluded. He should also be considered to have waived his right if he fails to state a legitimate ground of objection, unless there is a stipulation in the record that he may afterward state the grounds of objection. All objections, whether to the proceedings or to specific evidence, should be timely made in order that the opposing party may be placed on his guard. *Badger v. Morgan*, 117 O. G. 598 (1905). In many instances the answer of the witness is not responsive to the question, in which case there is no opportunity to object to the evidence by objecting to the question, since the question may have been proper, but in that event the aggrieved party should move to strike out the answer, or so much of it as is irresponsive to the question.

Form of Objection. An objection should be positive and should state what principle of evidence the question, or an answer thereto, would violate. A general objec-
tion, such as—that the evidence is inadmissible—would hardly present any question unless the evidence is such that it could not be admissible for any purpose whatever. If objection is made and no valid ground of objection is stated, it will not be available to exclude the evidence because there was another and valid ground of objection which might have been made but was not. It would seem that objections to the materiality or relevancy of evidence may be made at any time, for a party is bound to know whether the evidence tends to prove or disprove any issue in the cause. Furthermore the court will not decide a cause upon immaterial or irrelevant evidence, because if it is immaterial or irrelevant it does not prove anything in relation to the issue. Wigmore's Ev. Sec. 18.

192. Relevant Testimony—What Is. In an interference the ultimate question to be determined is, who was the prior inventor of the issue, and the evidence should be confined to the question of priority. Brill & Adams v. Uebelacker, 99 O. G. 2966; 1902 C. D. 220; Trufant v. Brindle, etc., 101 O. G. 1608; 1902 C. D. 397. As to what facts and circumstances have a tendency to prove priority there has been much controversy. The Court of Appeals D. C. has repeatedly declared that it would not take into consideration, in interferences, questions which do not relate to priority. Out of the numerous questions which parties to interferences have attempted to bring before that court on appeal, we have a number of decisions defining what is regarded by the court as material to the determination of the question of priority, or what facts or circumstances may be introduced to establish the ultimate fact of who, as between the parties, was the first inventor of the issue.

Laches. It has been held that the question of whether a party has been guilty of laches is one proper to be determined as relating to priority. Wintroath v. Chapman, 248 O. G. 1004, 47 App. D. C. 428.
Originality. It would seem to be obvious that the question of fact as to whether one party derived his knowledge of the invention from the other party, is one which relates to priority. *Milton v. Kingsley*, 7 App. D. C. 531, 75 O. G. 2193.


invalidity of an oath executed before a notary who was
the attorney for the applicant. *Dalton v. Wilson*, 224 O.
G. 741, 44 App. D. C. 249, and whether an application
was abandoned during prosecution. *Kinsman v. Strohm*,
136 O. G. 1769, 31 App. D. C. 581. All of the foregoing
questions being material to the determination of priority,
it is proper to introduce evidence thereon.

193. **Rebuttal Testimony.** The word rebutting has a
two-fold signification, both in common and legal parlance. It sometimes means contradictory evidence only.
At other times overcoming testimony. It may be em-
ployed as contravening, or opposing, as well as over-

The party on whom the burden of proof rests is re-
quired to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his case.
The defendant meets this proof by evidence to explain
or disprove the evidence already put in. 10 Fed. Cases
No. 5452; *Acklin v. McCalmont Oil Co.*, 201 Pa. St. 257,
50 Atl. 955.

Where a party anticipates a defense and puts in evi-
dence which he is not required to put in in chief, and
thereby undertakes to meet the evidence of the defendant
before it is produced, he can not thereafter introduce
cumulative evidence upon the same subject, as rebuttal.
*York v. Pease*, 2 Gray (Mass.) 282. Nor can a party
under the guise of rebuttal, put in cumulative evidence
which merely goes to sustain and support that which he
has introduced to sustain his original case, nor evidence
on an essential point which he failed to prove in his
original case. *Swinglehurst v. Ballard*, 265 O. G. 459,
258 Fed. 973; *Kohler v. Wells-Fargo & Co.*, 26 Cal. 606,
613. The admission or rejection of evidence offered in
rebuttal, is however, a matter largely in the discretion
of the court, the circumstances under which it is offered
and the good faith of the party being taken into ac-
Where a junior party filed interrogatories in rebuttal by which it was sought to prove that the senior party was not the original inventor, it was held that the testimony should be suppressed because it constitutes a part of the junior party's original case. 

_Goldschmidt & Weber v. Von Schultz_, 192 O. G. 743 (1913). Testimony taken in rebuttal will not be suppressed on motion or objection of the defendant upon the ground that it was not proper rebuttal after the defendant has, by leave of court, taken surrebuttal testimony. _American Bank Protection Co. v. City Nat. Bank_, 181 Fed. 375.

Where a senior party proved dates later than those set up in his preliminary statement, it was held not proper for the junior party to make out a different prima facie case in his rebuttal testimony. _Woodbridge v. Winship_, 21 Gour. 19-7 (Feb., 1909).

Where one party fails to take testimony it is improper for his opponent to put in additional testimony as rebuttal. _Kinsman v. Strohm_, 125 O. G. 1699 (1906).

Rebuttal testimony relating to the patentability of the issue will be stricken out on motion. _Parker v. Lewis_, 120 O. G. 323 (1905).

**193a. Surrebuttal Evidence.** In setting dates for the taking of testimony, no provision is made for taking surrebuttal testimony, and if the evidence previously produced warrants the taking of surrebuttal testimony, the party desiring to take the same should file a motion for permission to do so. Whether this motion shall be granted or refused is a matter within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences. The privilege of taking such testimony will be extended to a party whenever he has been surprised by evidence or a line of defense in rebuttal which he has had no reason to anticipate or an opportunity to prepare against. _Donning v. Stackpole and Lagunke_, 106 O. G. 264; 1903 C. D. 298. Such motions have been denied wherein it was not shown that the rebuttal testimony constituted a surprise. _Howard v._

In Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1874, it is said: "For the opponent's case in surrebuttal there remain properly only two sorts of evidence, namely, evidence explaining away the effect of new facts brought forward by the proponent in rebuttal, and evidence impeaching the witnesses testifying in rebuttal. All other evidence could and should have been put in in reply. Evidence legitimately receivable in surrebuttal would be evidence impeaching rebuttal witnesses."

SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY.

194. Motion to Suppress. Where a party desires to suppress certain testimony, he may make a motion to suppress, designating the parts that he desires to have suppressed, giving the grounds for such suppression. The motion should be made before final hearing and before printing of the record, but a ruling thereon may, and will be reserved for final hearing in cases where a reading of the record would be required for the Examiner of Interferences to determine whether or not the testimony should be suppressed. The motion should be noted for hearing with proof of service upon the opposing party. Talbot v. Monell, 99 O. G. 2965; 1902 C. D. 216; Hall v. Alford, 101 O. G. 1833; 1902 C. D. 418; Dyson v. Land, etc., 130 O. G. 1690 (1907); Andrews v. Nilson, 111 O. G. 1038; Keith v. Erickson, etc., 157 O. G. 754 (1910).

Whether a ruling on the motion should be reserved for final hearing is a matter within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences. Royce v. Kempshall, 119 O. G. 338 (1905).


194a. Retaking Testimony. A party may be permitted to retake his testimony where an irregularity in
taking the same arose through inadvertence and not through any desire to delay the proceedings or take any unfair advantage over the opposing party. Where a party finds that he has not taken his testimony in accordance with the rules, it is incumbent on him, in support of a motion to retake the testimony, to show why he failed to comply with the rules in the first instance and that the granting of the motion will result in no hardship to his opponent. *Jones v. Starr*, 111 O. G. 2221; *Shaw & Welty Shirt Co. v. Quaker City Shirt Co.*, 157 O. G. 1000 (1910); *Goodfellow v. Jolly*, 111 O. G. 1940. (See Sec. 220.)

The granting or refusing of a motion to retake testimony is a matter within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences, or the Commissioner on appeal, and the Court of Appeals, D. C., will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. *Jones v. Starr*, 1905 C. D. 694, 25 App. D. C. 529.

Since the primary reason for refusing a motion to retake testimony is the expense, inconvenience or disadvantage it might impose upon the opposing party, it would seem that the Examiner of Interferences or the Commissioner might properly impose conditions upon which the moving party would be permitted to retake the testimony. The moving party should act promptly upon discovery of the necessity to retake his testimony, to the end that his opponent be not delayed, inconvenienced or put to a disadvantage other than such as would necessarily result when the moving party is acting in good faith and with as much promptitude as the circumstances will permit.

**195. Grounds for Suppression.** The following facts and circumstances may be valid grounds for suppressing testimony. That the interrogatories are not proper rebuttal. *Goldschmidt & Weber v. Von Schutz*, 192 O. G. 743 (1913); that the testimony relates solely to the patentability of the counts and the state of the prior art.
Felbel v. Oliver, 13 Gour. 4-11 (Jan., 1901); Dixon & Marsh v. Graces, etc., 127 O. G. 1993 (1907); that the testimony was not taken in accordance with the rules. Blackman v. Alexander, 98 O. G. 1281; 1902 C. D. 41; that the notary’s certificate is defective in that it does not certify that the depositions were read by or to the witnesses before signing and that the notary did not seal the depositions and forward them to the office. Blackman v. Alexander, 98 O. G. 1281; 1902 C. D. 41; or failure to certify the date on which the package was sealed, or the name of the person who transcribed the stenographer’s notes, or that they were written out in presence of the notary, or that the notary failed to forward the exhibits to the office, in the absence of a stipulation that they may be retained by counsel. Rolfe v. Taylor, 111 O. G. 1938; that the depositions were taken without proper notice. Potter v. Ochs, 95 O. G. 1049; 1901 C. D. 39; that a party served notice to take testimony and failed to appear and subsequently served another notice and took the testimony. Denton v. Burnham, 18 Gour. S3-11 (Nov., 1906); that the cross-examination sought to be stricken out is not proper cross-examination; Marconi v. Shoemaker, etc., 121 O. G. 2664 (1906); that the testimony is not proper rebuttal; Kinsman v. Strohm, 125 O. G. 1699 (1906), 135 O. G. 1121 (1908); that a party was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses; Munster v. Ainsworth, 128 O. G. 2085 (1906), 128 O. G. 2088; Mattice v. Langworthy, 140 O. G. 507 (1909); that the testimony relates solely to public use; Stroud v. Miller, 101 O. G. 2075; 1902 C. D. 423; that corrections and additions were made long after the testimony was taken and without notice to the moving party. Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Fidelity Mfg. Co., 94 O. G. 222; 1901 C. D. 7.

196. Grounds Insufficient. The fact that the notary did not write the names of the witnesses at the top of each page, is not sufficient grounds for suppression of a
deposition; Rolfe v. Taylor, 111 O. G. 1938; nor that the notary delayed filing the testimony, where such delay is properly explained; Moss v. Blaisdell, 113 O. G. 2505; nor that certain words in the printed record are italicized; Fuller v. Lorimer, 16 Gour. 37-11; nor that the testimony was adduced by leading questions, though testimony adduced by leading questions will be critically scanned; Smith v. Brooks, 112 O. G. 953; nor that the notary acted out of his jurisdiction, no objection being made at the time the testimony was taken; Badger v. Morgan, etc., 117 O. G. 598 (1905); nor the fact that the notary was in the employ of the attorney for the opposing party, where no objection was made on that ground at the time the testimony was taken; Royce v. Kempshall, 117 O. G. 2090; nor that the notary failed to certify whether one of the parties was present in person or by attorney; Royce v. Kempshall, 117 O. G. 2090; nor that a party refused to produce or introduce in evidence certain books about which he testified for the purpose of refreshing his recollection, where it appears that he offered the same to opposing counsel for inspection at the time he testified. Bay State Belling Co. v. Kelton Bruce Mfg. Co., 127 O. G. 1580 (1907); nor that a certain witness was not named in the notice. Keith, etc. v. Lundquist, etc., 156 O. G. 798 (1910).

197. Suppressed Testimony—How Retained in the Record. When testimony is stricken out on motion in an interference proceeding, that part which is cancelled should be shown by red lines and proper marginal notes, as when matter is cancelled in a specification of an application for a patent. When the record is printed, that portion which is stricken out should not be printed in the body of the testimony, but notice should be inserted in the printed record that certain questions and answers or other evidence was stricken out, giving the date of the decision or order striking it out. The party whose testimony has been stricken out may print the parts stricken
out as an appendix to his record. *Marconi v. Shoemaker, etc.*, 121 O. G. 2664 (1906).

In an infringement suit, a party may move to strike out or he may insist upon his objections at the hearing. In either event the matter stricken out remains in the record for the purposes of appeal. *Blease v. Garlington*, 92 U. S. 1; *Nelson v. U. S.*, 201 U. S. 92, 114; *Wolff Truck Frame Co. v. American Steel Foundries*, 195 Fed. 940, 946. However, it was held in *Felbel v. Oliver*, 100 O. G. 1975; 1902 C. D. 309, that where a party prints in his record depositions which have been suppressed, such depositions will be expunged upon motion.

198. Testimony Taken in Another Interference—As Evidence. Rule 157 provides that testimony taken in an interference proceeding may be used in any other or subsequent interference proceeding, so far as relevant and material, subject to the right of the contesting party to recall the witnesses whose testimony has been taken and to take other testimony in rebuttal of the same.

For What Purpose Material or Relevant. Testimony taken in another interference may be introduced for the purpose of discrediting or impeaching the testimony of the witness in a later interference. This is upon the well established principle of evidence that the testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing declarations made at other times and places by the same witness relating to the same subject which are not consistent with his later testimony or are contradictory thereof. *Talbott v. Monell*, 99 O. G. 2965; 1902 C. D. 217; *Hewitt v. Weintraub*, 134 O: G. 1561 (1908). Such testimony may also be introduced where the issues in the interferences are substantially the same and the parties are the same and the provisions of Rule 157 are otherwise complied with and a proper showing made. It is for the office to determine whether the circumstances are such as to permit the use of such testimony. This rule is similar to the rules of evidence in the trial of
causes in court. In Clow v. Baker, et al., 36 Fed. 692, the court said: "To prevent a failure of justice that might result, it is permissible for the court, when cause is shown therefore, to permit the depositions taken in one case to be read on the trial of another, if it appears that the parties to the later case were the parties or privies with the parties to the former suit; that the issues upon which the testimony was taken are substantially the same; and that every opportunity for thorough examination and cross-examination was afforded both parties when the testimony was taken. Kenny & Thordarson v. O'Connell, et al., 117 O. G. 1163 (1905); Beall v. Lyon, 127 O. G. 3215 (1907); Strauble v. Young, 119 O. G. 338 (1905).

199. The Hearing. The extent to which the Examiner of Interferences will grant a hearing or re-hearing of a case, is a matter ordinarily within his discretion. Dunkap v. Creveling, etc., 160 O. G. 774 (1910).

200. Postponement of Final Hearing. It is within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences and the Commissioner to extend the time for final hearing. Dunkley v. Berkhuis, 158 O. G. 886 (1910). But a postponement will not be granted to permit a party to intervene. In re Columbian Carbide Co., 20 Gour. 17-1 (March 27, 1908).


No Hearing After Expiration of Limit of Appeal. Rule 125 does not provide for a hearing before the Commissioner, and no hearing will be granted after the expiration of the limit of appeal to an applicant whose claims are found unpatrientable by the Board of Examiners in Chief in consideration of the claim in connection with the question of priority. Holtz v. Hewitt, 127 O. G. 1992.
(1907). The length of time which will be granted for a hearing is within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences. *Moore v. Curtis*, 120 O. G. 324 (1905); *Cusin v. Von Welsbach*, 119 O. G. 650 (1905).

202. Petition to Restore Jurisdiction. A petition to restore jurisdiction to the Examiner of Interferences will not be set down for hearing, but briefs may be filed. *Adams v. Randall*, 125 O. G. 1700 (1906).


204. Questions Raised But Not Argued. Where a party moves to dissolve upon all grounds mentioned in Rule 122, but only argues part of them, judgment will be rendered against him on the grounds not argued. *Harnish v. Gueniffet, et al.*, 117 O. G. 1492 (1905).

205. Statements of Examiner of Interferences Made at Hearing—When Not Reviewable on Appeal. Where the Examiner of Interferences makes a statement as to admissions and waivers of counsel at a hearing, error there-in, if any, will not be reviewed on appeal unless there was a motion for a re-hearing presented to the Examiner of Interferences and ruled upon. *Hansel v. Wardwell*, 116 O. G. 2008 (1905).

206. Hearing on Motion to Dissolve—New Grounds and Notice. Patents referred to by one of the parties which are not of record and have not been served upon the opposing party at least five days before the hearing will not be considered on motion to dissolve unless service is waived by the opposing party. *Young v. Eick*, 113 O. G. 547; *Lake v. Cahill*, 110 O. G. 2235; *Wells v. Packer*, 1900 C. D. 35, 90 O. G. 1947; *Whitlock & Huson v. Scott*, 99 O. G. 1385; 1902 C. D. 166.

What Will Be Considered on Motion to Dissolve. Nothing can be considered which is not contained in the
record of the case unless timely notice (five days before
the hearing) of such matter is served upon the opposing

207. Notice of New Matter—Postponement of Hearing
to Give. Upon a proper showing of facts that the new
matter could not have been earlier discovered, a post-
ponement of the hearing will be granted to enable a
party to give the proper notice. Summers v. Hart, 98
O. G. 2585; 1902 C. D. 104.

JURISDICTION.

208. Jurisdiction of Examiner of Interferences. The
Examiner of Interferences has jurisdiction to determine
questions of priority and all matters which relate to the
question of priority, but not to dissolve an interference.
Brodwell v. Long, 21 Gour. 2-5 (Dec., 1908). Where
jurisdiction by the Primary Examiner is desired, it can
only be obtained by the order of the Commissioner and
the Primary Examiner should make his request of the
He has not jurisdiction to grant amendments to appli-
the filing of a new oath. Dukesmith v. Carrington v.
Turner, 125 O. G. 348 (1906).

209. Jurisdiction of Examiners in Chief. The Exami-
iners in Chief have appellate jurisdiction in all matters
properly brought before them on appeal, but have no
jurisdiction to extend the time within which such appeal
may be taken. Blackman v. Alexander, 105 O. G. 2059
(1903).

210. Jurisdiction of Commissioner Pending Appeal to
Court of Appeals. The Commissioner of Patents has jur-
isdiction pending an appeal to the Court of Appeals to
hear and determine a motion to reopen a case for the
purpose of taking additional testimony. Clement v.
Richards, etc., 111 O. G. 1627.

211. Jurisdiction of Courts Over Witnesses in Inter-
ferences. When a witness goes upon the stand in an interference case he submits to the jurisdiction of the U. S. District Court in the district in which he testifies and remains under that jurisdiction until his cross-examination is concluded. *Label v. Cossey*, 157 Fed. 664, 666.

212. Restoring Jurisdiction—Petition For. When it is desired to restore jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences to consider certain motions, copies of the motions which the petitioner desires the Examiner of Interferences to consider and decide should accompany the petition, and service of the papers should be made on the opposite party. The petition should be addressed to the Commissioner, but the Commissioner will not pass upon the merits of the motion but merely upon the form of it. *Adams v. Randall*, 125 O. G. 1700 (1906).

Restoring Jurisdiction After Limit of Appeal. Even after the limit of appeal has expired upon a judgment against the moving party, a motion to restore the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences to hear a motion to reopen the case, may be granted upon proper showing. *Lipscomb v. Pfeiffer*, 122 O. G. 351 (1906). After time for appeal has expired the Commissioner has sole power to restore jurisdiction. *Hough v. Gordon*, 108 O. G. 797.

Restoring Jurisdiction Pending Appeal. Though an appeal is pending before the Examiners in Chief on the question of priority, the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences may be restored to consider a motion to reopen the case to offer newly discovered evidence. *Newell v. Clifford v. Rose*, 122 O. G. 730 (1905); *Dunbar v. Schellenger*, 118 O. G. 2536 (1905).

Restoring Jurisdiction to Hear Motions to Dissolve. Under the former rules motions to transmit motions to dissolve were heard by the Examiner of Interferences, but under the present practice such motions to transmit are heard first by the Commissioner and if in his
opinion such motion should be transmitted it is so or-
dered and the motion then goes to the Law Examiner in-
stead of the Primary Examiner. Under the present
rules the motions are heard by different officials than
formerly heard such motions, but the time for making
such motions and the character of showing required are
not changed and the old decisions may therefore be im-
portant guides as to the practice.

Where a party fails to make a motion to dissolve under
Rule 122 within the time provided, but waits until testi-
mony has been taken and judgment has been rendered
on priority, the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Inter-
ferences will not be restored to consider a motion to
transmit a motion to dissolve. Fessenden v. Potter, 101
O. G. 2823; 1902 C. D. 466. While under the present
rules the Examiner of Interferences does not have jur-
isdiction of motions to transmit motions to dissolve, still
a similar question might arise under the present rules
where the motion to transmit is heard by the Commis-
ssioner.

213. Rehearings. The various tribunals of the Patent
Office stand upon the same footing respecting their judg-
ments and decisions as do the courts. In Donning v.
Fisher, 125 O. G. 2765 (1906), it was said: "A court
has control over its own judgments and decrees during
the term at which they were rendered and may at any
time before the expiration of the term, in the exercise
of its discretion, open, amend, correct, revise, vacate, or
supplement any judgment or decree rendered during
such term. The tribunals of the Patent Office have this
power over their judgments within the limits of appeal.
They also have the power in analogy to the practice of
the courts, of requesting a rehearing of any point upon
which they desire further light. The granting of a re-
hearing or refusal to grant the same are matters within
the discretion of the tribunal having jurisdiction of the
case at the time."
In *Robinson v. Townsend v. Copeland*, 106 O. G. 997, a motion was filed before the Commissioner to suspend proceedings in the interference and remand the same to the Examiner of Interferences to hear and determine a motion to reopen the interference for the purpose of introducing newly discovered evidence. At the time the motion was brought, decisions had been rendered by the Examiner of Interferences and by the Examiners in Chief on the question of priority and at the time this motion was brought one of the parties had appealed to the Commissioner. It was therefore held that there was no necessity of suspending proceedings, since there was no limit of appeal running against any of the parties, but the hearing on the appeal was continued until the final determination of the motion. It was further held that the motion to open the case for further testimony should be heard in the first instance by the Examiner of Interferences and therefore the motion to transmit the motion to reopen, to the Examiner of Interferences, was granted.

214. When Motion May Be Brought. A motion for rehearing may be brought at any time before the expiration of the time fixed for appeal and the motion may be heard and decided after the limit of appeal has expired. The filing of the motion does not stay the running of the limit of appeal and if a party desires to appeal he must do so within the limit of appeal notwithstanding his motion for a rehearing. *Naulty v. Cutler*, 126 O. G. 389 (1907).


216. Newly Discovered Evidence as Ground for Re-
hearing. Where the ground upon which a rehearing is
sought is newly discovered evidence, the motion must
show that the evidence sought to be introduced was not
known at the time the original testimony was taken and
could not have been discovered at that time by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence. Mosher v. Tully & Clark,
99 O. G. 2968; 1902 C. D. 224; Dudley v. Blickinsdor-
fer, etc., 99 O. G. 228; 1902 C. D. 119; Lalshaw v. Duff
v. Kaplan, 130 O. G. 980 (1907).

The motion must also show what the newly discovered
evidence consists of; that is, if it is the testimony of wit-
nesses, what the witnesses will testify to; if exhibits,
what the exhibits are that will be introduced in evi-
dence; that the evidence is material, and that the mov-
ing party was diligent in bringing the motion. Robin-
sen v. Townsend v. Copeland, 100 O. G. 683; 1902 C. D.
263; Allis v. Stowell, 85 Fed. 481; Parker v. Spoon, 14
Gour. 19-8 (April, 1902); Crescent Oil Co. v. W. C. Rob-

It must also be shown that the newly discovered evi-
dence is of such character that the establishment of the
facts alleged would likely result in a change or modifi-
cation of the decision. French v. Halcomb, 110 O. G. 1727;
Ball v. Flora, 117 O. G. 2088 (1905); Struble v. Young,
etc., 139 O. G. 729 (1909).

It must also appear that due diligence was exercised in
presenting the motion. Beckert v. Currier, 104 O. G.
2439 (1903); Newell v. Clifford v. Rose, 125 O. G. 665
(1906); Claussen v. Dunbar, etc., 129 O. G. 2499
(1907); Townsend v. Thullen, 21 Gour. 37-12 (May,
1909). A delay of two weeks held not unreasonable.

217. By Whom the Motion Shall Be Heard. The mo-
tion must be heard in the first instance by the Examiner
of Interferences and where the cause has passed out of
his jurisdiction, there must be a motion to restore his
jurisdiction. Bowen v. Bradley, 58 O. G. 386; Robinson
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v. Townsend v. Copeland, 106 O. G. 997 (1903); Clement v. Richards, etc., 111 O. G. 1626; Dunbar v. Schellenger, 19 Gour. 37-17 (April, 1907); Rolfe v. Leeper, 159 O. G. 991 (1910). Can not be granted by the Court of Appeals D. C. DeFerranti v. Lindmark, 32 App. D. C. 6, 137 O. G. 733 (1908). A motion to transmit a motion to take further testimony, made pending an appeal to the Court of Appeals, will be granted upon a proper showing. Clements v. Richards v. Meissner, 111 O. G. 1626.

Official Request for Rehearing. Where the request is made by the tribunal before whom the case was previously heard, it will be granted jurisdiction. Bettendorf, 17 Gour. 41-22 (May, 1905).

218. Insufficient Grounds for Rehearing. There is no sufficient ground for a rehearing where there is an absence of a showing why the evidence was not produced when the testimony was originally taken. Mosler v. Tully & Clark, 99 O. G. 2968; 1902 C. D. 224. Or where the evidence sought to be introduced is immaterial, or relates wholly to expert testimony. Robinson v. Townsend v. Copeland, 107 O. G. 1376 (1903). Or where the showing is merely that a party failed to produce his best evidence, or the object is merely to strengthen the testimony already in the record. Sutton v. McDonald, etc., 98 O. G. 1418; 1902 C. D. 47; Harris v. Stern & Lotz, 101 O. G. 1132; 1902 C. D. 386. Or where the purpose is to explain certain exhibits which are in evidence. Blackman v. Alexander, 104 O. G. 2441 (1903). Or where it appears that the evidence is unimportant or could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Shaffer v. Dolan, 100 O. G. 3012; 1902 C. D. 344. Or where a party failed to produce the evidence because he did not regard it as material. Roberts v. Buchelle, 101 O. G. 1831; 1902 C. D. 415. Or that a party did not recall certain facts at the time his testimony was taken. French v. Halcomb, 110 O. G. 125
1727. Or where it appears that a party knew of the evidence but did not introduce it because of the expense which he would have had to incur in securing it. *Greuter v. Mathieu*, 111 O. G. 582. Or where the proposed evidence relates solely to a statutory bar. *Ritter v. Krakau d’Conner*, 108 O. G. 1050. Or where the evidence relates to the right of a party to make the claims and not to priority. *Osborn v. Austin*, 115 O. G. 1065. Or where it is based on the fact that a party misjudged her ability to prove her case and for that reason took no testimony. *Hull v. McGill*, 117 O. G. 597. Nor is the fact that one of the witnesses of a party was sick, another was hostile and another was out of town at the time the original testimony was taken, sufficient ground for rehearing, though such facts may have been sufficient to support a motion or extension of time for taking testimony. *Newell v. Clifford v. Rose*, 125 O. G. 665 (1906). Or where the purpose is merely to introduce an earlier application. *Cutler v. Hull*, 135 O. G. 449 (1908). Or where it appears that the testimony was improperly taken as rebuttal and thereafter stricken out. *McNeil v. Stephenson*, 192 O. G. 517 (1913). Or where the testimony was known and available when the original testimony was taken. *Webber v. Wood*, 184 O. G. 553 (1912).

219. Stay of Proceedings. A motion for rehearing does not of itself operate as a stay of proceedings. *Char-michael v. Fox*, 104 O. G. 1656 (1903). Nor stay the running of time for appeal. *Naulty v. Cutler*, 126 O. G. 389 (1907). If future proceedings require that a party take some action before his motion for rehearing can be heard, and the proceedings are such as may be suspended, a motion to suspend proceedings should be made. *Robinson v. Townsend v. Copeland*, 106 O. G. 997.

220. Suppression of Testimony—Rehearing. Where testimony is suppressed because of irregularities in taking thereof due entirely to inadvertence and not intention to delay proceedings, the party should be given an
opportunity to retake the testimony. *Blackman v. Alexander*, 100 O. G. 2383; 1902 C. D. 323. But where testimony is improperly taken as rebuttal and due notice is given that a motion will be presented to suppress the same, the case will not be reopened to take such testimony. *McNeil v. Stephenson*, 192 O. G. 517 (1913).

221. **Motion to Dissolve—Rehearing.** A party may obtain a reconsideration of a motion to dissolve by showing good cause which justifies a rehearing. *Newcomb v. Lemp*, 110 O. G. 307. But where a party fails to cite all the references which he might have cited on his motion to dissolve, such failure does not entitle him to a rehearing. *White v. Powell*, 160 O. G. 776 (1910). Where a motion to dissolve on the ground that a party has no right to make the claims was not presented at the proper time, but after all the testimony had been taken, the case will not be reopened to consider such motion or a motion for permission to take testimony as to the operativeness of an opponent’s device. *Broadwell v. Long*, 164 O. G. 252.

222. **Second Interference Improperly Declared—Rehearing of First Interference.** Where a second interference was improperly declared, the first interference will not be reheard for the purpose of including the issue in the second interference. *Wende v. Horine*, 130 O. G. 1311 (1907).

223. **Stay of Proceedings—How Obtained.** Motions brought under Rules 109 and 122, when set for hearing, stay proceedings pending the determination of the motions. Rule 123. In all other cases a motion to stay proceedings must be brought under Rule 123, which motion should set forth with particularity the circumstances of the case which make it necessary that the proceedings be stayed. *Hoegh v. Gordon*, 108 O. G. 797. Proceedings may be suspended by stipulation. *McKean v. Morse*, 94 O. G. 1557; 1901 C. D. 33.

224. **Insufficient Grounds.** An interference proceed-
ing will not be suspended to permit a party to take out a patent upon a closely allied invention, merely because through the interference the opposing party might learn of such other application. *Field*, 130 O. G. 1687 (1906).

The taking of testimony on the question of priority will not be suspended until the question of the right to make the claims has been determined. *Hewitt v. Weintraub*, etc., 128 O. G. 1689 (1907).

**Ex Parte Rights.** Proceedings will not be stayed to consider ex parte rights, since such rights should be considered after decision on priority. *Dunbar v. Schellen- ger*, 121 O. G. 687 (1905); *Mark v. Greenewalt*, 118 O. G. 1068 (1905).

The fact that one of the parties to an interference has a patent and has an infringement suit pending against the other party, is no ground for suspending the proceedings in the interference. *McBr ide v. Kemp*, 109 O. G. 1069. Nor is the fact that it is alleged that joint applicants are not joint inventors, since that is a question which may be determined on final hearing. *Robinson v. Muller & Bonnet*, 110 O. G. 1429.

225. **Interference Terminated as to Some Parties—Effect of Stay.** A stay of proceedings after the termination of an interference as to some of the parties, only operates as to the remainder of such parties. *Swaren v. Sandage, etc.*, 17 Gour. 34-1 (April, 1905).

226. **Resumption—Suspended to Hear Motion.** Where proceedings are suspended to hear a motion, they are resumed on the date the motion is finally determined, and no notice of resumption, other than notice of the decision, is necessary. *Greuter v. Mathieu*, 112 O. G. 253; *Blackman v. Alexander*, 105 O. G. 2059 (1903). But in *Hewitt v. Steinmetz*, 122 O. G. 1396 (1906), it was held that times fixed for taking testimony do not commence to run after suspension of proceedings for consideration of motions for dissolution, until the cases are returned to
the Examiner of Interferences and formal notice of resumption of proceedings is noted.

227. Appeal—Effect of Stay. If a stay of proceedings is obtained after a decision is made and the time for appeal is fixed, such stay stops the running of time for appeal, but the time for appeal begins to run again as soon as the stay is ended and whatever time shall have expired between the time the limit of appeal was fixed and the granting of the stay, is lost to the party who obtains the stay, and he has only the remainder of the time originally fixed for appeal. Blackman v. Alexander, 105 O. G. 2059 (1903).

- Order of Suspension Modified After Appeal. An order suspending proceedings may be modified after appeal, provided the questions presented on appeal are not affected thereby. Herrshoff v. Knietzch, 111 O. G. 1624.

After Appeal Stay Unnecessary. After a party has appealed no stay of proceedings is necessary, but if the circumstances make it necessary to have more time for taking some action, the proper practice would be to ask that the hearing on appeal be continued. Robinson v. Townsend v. Copeland, 106 O. G. 997 (1903).

Appeal to the Court of Appeals—Time For Not Stayed. The office can not stay the running of time for appeal to the Court of Appeals, D. C., because that is a matter controlled by the rules of the court. Clement v. Richards v. Weissner, 16 Gour. 52-10.

RES ADJUDICATA.

228. Successive Interferences—Res Adjudicata. Where after final decision in an interference, claims are presented by the losing party which are such that they would dominate the subject matter upon which the other party prevailed, the decision in the interference would be res adjudicata. In re Curtiss, 238 O. G. 650, 46 App. D. C. 183.

As to claims involved in a second interference between
the same parties which could have been made in the first interference on the question of priority, the first decision is res adjudicata. *Hopkins v. Newman*, 131 O. G. 1161 (1907).

229. **What Questions Are Determined by Interference.** A final decision in an interference proceeding, as between the parties thereto, is conclusive as to all questions which were or could have been presented and determined by that proceeding. *Blackford v. Wilder*, 28 App. D. C. 535, 127 O. G. 1255 (1907); *Surfert v. Meyer*, 109 O. G. 1885; *Cross v. Rusby*, 42 App. D. C. 227, 204 O. G. 1347; *Horine v. Wende*, 29 App. D. C. 415; 1907 C. D. 615.

230. **Second Interference—When Allowed.** Second interferences will be allowed only under exceptional circumstances and will not ordinarily be declared upon claims to the same device differing from the first issue merely in scope. *Corey & Baker v. Trout v. McDermott*, 110 O. G. 306.

Second Interference—Rule 109. The purpose of Rule 109 is to avoid second interferences, and where a party fails to take advantage of that rule he loses the right to contest the question of priority as to the claims made by his opponent. *Sutton, Steele & Steele*, 121 O. G. 1012 (1906).

231. **Judgments in Interferences.** There are two kinds of judgments in interferences, interlocutory and final judgments.

A final judgment is one which determines the rights of the parties in the matter in controversy, or a definite branch of it and reserves no further question for future determination, but a judgment may be final though it does not determine the rights of the parties if it ends the suit.

An interlocutory judgment is one which does not dispose of the suit but reserves some further question for future determination.
An interference is for the purpose of determining who, as between the parties to it, was the first in point of time to invent the subject matter in issue.

In declaring the interference the Examiner settles to his own satisfaction all preliminary questions which must be determined in order that the question of priority may be investigated and determined by final judgment. To do this he determines that the issue is patentable; that it is properly declared so that there may be a proper determination of the question of priority; that each of the parties has the right to make the claims and who are the senior and junior parties. If any party desires to question the correctness of his conclusions he should do so by appropriate motions provided by the rules of practice, as for instance, if he wishes to question the decision as to whether he is a junior or the senior party, he should move to shift the burden of proof. A decision on this motion would be an interlocutory judgment from which there is no appeal, but which may be presented again on appeal from the final decision on priority. If a party believes the issue is not patentable he moves to dissolve the interference for that reason and if upon this motion the Law Examiner holds the issue is not patentable, this is a final judgment and puts an end to the interference unless one or more of the parties appeal and obtain a reversal of the judgment. This though a final judgment, is not a final judgment on priority, there being no question of priority involved. The foregoing are given as illustrations of interlocutory and final judgments.

231a. What Questions Should Be Presented by Motions. All questions, except those involving priority, should be presented by appropriate motions as provided in the rules. Some questions which should first be presented by motion may also be urged at final hearing as involving the question of priority, illustrations of which will be
found in Sec. 154a. Questions ancillary to the question of priority are set forth in Sec. 192.

232. Res Adjudicata. When a second suit is upon the same cause of action, and between the same parties as the first, the judgment in the former is conclusive in the latter as to every question which was or might have been presented and determined in the first action; but when the second suit is upon a different cause of action, though between the same parties, the judgment in the former action operates as an estoppel only as to the point or question actually litigated and determined, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. Nesbit v. Riverside Independent District, 144 U. S. 610, 618; New Orleans v. Citizen's Bank, 167 U. S. 371, 386; S. P. R. R. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1, 48. It was held that the doctrine as above stated is applicable to decisions of the Patent Office. It was therefore held in Blackford v. Wilder, 127 O. G. 1255 (1907), 28 App. D. C. 535; Wende v. Horine, 129 O. G. 2858, 29 App. D. C. 415, and In re Marconi, 179 O. G. 577, 38 App. D. C. 286, that the losing party in an interference can not, after the interference, present claims which will dominate the issue involved in the interference. In other words, the party who prevails in the interference is by reason of the judgment of priority given the right to the subject matter involved and it can not afterward be given to another without taking it from him, and the question of his right to it having been fairly tried, he should not and can not be forced to retry the question, except upon appeal. See also Carroll v. Hallwood, 135 O. G. 896, 31 App. D. C. 165.

The fact that a party has a right under the statute to bring an action in equity to obtain a patent notwithstanding such judgment of priority, does not lessen the force of the foregoing decisions, since this is a right granted by statute to retry the issues and must be
availed of in accordance with the provisions of the statute.

In harmony also with the foregoing decisions is the later case of *Rusby v. Cross*, 204 O. G. 321, 42 App. D. C. 341. Rusby prevailed in the interference. He then presented claims dominating certain claims of a patent inadvertently issued to Cross, the claims of which were not involved in the interference. Because Cross could have presented these claims but failed to do so, it was held that the judgment of priority awarded Rusby was res adjudicata as to those claims. Each party was demanding a right to the claims which formed the subject matter of the interference and it was incumbent on each party to present whatever facts he could to sustain his right thereto. A winning party in an interference should not be disturbed in the full enjoyment of that which he has won, nor should he be penalized by further litigation for which there is no excuse other than that his opponent neglected to present all the facts which he could have presented.

233. **Broad Claims Presented After Termination of Interference—Res Adjudicata.** Where after termination of an interference involving only narrow claims, the winning party takes out a patent on the narrow claims, not claiming the invention broadly, and the losing party establishes by competent evidence that he made another species of the invention patentably different from that involved in the interference prior to the date of invention established by his opponent, he is entitled to a claim broad enough to cover both forms of the invention notwithstanding the adverse decision in the interference. Such is the holding by the Board of Examiners in Chief. *In re Kluhn*, 241 O. G. 623; 1917 C. D. 7 (See Estoppel, Sec. 242).

In *Temple v. Goodrum*, 176 O. G. 526, the losing party in the interference, after judgment on priority, presented claims which read upon his own case and the two
other cases with which he had been involved but which could not have been added to that interference because of a decision in another interference adverse to one of the parties. These claims were held res adjudicata because the applicant could have presented and contested them with the other party who could have made them, concurrently with the other interfering subject matter.

In Frickey v. Ogden, 199 O. G. 307, it was held that where during the pendency of an interference between Ogden and Cornwall, but too late to be added thereto, an application was filed by Frickey which was assigned to the same party as that of Cornwall and it appeared that the assignee controlled both inventions and could have filed the application of Frickey in time for it to have been included in the interference between Ogden and Cornwall, but neglected to do so, he was estopped to contest further with Ogden the subject matter thereof.

234. Motion to Dissolve—When Judgment is Res Adjudicata. When a motion to dissolve on the ground that a party has no right to make the claims is sustained and no appeal is taken, such judgment is final as to the right of the losing party to a patent, or in other words, it is res adjudicata in the further prosecution of his application. U. S. ex rel. Newcomb Motor Co. v. Moore, 133 O. G. 1680, 30 App. D. C. 464.

Motion to Dissolve—Unpatentability. Since every applicant is entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeals on the patentability of his claims and since motions to dissolve can be carried no farther than the Commissioner, the dissolution on this ground is not conclusive against the parties. Gold v. Gold, 150 O. G. 570, 34 App. D. C. 229.

Right of Prevailing Party to Patent—Not Res Adjudicata. The right of the prevailing party in an interference to a patent is not conclusively determined by a judgment of priority because it may be that a statutory bar exists such as public use. After the interference is
terminated public use proceedings may be instituted and the issue in such case is not one of priority, nor is it confined to the structures or parties to the interference. *In re Pittsburgh Brake Shoe Co.*, 176 O. G. 750 (1912); *Gueniffet, etc. v. Wietorsohn*, 134 O. G. 255, 134 O. G. 779, 30 App. D. C. 432.

235. Prior Motion—Res Adjudicata. Where a party makes a motion he must set up all that he can offer in support thereof as he is precluded from bringing another motion upon the same ground. *Townsend v. Ehret, etc.*, 137 O. G. 1485 (1908); *Townsend v. Thullen v. Young*, 137 O. G. 1710 (1908).

236. Judgment of Priority—Effect. Under the rules and practice of the Patent Office the decision of the Examiner of Interferences on a declared interference determines only the question of priority of invention in time as between the parties, and the party against whom the decision is rendered may still contend that the successful party is not entitled to the claims made, and he is not concluded upon the question of his right to a patent until the expiration of the time allowed him by statute for an appeal from the final order rejecting his application. *Westinghouse v. Hien, et al.*, 159 Fed. 936.

A judgment in an interference is to the effect that the losing party is not the first inventor of the subject matter in issue and he is therefore not entitled to a patent as to that issue. But such judgment is not conclusive against the losing party under all circumstances, for, it may appear that subsequent to the rendition of the judgment the prevailing party abandoned his application, never in any way gave his invention to the public and never took out his patent. And where the judgment was rendered upon the record because the losing party failed to produce any testimony to support his preliminary statement, the prevailing party was not required to take testimony and the judgment was therefore based upon the applications, there being no evidence of actual
reduction to practice by either party. In such case, if the prevailing party, after judgment, permits his application to become abandoned and has in no way given his invention to the public, he has not completed the act of invention by in any manner giving the public the benefit of his invention. Since an abandoned application is not a bar to the granting of a patent to another, the losing party in such interference, if he has kept his application alive, is entitled to a patent on the issue notwithstanding such judgment of priority. It was held in Ex parte Phelps, 176 O. G. 525, that a judgment of priority was a bar to the claims of the losing party, even though the prevailing party had permitted his application to become abandoned after judgment and there was no testimony taken in the interference to show an actual reduction to practice by the prevailing party. But in Joliffe v. Waldo v. Vermer & Schorick, 234 O. G. 671 (1916), Commissioner Ewing did not agree with the reasoning in Ex parte Phelps, 176 O. G. 525, and held that the losing party under such circumstances was entitled to a patent notwithstanding the judgment of priority against him. See also Fanslow v. Whitney, 266 O. G. 742 (1910).

237. Judgment on the Record—When Not Permissible. Where a junior party to an interference alleges in his preliminary statement a date of conception of the invention in issue prior to the senior party's filing date, but the other dates alleged are subsequent thereto, an order to show cause why judgment should not be rendered on the record should not be granted, as, conception might be proved as alleged. Peters v. Hopkins & Dement, 150 O. G. 1044, 34 App. D. C. 141.

238. Motion for Judgment on the Record—Question Raised. A motion for judgment on the record in an interference does not present the case for final hearing on the merits, but raises only the question of the sufficiency of the allegations of the preliminary statements of the opposing parties, admitting their truth for the purposes
of the motion only. *Lindmark v. De Ferranti*, 153 O. G. 1082, 34 App. D. C. 445. But where the junior party in his preliminary statement fails to allege a date of conception earlier than the filing date of his opponent, judgment of priority will be awarded to the senior party on the record. *Neth & Tamplin v. Ohmer*, 123 O. G. 998.

In response to a motion to show cause why judgment should not be rendered upon the record, a party may move to dissolve the interference. *Field v. Colman*, 131 O. G. 1686 (1907); *Felbel v. Fox*, 130 O. G. 2375 (1907); *Jarvis v. de Focatiis*, 20 Gour. 66-4 (Mar., 1908).

239. For Failure to File Preliminary Statement. Where a party fails to file any preliminary statement and his filing date is later than that of one of his opponents, an order will be made to show cause why judgment should not be entered against him. If he fails to respond to this order judgment will be rendered that he is not the first inventor, but where there are several parties such judgment is not a holding that he was the last of all the parties to make the invention. *Dutcher v. Matthew, etc.*, 118 O. G. 2538 (1905).

240. For Failure to Print Testimony. Judgment of priority will be awarded against a junior party who fails to print his testimony. *Brown v. Gillett*, 191 O. G. 832 (1913).

241. For Failure to Take Testimony. When the time for taking testimony has expired and no testimony has been taken or filed by either party, it is the duty of the Examiner of Interferences to award priority to the senior party under Rule 116. *Brough v. Snyder*, 94 O. G. 221; 1901 C. D. 3.

ESTOPPEL.


By Concealment. (See title Concealment).
To Deny Validity of Patent After Contesting an Interference. Where a party has made application for a patent on the invention and contested an interference in regard to it, the contention against his successful rival that the invention is not patentable does not come with good grace. *R. Thomas & Sons Co. v. The Electric Porcelain & Mfg. Co., et al.*, 111 Fed. 923, 97 O. G. 1838; 1901 C. D. 510. Nevertheless a defeated party in an interference is not stopped to deny the validity of the patent granted on his opponent's application. *Automatic Racking Machine Co. v. White Racker Co.*, 145 Fed. 643, 645.

To Make Claim After Rights or Third Parties Have Intervened. A party is not estopped from subsequently making a claim to an invention unless there is a failure of the specification to disclose it. The absence of a definite and special claim for an invention when the application was originally filed does not act as an estoppel to the subsequent making of the claim. In *Beckman v. Wood*, 89 O. G. 2462, and *Mickle v. Read*, 18 App. D. C. 128, 96 O. G. 426, it was held that where there are intervening rights an applicant may not broaden his claims to destroy those rights. *Furman v. Dean*, 114 O. G. 1552.

By Failure to Appeal. Where action is taken by the office upon motion to dissolve an interference from which an appeal may be taken in the interference and the opportunity for such appeal is neglected, an ex parte appeal thereafter upon the same matter will not be entertained except where the right of appeal is statutory. *Newcomb v. Thompson*, 122 O. G. 3012 (1906).

242a. By Failure to Make Claims Under Rule 109. The purpose of Rule 109 is to avoid a second interference, and where a party fails to take advantage of that rule he loses his right to contest the question of priority as to the claims made by his opponent. *Sutton v. Steele & Steele*, 121 O. G. 1012 (1906).

By Admissions of Solicitor in Prosecution of Applica-
tion. A party is estopped to deny admissions made by his solicitor in the prosecution of his application. Weissenthanner v. Dodge Metallic Cup Co., 156 Fed. 365, 368.

243. Judicial Notice. Since the Commissioner of Patents may take judicial notice of facts adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United States in a cause passed upon by that court, he may for a stronger reason act upon knowledge derived from a search of the records of litigation and decisions made in his own department even though such records have not been formally introduced in evidence. *In Re Marconi*, 179 O. G. 577, 38 App. D. C. 286; 1912 C. D. 483; *In re Drawbaugh*, 1896 C. D. 527, 77 O. G. 313; 9 App. D. C. 219; *McDermott*, 15 Gour. 88-26 (Oct., 1903).

The Commissioner takes judicial notice of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, D. C. Tournier, 108 O. G. 798.

Facts of which the tribunal before whom the cause is tried, is bound to take judicial notice, need not be proven. *Ball v. Flora*, 121 O. G. 2668 (1905).


While the court takes notice of its own records, it can not travel for this purpose out of the records relating to the particular case. Thus in one case the court can not take notice of the proceedings in another case, unless such proceedings are put in evidence. Wharton on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 326.

The court can not in one case take judicial notice of the records in a different case, even though pending in the same court. Nor will it take judicial notice in a given case of the pendency of proceedings in other causes in the same court, much less of those of other courts. Jones on Evidence, Sec. 129.

Special Knowledge of the Judge. A judge has no right to act upon his own personal or special knowledge of
facts, as distinguished from that general knowledge which might be important to other persons of intelligence, since if the judge knows anything which would aid one of the parties he should be called from his place as judge and become a witness. Jones on Evidence, Sec. 133.

MOTIONS.

244. (See Forms, Dissolution, Preliminary Statement, Hearing, Burden of Proof, Stay of Proceedings.)

Interlocutory Motions—What Are Permitted. Interlocutory motions are not permitted upon matters which can not be determined from a consideration of the application and office-records and which require the taking of proofs. Cory, et al. v. Blakey, 115 O. G. 1328.

Piecemeal prosecution is against the policy of the office, and hence a party may not make a motion which embodies but a part of his grounds for relief and after that has been determined, file other motions for other reasons which could have been and should have been included in the first motion. Williams v. Webster v. Sprague, 148 O. G. 280 (1909); Egly v. Schultz, 117 O. G. 276 (1905).

To Dissolve Interference. (See Dissolution.)

To Transmit Motions. Where a party desires to present a question which can not be passed upon by the particular tribunal before whom the case is at the time pending because of lack of jurisdiction to hear the motion, it is necessary to make a motion to transmit the motion to such tribunal. A motion to transmit should be accompanied by the motion which is to be transmitted. Under the present rules such motions are filed before and passed upon by the Commissioner. If in the opinion of the Commissioner the motion be not in proper form, or if it be not brought within the time specified and no satisfactory reason be given for the delay, it will not be transmitted. Rule 122. If the motion is transmitted,
it is sent to the Law Examiner for his opinion thereon. Under the former practice and under which most of the decisions elsewhere considered under the head of "dissolution" were rendered, a motion to transmit a motion to dissolve was filed before the Examiner of Interferences and if granted, the original motion then went to the Primary Examiner for determination. Since the change in the rules relate to the jurisdiction of the official who is authorized to pass upon the same, it is believed that the decisions under the old rules will apply under the new rules in so far as the form and merits of such motions are concerned.

To Shift the Burden of Proof. Motions to shift the burden of proof should be filed before and decided by the Examiner of Interferences. Rule 122 (See Burden of Proof).

To Amend Preliminary Statement. (See Preliminary Statement—Amendment of.)

To Postpone Time for Filing Preliminary Statement. Rule 104. (See Preliminary Statement.)

To Postpone Hearing. (Rules 120-153. See Hearing.)

To Extend Time for Taking Testimony. The granting or refusing of a motion to extend time for taking of testimony is wholly within the discretion of the Examiner of Interferences and no appeal lies from his decision upon such motion, though in extreme cases where an abuse of discretion is shown, resulting in great hardship to a party, the ruling may be reviewed on appeal. Goodfellow v. Jolly, 115 O. G. 1064; 1905 C. D. 105; Christensen v. McKenzie, 117 O. G. 277; 1905 C. D. 238; Dalton v. Hopkins, 121 O. G. 2666 (1906).

Delay in bringing the motion may result in its refusal. Donning v. Anderson, 111 O. G. 582. And where a party made no effort to take testimony as to priority within the time set, but devoted his time to the investigation of public use of the invention, it was held
that an extension of time was properly refused. *Per-

The motion should clearly set forth the grounds upon which the extension is asked and state why the testimony could not be taken during the time originally allowed. *Reynolds v. Beau*, 101 O. G. 2821; 1902 C. D. 461. The motion should be brought before the time originally set has expired. *Turner v. Benzinger*, 102 O. G. 1552 (1903); *Byron v. Henry*, 104 O. G. 1895 (1903). A party may not voluntarily put himself in a position where his testimony can not be taken and then ask to be relieved of his own fault or negligence, as such action will be regarded as a waiver of his right to take testi-

Since the granting or refusing a motion to extend time for taking testimony is a matter within the discre-
tion of the Examiner of Interferences, each motion pre-
sented must rest upon its own inherent merits. It would seem that the rules of the courts in granting continu-
ances should be made applicable to motions of this char-
acter, though it seems that the office has not thus far applied such rules, as where an extension is asked because of the inability of a party to procure the testi-
mony of a certain witness, three elements should concur: (1) Materiality and admissibility of the evidence; (2) due diligence; (3) an affirmative showing that the ab-
sent witness can and will be produced at a future time.

To Suppress Testimony. (See Testimony—Suppres-
sion of.)

To Take Testimony in a Foreign Country. Rule 158.

To Amend Issue. Rule 109. (See Issue—Amend-
ment.)

To Add Further Counts. (See Issue.)

For Rehearing. (See Hearing.)

244a. To Amend a Motion. Where a party makes a motion which if found to be not in proper form, he may cure the defect by a motion to amend the motion, pro-
vided it appears that he is acting in good faith and that the same was brought within the time for appeal from the decision upon the former motion. *Gold v. Gold*, 131 O. G. 1422 (1907); *Rochstock v. Warmock*, 132 O. G. 234; *McQuarrie v. Manson*, 142 O. G. 288 (1909).

For Judgment of the Record. Rule 119. (See Judgment.)


**APPEALS.**

245. To the Examiners in Chief. Sec. 4909 R. S. "Every party to an interference may appeal from the decision of the Primary Examiner, or of the Examiner in charge of interferences in such case, to the Board of Examiners in Chief." Rules 143, 144, 145 and 146.

Sec. 4910 R. S. "If such party is dissatisfied with the decision of the Examiners in Chief, he may appeal to the Commissioner in person."

Extent of Right to Appeal. The right to appeal to the Examiners in Chief in interference cases created by statute was to review the question of priority and such ancillary questions as the Examiner had passed upon in deciding the question of priority for which the interference is instituted. *Allen Cour. v. U. S. ex rel. Lowry, et al.*, 116 O. G. 2253 (1905).

Ancillary questions which go to the question of priority and which have been passed upon by the various tribunals of the Patent Office and Court of Appeals, D. C., are set forth in this work under title of Relevant Testimony, Sec. 192.


246. To the Court of Appeals, D. C. In interference cases the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Commissioner in but one class of decisions, viz., final awards of priority. Decisions on motions are interlocutory judgments on which no appeal lies to the Court of Appeals. No award of priority may be made on motion to dissolve and before proofs are taken, not even in a case where the motion is based upon the ground that a party has no right to make the claims. If the motion is denied, the soundness of the ruling is a question ancillary to the final judgment of priority, as in Podelsak v. McInnerney, 26 App. D. C. 399. If the motion is sustained, it ends the interference and no cause of action survives or exists upon which an order of priority can be based. Since the statute imposes on the Commissioner the power to declare in interference without right of appeal, he may also dissolve it without right of appeal. In Cosper v. Gold, 34 App. D. C. 194, the Commissioner dissolved the interference on the ground that Cosper had no right to make the claims. On the first appeal the Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction because there had been no judgment of priority rendered. Thereupon the Commissioner entered a judgment of priority upon the ground that Cosper had no right to make the claims, and the question of priority hinged upon the question as to whether Cosper had a right to make the claims. Where there has been no hearing upon the question of priority no award of priority can be made on motion to dissolve. Carlin v. Goldberg, 45 App. D. C. 540, 236 O. G. 1222; 1917 C. D. 128.

Questions Which May Be Presented on Appeal on Priority as Ancillary Thereto. (See Sec. 192.)

247. Questions Not Considered. As we have already seen, no question will be considered on appeal except that of priority and such questions as are ancillary thereto. The court has declined to consider: that a showing made is not sufficient to establish that the delay in prosecution of the application was unavoidable. In re Carvalho, 250 O. G. 514, 47 App. D. C. 584. Patentability


### 247a. Questions Presented for the First Time on Appeal


### 248. Assignment of Errors—Scope of

On an appeal to the Examiners in Chief from a decision of the Examiner of Interferences, an assignment of error which assails the decision of the Examiner of Interferences in awarding priority on the whole case to the opposing party is sufficient to preserve the appellant’s right to argue the question of res adjudicata by reason of a judgment in a prior interference. *Carroll v. Hallwood*, 135 O. G. 896 (1908), 31 App. D. C. 165.

**Amendment of Assignment of Errors.** No provision is made in either the Court Rules or the Rules of the Pat-
ent Office for amendment of assignment of errors, but amendment may be permitted upon a proper showing, where no injury could be done the opposing party. Horine v. Wende, 129 O. G. 2858 (1907), 29 App. D. C. 415.


250. Reversal on Questions of Law. While the decisions of the Patent Office on questions of fact will ordinarily be followed, such is not the rule where matters of law are involved. Orcutt v. McDonald, Jr., 123 O. G. 1287 (1906), 27 App. D. C. 228; Bourn v. Hill, 125 O. G. 1284 (1906), 27 App. D. C. 291.

251. The Record on Appeal. The court will not consider affidavits filed either in the court or in the Patent Office, relating to changes that may have occurred, in drawings, models, or exhibits and the like, after the same have been introduced in evidence, and has pointed out that to guard against such possibility parties should describe exhibits at the time they are introduced in evidence. If any corrections are to be made in the record they should be made in the Patent Office before the record is certified to the Court of Appeals. Blackford v. Wilder, 104 O. G. 580 (1903), 21 App. D. C. 1; Green-

Where error in suppressing testimony is alleged, the suppressed testimony must be made a part of the record. Jones v. Starr, 117 O. G. 1495, 26 App. D. C. 64.

252. Extending Time for Filing Record. The Commissioner may not extend time for giving notice of appeal, but he may extend the time for filing the transcript of the record. In Elements v. Richards, 111 O. G. 1626, it was held that the Commissioner has no authority to extend the limit of appeal to the Court of Appeals, as that is fixed by the rules of the court.

253. Appeals to the Commissioner. Appeals to the Commissioner in Interferences are permissible under Rules 124, 139 and 143. Regulations respecting the presentation of such appeals are provided in Rules 144, 145 and 146. In general a party may appeal from a judgment against him on priority of invention. Certain questions have arisen in interferences and which have been designated in various decisions as questions ancillary to that of priority. The questions which have been considered by the Court of Appeals, D. C., as ancillary to priority, are referred to elsewhere under Relevant Testimony, Sec. 192. Such questions having been taken into consideration by the court as properly relating to priority of invention, they may be presented to the various tribunals of the Patent Office and appeal taken to the Commissioner from adverse rulings thereon by the Examiners in Chief. But the jurisdiction of the Commissioner being more extensive than that of the Court of Appeals, D. C., he may take into consideration on appeal matters which will not be considered by the court.
For the sake of orderly procedure the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, has promulgated the Rules of Practice in which provision is made for appeals on certain questions and the right of appeal denied as to others. The rules are designed to be in strict accordance with the Revised Statutes relating to the grant of patents. Questions which are appealable under the rules should be presented by appeal in conformity with such rules, but where a party desires to present to the Commissioner a question on which the rules do not provide for appeal, he must do so by petition. (See Petitions.)

254. Patentability of the Issue. On appeals on priority, the patentability of the issue will be considered only under extraordinary circumstances which will warrant the exercise of the supervisory authority of the Commissioner to correct a manifest error. *Lacroix v. Tybery*, 148 O. G. 831 (1908); *Dixon & Marsh v. Graves*, 130 O. G. 2374 (1907); *Sorrell v. Donnelly*, 129 O. G. 2501 (1907); *Potter v. McIntosh*, 122 O. G. 1721 (1906); *Sobey v. Holsclaw*, 119 O. G. 1922 (1905).

Where the Examiners in Chief recommend under Rule 126, that the issue is not patentable, the Commissioner will not pass upon the patentability of the issue at this stage of the proceedings, but may suspend the interference and remand the question to the Primary Examiner, from whose decision an appeal may be taken as in other cases. Rule 126. *Sorrell v. Donnelly*, 129 O. G. 2501 (1907). Where the Examiner of Interferences or the Examiners in Chief refuse to make any recommendation under Rule 126, such refusal will not be reviewed on appeal. *Wert v. Borst*, 122 O. G. 2062 (1906).

255. Petitions in Interferences. It is well settled that a matter will not be considered on petition if the rules provide adequate remedies by appeal. An aggrieved party must follow the regular course of procedure provided by the rules and should only invoke the supervi-
sory authority of the Commissioner under circumstances where he has no other remedy and in a clear case. *Brown v. Gammeter*, 132 O. G. 679 (1908); *Cazin*, 20 Gour. 86-15 (Dec., 1908); *Numan v. Ashley*, 175 O. G. 1098 (1912).

256. Right of Appeal Denied—in What Cases. No appeal lies where the rules specifically provide that a question is not appealable. And it has been held that where a motion to amend the issue is denied because the opposing party can not make the claim, no appeal lies to the Commissioner. *Stronach v. Shaw*, 192 O. G. 989 (1913); *Mortimer v. Thomas*, 192 O. G. 215 (1913); or from a decision which would not constitute a ground for rejecting the claims in the application of the moving party after the termination of the interference. *Mortimer v. Thomas*, 192 O. G. 215 (1913). Or where a motion to dissolve an interference is based on the ground of irregularity in declaring the same because of the alleged inoperativeness of the opposing party’s structure. *Seacombe v. Burks*, 182 O. G. 973 (1912). Or the granting of a motion to add counts under Rule 109. *Leonard v. Pardee*, 164 O. G. 249 (1911). *Degen v. Pfadt*, 133 O. G. 514 (1908). Or from a decision of the Primary Examiner as to the sufficiency of a notice as to matters not of record which are to be presented at the hearing on motion to dissolve, except in cases of abuse of discretion. *Thieme v. Bowen*, 21 Gour. 70-13 (Aug., 1909). Or upon the admissibility of affidavits filed with a motion to dissolve, if no appeal lies from the decision on the motion to dissolve. *Brown v. Inwood*, 131 O. G. 1423 (1907). Or from a decision of the Examiner of Interferences extending time for taking testimony, nor will the question be considered on petition, except in a clear case of abuse of discretion. *Wickers v. Weinwurm*, 129 O. G. 2501 (1907). Or the granting of a motion to take testimony abroad. *Keith v. Lundquist*, 128 O. G. 2835 (1907). Or from a decision denying a motion to